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**Drivers of Urban Livelihoods in Informal Settlements  
in Mysore and Pune**

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## Zur Reihe der Arbeitsberichte

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## Abbreviation Index

AR	Action Research
ASI	Annual Survey of Industries
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BPL	Below Poverty Line
BSUP	Basic Service to urban poor programme
BVIEER	Bharati Vidyapeeth Institute of Environment Education and Research
CLTC	city level technical cell
ESCI	Employee's State Insurance Corporation
GDP	Grand Domestic Product
INR	Indian Rupee
ISOZ	Institute of Sociology
JNNURM	Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
KKPKP	Kagad Kach Patra Kastakari Panchayat
KSDB	Karnataka Slum Development Board
MCC	Mysore City Corporation
MSDF	Mysore Slum Dwellers Federation
MUDA	Mysore Urban Development Authority
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIE-Crest	National Institute of Engineering - Centre for Renewable Energy & Sustainable Technologies
NSSO	National Sample Survey Commission
NULM	National Urban Livelihood Mission
OvGU	Otto-von-Guericke University
PHC	Primary Health Care
PHCC	Primary Health Care Centre
PM	Prime Minister
PMC	Pune Municipal Corporation
PMJDY	Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana
PPP	Public Private Partnership
RAY	Rajiv Awas Yojana
RLHP	Rural Literacy and Health Project
RSBY	Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
RTE	Right to Education
SLA	Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
SRA	Slum Rehabilitation Authority Schemes
SWaCH	Solid Waste Collection and Handling
SWM	Solid Waste Management
WHO	World Health Organisation

## Preface

For some time now the Institute of Sociology (ISOZ) has been involved in studying Indian social structure, living and working conditions in informal settlements. After two excursions in 2004 and 2007 (cooperation with the University of Mumbai, Department of Sociology and the TATA Institute of Social Science in Mumbai), in 2014 a group of master students visited Pune (Bharati Vidyapeeth Institute of Environment Education and Research, BVIEER) and Mysore (National Institute of Engineering - Centre for Renewable Energy & Sustainable Technologies, NIE-Crest) to do qualitative research under the topic of “Drivers of urban livelihoods in informal settlements”.

Teaching on these issues involves a distinctive feature: Excellent students from social science and peace and conflict studies are invited to participate in research work (so-called students’ research training programmes, in German: “Lehrforschungen”). The whole process takes a period of one or 1 1/2 years and involves four working-steps: initially, background knowledge on India is collected (phase 0). In the following the research frame is set: the students select a research topic, collect and analyse secondary material, develop a research design, work on research methodology, and finally write a research proposal (phase 1). The field research is accomplished in cooperation with lecturers and students of partner universities (phase 2). Finally, the data is analysed and the research report is written (phase 3).

Besides scientific aims this training programme involves students experiencing a very different culture, providing an insight into the life-world and anthropology of those they encounter, the work of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as other organisations in the field, and giving prospects to the working technique of social science.

In 2004/2005 a group of students conducted research on the life-world in Mumbai slums (cf. ISOZ 2005, Working Paper No. 36). Their findings included the strong segregation of Mumbai population in slums according to religion, place of origin, or ethnicity. They also collected a lot of information on housing policy in Mumbai. In spring 2007 students worked on social activism in Mumbai slums and on communalism and anti-communalist movements (cf. ISOZ 2009, Working Paper No. 54). The 2014 research group examined five different topics related to the population of informal settlements in a rapidly changing and growing environment. Now the research report is available. Due to the number of authors involved they decided to publish under the group name “Magdeburg Research Group on Informal Settlements in Pune and Mysore”. To mention the individual authors: Mauno Gerritzen, Josephine Hartwig, Katharina Koller, Moritz Lehmann, Hannah Schmidt, Luisa Scholz, Hans Stanka, Nora Wagner, Stephanie Walter, Lisa Wassermann, Corinna Würzberger.

Due to the contribution of several individuals with every author having his or her own style of writing, only a standardisation of layout was aspired but not an adjustment of the different styles (e.g. tenses). Furthermore, the research report is subdivided in two parts: PART ONE contains the collectively and corporately compiled scientific groundwork such as an introduction to the research field, theoretical and methodological considerations. PART TWO more deeply focuses on the five different group

works which symbolises different aspects of the sustainable livelihood approach and all together contribute to the common conclusion.

We are thankful to the cooperating and hosting institutes, particularly Prof. Shamita Kumar, her colleagues and team from BVIEER, and Prof. S. Shamsundar and team from NIE-Crest, the Indian students and PhD students working with us as interpreters, and all informants in the field, and Dr. Regine Schönenberg (Berlin) who took part in preparation and in the field. We also thank the financing institutions (Foreign Academic Office) and Co-Financiers at the University of Magdeburg (Institute, Students' Council, Faculty).

Magdeburg, June 2015

Heiko Schrader (project leader)

# **PART ONE**

## A. Introduction

“Vegetable sellers, milkmen, grocers, washermen, *newspaperwallahs*, weavers, artisan, flower-sellers, and so on – you all are the backbone of our nation” (Modi 2015).

With this statement Prime Minister Modi addresses the small business men and women of India and emphasises their significance. Almost 84 percent of India’s population works in the non-agricultural field in informal employment (ILO 2012: 4; numbers from 2009/2010). Nonetheless, this population group is often marginalised and their life is characterised by great insecurity arising from different factors. One reason for this is that many people who are working in the informal economy are living in so-called slums or informal settlements<sup>1</sup>; this counts for 17.4 percent of India’s urban population (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2013: 13). A possible explanation for the development of informal settlements can be that India has witnessed a rapid population growth and urbanisation in the last decades (World Bank 2013). Nowadays, India is known as one of the most highly populated countries in the world, second place after China (German Institute for Population and Development 2009: 1), with one of the largest concentrations of mega cities (UN DESA 2014: 26f)<sup>2</sup>. Cities “are magnets that cause hundreds of thousands of landless people to migrate (push-pull factors), trying to improve their living conditions” (Schrader 2004: 1). Those push and pull factors are considered to be the prospects of access to employment, health and education. A result of this rapid urbanisation and drastic population growth is that space gets scarce and people start to live on any free space without a formal organisation or permission. Additionally, the population growth is not correlated with an increasing amount of tax incomes as most people of informal settlements are, if at all, working in the informal sector.<sup>3</sup> This adds to the pressure Indian city administrative are facing already in terms of providing infrastructure, education and health care facilities, managing solid waste and waste water management – most Indian cities are simply overstrained by this huge amount of inhabitants.

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<sup>1</sup> We use the terms ‘slum’ and ‘informal settlement’ synonymously. We hereby refer to settlements which were neither officially recognised nor incorporated by city planning authorities at the time of their establishment. The term ‘slum’ was subject of vivid discussions. It has been exploited politically both in favour and against slum populations and the settlements. It is not our aim to take part in this discussion. Therefore, we use the wide definition suggested above. For further reading: c.f. Davis (2006), Garside (1988), Gilbert (2007), UN Habitat (2003).

<sup>2</sup> There is no universally accepted definition of ‘megacity’ (see e.g. Kraas 2007). In quantitative terms megacities will be defined to be metropolises with a population of over five million inhabitants. According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA 2014: 26f) India has nine megacities: Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Ahmadabad, Pune and Surat.

<sup>3</sup> However, this does not imply, one can generally refer to slums as low-income habitats. During our research we encountered multiple definitions of the term ‘low-income’. A starting point may be the political category ‘below poverty line’ (BPL). According to the Corporator of J.P. Nagar BPL implies an income of less than 100.000 INR per year. The official line seems to be at an income less than 47 INR per day in urban areas (Choudhury 2015). However, we believe that such a narrow definition in monetary terms is not sufficient. As such, this research report focuses on the vulnerability caused by peoples’ precarious living conditions in informal settlements. Additionally, the subjective self-designation of „being poor“ has to be taken into account. However, from authority side the terms ‘BPL-population’, ‘urban poor’ and ‘slum dwellers’ were used synonymously. Yet, our research observations revealed that informal settlement inhabitants come from diverse economic backgrounds.

Therefore, the phenomenon of urbanisation and migration creates various conflict lines. The rapid growth of cities with the accompanied scarcity of resources in general and, for instance, the lack of space in particular produces distributional conflicts. Hereby, diverging interests of informal settlers and the growing middle class play an important role, as well as conflicts over the use of space between the city administrative and dwellers of informal settlements.

In order to solve the mentioned challenges of urban planning, to address the needs of the urban poor and to provide them with basic services, as well as to tackle the living conditions in informal settlements several programmes were established at national level such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM, cf. Gov. of India n. d.), the Rajiv Awas Yojana guidelines (RAY, cf. Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation n. d.) and the device “Slum-Free City” (cf. *ibid*). Besides the improvement of the living conditions for the urban poor and informal settlements, these initiatives aim to advance governance practices. Parts of their approaches are resettlement or upgrading schemes. In resettlement schemes, slum inhabitants get transferred to another place, often outside the city centre, and move into multi-storey buildings. This often means the loss of social networks, their familiar working place since informal settlements are most often both, living and working place (Schrader 2004: 8). Upgrading programmes, however, are improvements of living conditions at the current living place, providing inhabitants with a secure tenure and building on their own investments. Despite the preference for upgrading, decision-makers favour new multi-storey buildings due to an alleged better reputation and a change that is visible for their electorate (cf. Patel 2013). In general, progress is slow and results up to now remain minor. For instance, in 2012 when the seven years of the JNNURM period came to an end, reforms were rarely made and only 23 percent of the sub-projects completed (Birkinshaw 2013: 3).

Regarding this criticism and the recent official debate in India, our research concentrates on informal settlements. In terms of our topic “Drivers of urban livelihoods in informal settlements in Mysore and Pune” we are taking a closer look at the two sides that are involved in the current process: We identify and investigate the various mechanisms that are officially used by city administrators and NGOs which target to uplift slum dwellers and help access a higher living standard. Additionally, we analyse the insecurities and obstacles people face in slums which lead to a vulnerability caused by peoples’ precarious living conditions in informal settlements and which strategies they take to deal with these. Afterwards, we compare both sides with each other and check if they fit. By this we seek to answer the following research question: How does the population of informal settlements react and adapt to their changing environment in regard to rapid urbanisation and what actions are undertaken by the city administrative? Therefore, we are first taking a look at the political programmes and their focus on the urban poor (Chapter I). Subsequently, we zoom in at the local level and analyse their access to health and access to education (Chapter II). Staying on the local level, Chapter III focuses on effects on waste pickers in regard to different solid waste management systems. Chapter IV captures the livelihoods of the informal sector. The final chapter (V) concludes with findings on how far the needs of people

living in informal settlements can be voiced. Our research question will be analysed with help of the theoretical framework of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) with the five categories Financial, Human, Natural, Physical and Social Capital (Part B).

We conducted our field research in Pune and Mysore, two Indian cities that vary in regard to spatial size and population figures that determine the parameters of citizen's living conditions. With more than 3 million inhabitants at the core and more than 5.5 million citizens in the agglomeration in 2011, **Pune** accounts for an emerging mega city (UN DESA 2014: 27; Census 2011a). Its boundaries are constantly expanding towards the green lungs of the state of Maharashtra, the Western Ghats, with the city currently measuring 243.84 km<sup>2</sup> (PMC 2014). According to the data of the Census of India in 2011, 22.1 percent of Pune's population lives in Slums (Census 2011b); the NGO Shelter Associates even assumes it to be more than 40 percent (Sen/Hobson n. d.: 1). **Mysore** is the second largest city in the southern state Karnataka, ranking just behind the capital city of Bangalore. Situated along the foothill level of Chamundi Hills, the city spreads across an area of 128.42 km<sup>2</sup> (MCC 2016). In 2011, Mysore counted 920 550 citizens (ibid); in regard to India's megacities, however, it is comparably small (Rajendra/Ramu 2014: 135). Eventually, this could be the reason why the city also has a comparably small percentage of slum population, namely 4.24 percent of the total population (Census 2011c). The different sizes of the two chosen cities as our research objects may give us an insight in different development stages during the process of a rapid urbanisation with Mysore representing a starting point of the excessive demands of rapid urbanisation and Pune already exemplifying an advanced problematic situation.

This report can only provide a small insight of distinct biographies and narratives of people we encountered. Our research was determined by a relatively short stay in the field (in total two weeks) which only allowed a limited access to the field. Furthermore, due to language barriers we were depending on translators and the indirect communication led to difficulties in understanding on both sides of communication. Nevertheless, tendencies have been captured by the research groups that give relevant insights.

## B. Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA)

The sustainable livelihoods approach is designed to potentially understand the livelihoods of people living a life below or near poverty line. It is used as a guidance concerning structures and integration of intricate social patterns. The SLA aims to draw attention to the main parameters that put influence on the previously named category of human beings and it also examines the relations between these parameters. Within this framework, the SLA puts people as a variable at the centre of a network of coherent impacts that have an effect on how maintenance for their households is fabricated. Within this context one has to refer to the so-called livelihood assets and resources that are accessible for these people. These assets can contain access to health and education, security of financial sources, networking and natural resources.

The terminology of the SLA shall be defined more with the help of the following graph:




Figure 1: Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (IFAD 2015).

The chosen figure presents the main constituents of the SLA and its linkages to each other. Furthermore, the approach shall not be seen as a strict direction or guidance but it shall rather give a broad overview about the range of factors that interact with each other when creating a livelihood.

The previously mentioned assets can be specified and categorised into five kinds of capital as pictured as the corners of a pentagon in the figure above (Morse/McNamara/Acholo 2009: 5):

Natural Capital	natural resource stocks (soil, water, air, genetic resources, etc.) and environmental services (hydrological cycle, pollution sinks, etc.);
Financial Capital	capital base (cash, credit/debt, savings, and other economic assets);
Physical Capital	infrastructure (buildings, roads), production equipment and technologies;
Social Capital	social resources (networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, associations);
Human Capital	skills, knowledge, labour (includes good health and physical capability).

Each human may take hold on an inimitable combination of these capitals. Speaking of combinations, the number of varieties is countless as it takes the entire social, cultural, et cetera, factors into account that result in a livelihood.

The SLA also aims at pointing out the vulnerability influencing the consistency of these assets since it links the micro with the macro level (Dittrich/Schrader 2015: 8). The stability is susceptible for any kinds of shocks (e.g. natural disasters, epidemics), developments (e.g. political, economic, and technological) and seasonality (e.g. prices, production, employment opportunities) (IFAD 2015) which forces people to give up on the livelihood security they had before.

Furthermore, the access also gets affected by the predominant social, institutional and political environment which as an effect will influence the possibilities in which people combine and use their assets to accomplish their living – this phenomenon can be seen as livelihood strategies. Labour can be concerned by all of these factors: People may be affected by the assets they find access to or their cultural reality. Furthermore, their system of government and politics may have an impact on them as will be remarked in the report later. These arisen livelihood outcomes can include a development of, for instance, income and savings (resulting for example in an improved standard of well-being) and a reduction concerning vulnerability or other aspects.

Definitive for the SLA is that in the case of scarcity of one capital it can to a certain extent be represented by other forms of capital which comprises choices and venture (Dittrich/Schrader 2015: 11). This way a household facing a lack of financial capital (caused by death of the breadwinner for example) may be able to substitute the lack of financial resources by activating the social capital (speaking of networks and social relations). However, in some cases the livelihood may face a shortage of a variety of capitals at the same time so replacements become intricate and the vulnerability increases.

The SLA and the concept of capital forms are nowadays used by the major international developmental organisations. However, scholars (e.g. Harriss 2001) criticise, that these concepts – compared to the foundation of the Bourdieuan original approach of capital forms on power and social structure – are depoliticised now. They are in line with the major assumptions of neoclassical economics, for example measurability and pricing of commodities, natural and social resources based on a neoliberal ideology (cf. Beder 2011). By just analyzing the vulnerability context and access to different capital forms, the questions of power and equity in terms of appropriating and regulating access to resources are not addressed. The assumption that capital forms can substitute each other is euphemistic insofar that in most cases poor people are vulnerable with regard to all capital forms and not only one or two while rich ones are sufficiently equipped with, if not even affluent in all capital. Also can be criticised that the neoclassical belief in markets and privatisation which had been agreed to with the Washington Consensus by international organisations in the 1980s and since then been practiced (although in a milder form now), replaced a poverty oriented development policy in the 1970 development decade (Schrader 2010) and led to a reduced provision of public goods and their pricing.

Within the SLA this concerns physical capital (infrastructure, such as the public health and education system, public transport, water pipes, etc.) and to some degree natural capital (water, access to fire wood, etc.). In political terms this also means that an orientation towards the poor made way for a middle class orientation and its concerns (middle class housing, broader roads, consumer infrastructure, etc.).

We should also take a short look at the concept of middle class. While in the Anglo-Saxon context the terms of class and social stratum are interchangeable, the Marxist tradition closely links the concept to class consciousness. Following Portes (2010: 77ff), Dittrich/Schrader (2015: 10, FN 8) argue that the class concept makes sense even now – if we do not make class consciousness the central criterion.

Classes are midrange theoretical constructs for analysis of social change and even revolution. Classes provide deep structures of society being defined by long-lasting inequalities between large social aggregates. Classes are defined by different forms of control over resources within a certain social system [...]. And, class structures are reproduced within society, as well as the class position of a single household, as has already argued Bourdieu (ibid).

Deshpande (2003) discusses the middle class concept for India. He refers to an economic, a political and a social perspective on class in the tradition of Marx. The economic perspective identifies shared economic characteristics such as level of income, wealth or property; the social perspective refers to lifestyles and consumption patterns or social attitudes; the political perspective relates to attitudes, shared ideologies, party support et cetera (ibid: 131). We believe that the interlinkage of these perspectives may become relevant for our investigations. Deshpande also emphasises that the middle class ‘articulates the hegemony of the ruling bloc’ (ibid: 139), that is on one hand it strongly influences public policy with their interests as voters. Within the class position the middle class is also very much dependent on the reproduction of cultural capital (identities, educational titles, etc.) (ibid: 140). This may become relevant, for example, with regard to the different prestige and quality of public and private schools or medical provision, et cetera. It also plays a crucial role in the production, dissemination and consumption of ideologies (ibid: 141). Here we can argue that neoliberal ideologies and middle class ideologies mutually support each other at the expense of equity ideologies, poverty oriented politics, and articulation of the subalterns (cf. Spivak 1988).

We want to conclude our theoretical part by suggesting to use the SLA form, however, not in its depoliticised way. In addition to an analysis of availability of and access to capital forms, we want to refer to class aspects and power, to ideologies and policies.

## C. Preliminary Research and Methodology in the Field

This research project on “Drivers of urban livelihoods in informal settlements in Mysore and Pune” deploys a variety of qualitative research methods when collecting data. First we gather secondary data about the research object. Subsequently, we will gather primary data via expert interviews and observations in the field. The research process in the field will be undertaken utilising techniques of the Action Research (AR) approach.




Figure 2: Data Collection (authors' graph).

### Expert Interviews, Observations and Guideline-based Interviews

Expert interviews have been chosen as appropriate research tool, since qualitative research is interested in analysis of interpretations and perceptions (Mack/Woodsong 2005: 3). Experts are understood as bearing knowledge about certain social issues. They are witnesses of the before mentioned issues, not necessarily research objects themselves. The expert interview is thus the appropriate method to get access to this knowledge (Bogner/Menz 2009: 46f). As Meuser and Nagel (1991: 443) put it, the status of an expert is relational to the research project. But to count as an expert, one has to 1) bear responsibility for the draft, implementation or control of a certain action or 2) bear privileged access to information about certain actions or persons – the objects of research. Thus, the research interest conditions the expert as one being the object and centre of research or as one offering complementary information about the object of research (ibid: 445). The OvGU India research group draws on both kinds of experts.

The expert interviews are conducted via guideline-based interviews. These are developed beforehand by reference to the sustainable livelihoods approach and aim at producing comparable and reliable results (Mayring 2010). Consequently, the guideline-based interviews want to explore the five kinds of capitals central to the SLA: social, human, physical, natural, social and financial capital. Additionally, aspects of political action and social/political representation concerning the experts are being integrated into the guideline-based interview. During the interview, not all questions of the guideline

were asked, since some interviews went into interesting, unforeseen directions. Some questions had to be altered or deleted as a result of the learning-in-the-field approach because they did not produce comparable or reliable results. Observations by the research team will be considered when it seems appropriate and could clarify, foster or challenge information gathered during secondary and primary data analysis. It aims to broaden the picture of the investigated social processes and causalities when being considered appropriate, relevant, complementary or helpful (Mack/Woodsong 2005: 13ff).

### **Action Research (AR), Access to the Field and Interviewee Selection**

The fieldwork and the access to the field is orientated on the concept of AR which is originally a participatory and process oriented form of planning, implementing and evaluating of promotion measures. It draws its strength from a strong learning-from-the-field focus, concentrating on interviews with inhabitants of the field, participating in community meetings and finally proceeding to a stakeholder and problem mapping in the field. Combined with background information gathered before the research, new information from the field shall alter and specify the understanding of the research site and its social context. In a hermeneutic process during and after the research process, this should lead to constant (self-)reflection on research, field and its understanding (Brydon-Miller/Greenwood/Maguire 2003: 10f).

When it came to the conduct of the interviews, we had to rely on translators, since a direct communication was mostly impossible due to our lack of local language knowledge. This led to the constellation of three party conversations: Interviewers, translator and interviewees. Ultimately, this resulted in recorded and transcribed interviews *about* a certain expert and his or her experiences, not *with* him or her. This was actually the case, because many translators interpreted the given information in the third, not the first person of speech.

Being dependent on translators and partly on local partner institutions posed problems to the research in two ways:

1. **Selection bias:** Our partner institutions partly helped us organise interview partners what might have led to a selection bias through our partners. When acting on our own, we selected interviewees who were visible for us. Possible interviewees, “invisible” to us or unknown to our partners were withdrawn from our attention and access.
2. **Translations bias:** Though we tried close communication and briefing with the translators, a translation bias may at least not be ruled out. This issue is withdrawn from our influence since even during the analysis period we do not have comprehensive access to secondary translation or interpretation.

As mentioned before, the guideline-based interviews were adapted during the field work, due to the epistemological process of AR. Still, comparable results could be generated. A transfer back to the field of the gained knowledge was neither intended, nor tried owed to the limited range of the research.

## **PART TWO**

# **I. City Development Strategies in Pune and Mysore:**

## **A “golden opportunity for slum dwellers”?**

Moritz Lehmann and Lisa Wassermann

### **1. Introduction**

In this chapter, we will focus on the top-down level of city management and its links to the population of informal settlements. We will take a look at the perceptions and attitudes of the city administration officials towards city development with respect to the low-income population in Pune and Mysore. According to the particular city development plans, “slum dwellers”, or the “urban poor”, are a defined target of city development strategies both in Pune and Mysore. In recent years, the central government of India has introduced several urban development schemes which are at least partly directed towards the improvement of the living conditions for the urban poor. Most notably, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was an extensive, nationwide urban-development encounter designed to cope with the massive and often unplanned growth of Indian cities. It was established in 2005, provisioned until 2012 and extended until 2014 (Gov. of India n. d.). A more recent scheme, the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), aims to make Indian cities „slum-free“ until the year 2022 (Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation n. d.). With respect to the extensive increase of government activity directed towards slum development, one official in Mysore proudly stated: “This is a golden opportunity for slum dwellers”.<sup>4</sup> We will come to examine this statement, among others, in more depth in the following.

Our research goal was to inquire the people who implement these kinds of schemes, focusing on those who are dealing with the infrastructural matters of cities on a daily base. We wanted to find out what kind of problems the employees and decision-makers in the administration identify, especially the problems they see related to the population of informal settlements. Furthermore, we wanted to find out what kind of solutions for these problems they have in mind – and which role the slum population plays in their planning. Accordingly, the research question we seek to answer in this chapter within the framework of the broader research interest reads: “What kind of solutions for sustainable city development does the administration aspire and which role does the slum population play in their planning?”

In chapter 2, we will elaborate some theoretical aspects concerning development, based on assumptions by Ferguson (1990), and post-colonial political society, based on Chatterjee (2004). The empirical part of this report is divided in two parts. Chapter 3 will discuss the rather infrastructural aspects of city development, while chapter 4 focuses on the cities policies and strategies aimed

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<sup>4</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 7.

directly at low-income inhabitants. We briefly conclude our findings in chapter 5. Our report is mainly based on interview material. Altogether, we conducted eleven interviews with decision makers from the administrative bodies in Pune and Mysore. The interviewees range from high level executive officials concerned with slum development to medium level civil engineers and low level community workers. The access to the field was easier in Mysore, which explains an interview surplus in this area: We interviewed eight officials in Mysore and only three officials in Pune. However, we were able to use interviews from other research groups involved in the project for our analysis.

## **2. Theory: “Political Society” and the “Anti-Politics Machine”**

In this chapter, we are going to approach our research project from a theoretical standpoint, exploring arguments of James Ferguson (1990) and Partha Chatterjee (2004). The theoretical assumptions generated here will help analyzing the data collected in the field.

In his examination of the “development apparatus” in Lesotho, James Ferguson (1990) makes some interesting observations useful for our analysis. In a nutshell, Ferguson finds that planned interventions produce unintended side effects: Ferguson claims that “what is most important about a project is not so much what it fails to do but what it does do” (Ferguson 1990: 254). This means, that unintended side effects are most interesting to look at. In Lesotho, for instance, he finds that even though the development objectives have not been met as provisioned, “state power was expanded and strengthened by the establishment of the local governing machinery” (ibid: 253). Ferguson (ibid: 255) observes a two-fold effect of a planned development intervention. Aside from strengthening the power of the state, it has the effect of “depoliticizing” poverty, turning it into a merely technical problem – an effect that Ferguson calls “the anti-politics machine”. He also claims that it is possible to generalise his findings, since “many aspects of ‘development interventions’ remain remarkably uniform and standardised from place to place” (ibid: 258), since they often include the same basic elements. That is because in this way, development projects are easier to implement and to evaluate (ibid: 258f).

Drawing on Ferguson’s findings will help us conceptualising the actions of government officials implementing certain policies.

In this matter, Partha Chatterjee's (2004) writings about “political society” in the postcolonial world may provide some additional insights. Chatterjee (ibid: 27-33) distinguishes between civil society and political society. According to him, civil society is the link between the people and the institutions of modern nation state. It describes “a network of norms in civil society that prevail independently of the state and that are consistent with its laws” (ibid: 33). The modern state stems its legitimacy on “popular sovereignty” (ibid: 27), with its citizens being “bearers of rights” (ibid: 29). But according to Chatterjee (ibid: 34f), large parts of the population of postcolonial states are not actually citizens – that is why he distinguishes between citizens and populations. While the former are granted “participation in the sovereignty of the state”, the latter are “targets” of governmental “policies”. Populations are “identifiable, classifiable, and describable by empirical or behavioural criteria and are amenable to

statistical techniques such as censuses and sample surveys” (ibid: 34). Leaning to Michel Foucault's writings, Chatterjee sees populations as objected to “governmentality” – a general trend in contemporary political regimes. That means that legitimacy is not so much generated by participation, but rather “by claiming to provide for the well-being of the population” (ibid: 34). These governmentality-techniques obey the laws of efficiency – delivering “more well-being to more people at less cost” (ibid: 34).

### **3. Problems of City Development and Their Solutions: Infrastructure**

From our interviews with administrative actors and decision-makers in Pune and Mysore, we extracted their perspectives on problems of city development, as well as on the solutions they have to offer in order to manage these problems. We classified the statements made concerning both problems of city development and their solutions in two separate categories: “Infrastructure” and “the Low-income Population”. In this chapter (3), we will explore the first category. It includes rather material issues such as space and the development of slum areas. The second category is more people-centred and will be explored in chapter 4. In chapter 3.1., we will analyse the problems administration officials identify concerning city infrastructure, while in chapter 3.2 we will turn to the corresponding solutions they have in mind.

#### **3.1 Problems of City Infrastructure**

Apart from a growing population, India’s urban centres are facing increasing migration floods as a result of a rising social gap between the urban and the rural areas. An official of Pune Municipality Corporation (PMC) described, the comparably good infrastructure in the cities and the access to primary public services, such as health care and education, are push and pull factors for rural-urban migration.<sup>5</sup> Between 2001 and 2011, the population of Pune more than doubled (indiaonlinepages 2016). This tremendous growth causes several problems to the administrative body. As the official told to us, the issue of transportation, the water supply, sewage systems and the scarcity of living-space are the most pressing challenges.

According to a political representative in Pune, the streets and the public transport system has been developed too slow for being able to deal with the additional traffic. This, according to him, is as a result of inefficient administrative bodies and their lack of financial resources. As a consequence of the volume and density of the traffic, the number of accidents and the level of pollution are increasing.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 103.

<sup>6</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 21.

According to a PMC official, the city administration is no longer able to provide for the supply of water necessary in order to deal with the increased consumption. The city is obtaining water from different places of the state, which causes exorbitant costs.<sup>7</sup> Especially in slum areas, the disposal of sewage and waste has become an urgent problem. The sewage systems are in large parts obsolete, and the city can hardly find any space to build new waste plants.<sup>8</sup>

Living-space has become a scarce resource, too. Both members of the public administrative bodies in Pune and in Mysore reported about continuous migration flows of unskilled workers from the rural areas. A civil engineer at the planning authority MUDA in Mysore told us that newly arrived migrants, hoping for a better life, end up marginalised on the edges of society.<sup>9</sup> Shelters established by slum inhabitants are often constructed informally, without governmental permission, making the administration's planning ambitions difficult. As we were told in Mysore by a municipal Corporator, most of the migrants settle down in places where the living conditions are hardly any better than in the rural areas: "I can say that [from] over 100 people who come from the rural areas to the urban areas, 80 people are staying in the informal settlements".<sup>10</sup> Due to a lack of appropriate living space for low-income people, informal settlements spread all over the city. Some slums are situated in "inhabitable areas", for instance, next to railway stations.<sup>11</sup> As living space within the city centre becomes scarce and expensive, low-income citizens are relegated to the periphery, often several kilometres away from their former working and living places.

A major challenge for the city administration in Pune emerges from the growing gap between the middle class and the urban poor. An official in Pune stated: "Those people who [have] migrated, those who have [an] economically weaker background – they really do not contribute directly [to] the taxes".<sup>12 13</sup> Consequently, the municipal administration has to provide more public services to an increasing number of unskilled workers from the rural areas, which in turn are not generating additional revenue for the public institutions to the same extent. Because financial resources are limited, this leads to "slow and low quality" solutions, the PMC official argued.<sup>14</sup> However, not just low-income people pursue informal housing. Also, apartments primarily built for a growing middle class emerge without official permission and occupy the tiny bit of space left in the city centres. As an official in Pune stated, the increasingly confident middle class calls for a greater say in shaping the

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<sup>7</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 42.

<sup>8</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 72-73; Interview 22, Pune, Employee of Shelter Associates, 06/09/14, line 77-79.

<sup>9</sup> Interview 41, Mysore, MUDA Civil Engineer, 12/09/2014, line 62-67.

<sup>10</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 89.

<sup>11</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 50.

<sup>12</sup> Interview 57, Pune, PMC Official (Part 2), 05/09/2014, line 45.

<sup>13</sup> Citations are abstracted from transcripts which had been made from the taken interviews. Due to formal criteria of this publication and a better legibility those citations had been slightly polished and corrected where the spelling or the grammar was too confusing.

<sup>14</sup> Interview 57, Pune, PMC Official (Part 2), 05/09/2014, line 3.

development of the city.<sup>15</sup> In this regard, the official expressed his concerns about emerging conflicts for space between the well situated middle class and the socially downgraded people.<sup>16</sup>

### **3.2 Solutions to Problems Concerning the City Infrastructure**

From the statements made in the interviews, we derived three broad strategies by the municipal bodies in order to deal with unplanned city growth and the lack of resources. The first one is slum development (rehabilitation and relocation), the second one is the division of the city into different zones, and the third one are Public Private Partnerships (PPP).

The main strategy for resolving the infrastructural challenges posed by rapid, informal city growth is slum development. The introduction of city-development schemes, such as the JNNURM-programme, are an attempt of the Indian central government to give municipal authorities instruments to effectively cope with the quickly growing cities, both by granting financial resources and technical assistance. In order to deal with informal settlements, especially the administration of Mysore pursues an institutionally complex strategy. The city has created several institutions and technical units that are charged with slum “rehabilitation” and “relocation”. Their tasks range from conducting surveys and the upgrading of existing habitats to the construction of new shelters for slum dwellers in different areas. Slum development in Mysore is mainly exercised by the Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB), which receives additional assistance by specialised technical units, such as the city level technical cell (CLTC) assigned with the implementation of the RAY scheme.<sup>17</sup> The overall, long-vision framework for urban planning is worked out by the Mysore Urban Development Authority (MUDA). MUDA determines the meta-planning for the next 20 years by developing a “master plan” and therefore has a crucial influence on the future development of the city. However, the urban poor do not take an accentuated role in their planning process, as an official explained to us: “Seriously, we are not so much concentrated on the urban poor people”.<sup>18</sup> In reply to our question which role slums and slum-dwellers play in reorganizing the city, the MUDA engineer told us about land subsidies. Low-income people may apply for a piece of land outside the city centre and, after having paid a fee, receive a “small dimension site” for a low price.<sup>19,20</sup>

A project engineer at the CLTC described the process of slum development as follows: At first, basic data concerning slum inhabitants is collected. On the basis of this data, a “plan of action” is created in order to decide how to deal with the area in the future, based on the degree of “vulnerability” of the correspondent area.<sup>21</sup> Slum relocation, then, is only an option, if the slum is located in an “uninhabitable area”, as a KSDB official explained to us.<sup>22</sup> Generally habitable areas are upgraded, for

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<sup>15</sup> Interview 57, Pune, PMC Official (Part 2), 05/09/2014, line 94-96.

<sup>16</sup> Interview 57, Pune, PMC Official (Part 2), 05/09/2014, line 98.

<sup>17</sup> Interview 59, Mysore, RAY Project Engineer at City Level Technical Cell, 12/09/2014, line 53.

<sup>18</sup> Interview 41, Mysore, MUDA Civil Engineer, 12/09/2014, line 53.

<sup>19</sup> Interview 41, Mysore, MUDA Civil Engineer, 12/09/2014, line 89-90.

<sup>20</sup> The report on representation in chapter V will further elaborate on the participation of citizens.

<sup>21</sup> Interview 59, Mysore, RAY Project Engineer at City Level Technical Cell, 12/09/2014, line 53; 100-104.

<sup>22</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 90-94.

example, by the construction of houses, which are to provide basic services, such as running water, sanitary and sewage systems.<sup>23</sup>

We had the opportunity to interview two different KSDB-officials working in two different areas of Mysore city, providing us with insights from their work. According to one of these officials, the efforts regarding slum rehabilitation and resettlement have increased since the establishment of the JNNURM-scheme: “From 1980 to 2005, (...) we have only been able to tackle 3440 houses (...). After the JNNURM-scheme and the Slum Free Plan of Action were implemented, from 2008/9 onwards, (...) we got sanctioned 6328 houses”.<sup>24</sup>

Fergusons (1990: 255) claims concerning development appear to be true for the implementation of resettlement-policies in Mysore: it remains a highly technical and bureaucratic enterprise. The five year plan to clear all slums under the RAY-scheme contains a framework determining how the newly constructed houses for upgrading and resettlement purposes should look like. This means that all apartments have the same shape and are not adjusted to the special needs of its inhabitants.<sup>25</sup> In order to get a permission to live in one of these houses, slum-dwellers have to pay ten to twelve per cent of the actual costs of the construction, with the goal being “to create a sense of belongingness to the houses”<sup>26</sup>. Nevertheless, the land title stays in government custody, while the slum-dwellers will be given legal certificates which entitle them to live in these houses.<sup>27</sup>

Regarding the eventually emerging long distances between peripheral living spaces after relocation and working spaces, an executive engineer at the KSDB told us about plans to establish “multi-purpose-community centres”.<sup>28</sup> There, small shops and educational institutions shall be accommodated. In this way, long distances to working places and educational institutions shall be avoided.<sup>29</sup> This statement, however, did not stay unchallenged. Another KSDB official stated: “Industry people have to give them the working area. We are giving basic shelter”.<sup>30</sup>

The second broad strategy in order to cope with unplanned city growth, as we have observed in Mysore, is the division of city space into different zones. In this way, overloaded capacity of public infrastructure shall be redistributed. An MCC official told us about plans to relocate people working at public places, such as food vendors, to specific districts, such as “food zones”.<sup>31</sup> In Pune, a similar

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<sup>23</sup> Interview 59, Mysore, RAY Project Engineer at City Level Technical Cell, 12/09/2014, line 67.

<sup>24</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 13.

<sup>25</sup> The guidelines for the new houses can be found in the document already mentioned in the first chapter of this section I: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (n. d.).

<sup>26</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 32.

<sup>27</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 35.

<sup>28</sup> The subject of working and living spaces will be further discussed in chapter IV.

<sup>29</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 48.

<sup>30</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 126-127.

<sup>31</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 13.

strategy shall help to avoid accidents (due to the encroachment of informal economic activities) and facilitate space for the construction of roads and sewage systems in the urban centre.<sup>32</sup>

The third broad administrative strategy is the establishment of Public Private Partnerships. However, as a KSDB official in Mysore told us, this strategy is rather dominant in other realms of city development than slum development, since processes such as slum relocation are not profitable for investors. However, PPP is an important element in the cities' development plans, and in nearly every interview we conducted in Pune and in Mysore, decision makers talked about cooperating with private investors in order to cope with the increasing demand for resources and the lack of public revenues. In Pune, the PPP model of “Solid Waste Collection and Handling” (SWaCH)<sup>33</sup> is described as a successful model to reduce the carbon emission and to create formalised jobs for waste pickers.<sup>34</sup> In Mysore, we were informed about the privatisation of water supply by a private enterprise.<sup>35</sup> To our question about possible problems that PPP models might create for low-income people, a KSDB official replied that the price for water has increased as a consequence of the cooperation with the private investor.<sup>36</sup>

#### **4. Problems of City Development and Their Solutions: Low-income Population**

After having explored the rather material aspects of city development, we will focus on the low-income population directly in this chapter. In chapter 4.1, we will analyse the problems administration officials identify connected to the low-income population, while in chapter 4.2 we will turn to the corresponding solutions they have in mind.

##### **4.1 Problems Concerning the Low-Income Population**

In the eyes of many of our interviewees, the low-income population is exposed to specific problems related to their socioeconomic conditions. Several administration officials identified a lack of self-sustainability from their part, expressed in “living day to day”, without savings and a lack of financial security.<sup>37</sup> Many of them are employed in the informal sector, where they work as unskilled labourers and earn little money, which makes it hard for them to break out from poverty.<sup>38,39</sup>

Frequently, the low-income population's lack of education and skills was mentioned as problematic. According to a skill development expert in Mysore, this even compromises their participation in

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<sup>32</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 111.

<sup>33</sup> See chapter III.

<sup>34</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 1-3.

<sup>35</sup> Interview 40, Mysore, MCC Town Planning officer, 12/09/2014, line 109-110.

<sup>36</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 117-120.

<sup>37</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 85-93; Interview 59, Mysore, RAY Project Engineer at City Level Technical Cell, 12/09/2014, line 151.

<sup>39</sup> See chapter IV.

government-sponsored skill development programmes.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, an official of the KSDB in Mysore lamented opposition to the resettlement-provisions which he described as a “golden opportunity for urban slum dwellers”<sup>41</sup>. In his view, many low-income citizens could not understand the schemes due to their lack of education.<sup>42</sup> The living conditions in slum areas, along with “unhealthy lifestyles” can cause the spread of diseases, as a PMC medical officer stated.<sup>43</sup> Yet, the health-related issues are discussed in more detail in the next contribution of this volume (chapter II). To us it seemed that many officials recognise the specific situation of slum inhabitants. As one PMC official noticed, the building permission process is complicated and expensive.<sup>44</sup> And one KSDB official in Mysore noted that in city-development schemes prior to JNNURM and RAY, the costs of houses that the government had constructed for the low-income population for resettlement purposes, were not affordable for many of them. Also, homeless people sleeping at the roadside are perceived as a problem.<sup>45</sup> One official emphasised a lack of interaction with slum dwellers as a major problem of resettlement policies in the past.<sup>46</sup>

#### **4.2 Solutions Concerning the Low-Income Population**

We identified three main development strategies that are aimed towards the low-income population directly. Firstly, the participation of and the interaction with slum dwellers; secondly, motivating the urban poor to take an active role in improving their situation; and thirdly, providing them with education and skill training. We will explore these three strategies in detail in this section.

The first strategy, the participation of the people subjected to the slum development policies during the implementation process, has proven to be an effective tool in order to increase the success of these policies. This has been stated by officials in Mysore<sup>47</sup> as well as in Pune, where a PMC official assigned to waste management stated that “citizen involvement” is necessary in order to cope with the increased infrastructural challenges due to intensified population growth.<sup>48</sup> It is interesting to examine what both officials mean when they talk about “citizen involvement” and “participation”. First of all, it means the inclusion of informal workers into the formal system. In our interview in Pune, the official did not so much emphasise the “democratic” aspect of this involvement, but talked about the problem that the informal sector is hard to tax. One approach to ensure taxation of slum areas in Pune was the introduction of a “service tax” for slums. Slum dwellers have to pay 365 INR annually in order to receive governmental services such as water supply, drainage, road construction and health facilities.

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<sup>40</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 48.

<sup>41</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 7.

<sup>42</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 7.

<sup>43</sup> Interview 33, Pune, PMC official, 05/09/2014, line 33-34.

<sup>44</sup> Interview 57, Pune, PMC official (Part 4), 05/09/2014, line 24-76.

<sup>45</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 12; 14.

<sup>46</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 30-31.

<sup>47</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 56-63; 102-103.

<sup>48</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 47-52.

According to him, around 60 to 70 per cent of slum inhabitants pay this tax, since it is “very low”. Also, he talked about the new waste management model SWaCH, which brings former informal waste pickers into the official waste collection system. In this model, the waste pickers go door to door in order to pick up waste, this service is then charged for.<sup>49</sup> He emphasised that, in this way, “social bonding” between waste pickers and their customers is taking place. However, we highly doubt that this aspect is the driving force behind the adoption of this model, but rather the other point that he made:

Also, the cost is less. (...) because there is no extra burden on local state government, indirectly we are extracting the money from people's pocket, because people avail the door to door service and they have to pay for that extra services.<sup>50</sup>

Therefore, we believe that participation, in his view, is not so much meant in its democratic sense, but rather as means of “governmentality” in terms of Chatterjee to ensure the efficient governing of the population. Although more implicitly stated than in Pune, the KSDB official in Mysore saw participation not so much as including people's wants and needs into the policy making process of resettlement, but rather the process of convincing opponents that the government enterprises are “beneficial” for them. In this process, the KSDB official emphasised the importance of NGOs in assisting the government in their persuasion (namely the Mysore Slum Dwellers Federation, MSDF; and the Rural Literacy and Health Programme, RLHP). The task of these NGOs is, according to the official, to inform the people about the resettlement plans and to visit opponents of these plans in their homes in order to convince them:

So during the interaction with the beneficiaries, these NGOs (...) will inform all the hut men, (...) and sometimes, during interaction, if some (...) of them aren't agreeing for our proposal, (...) later on these NGOs (...) will visit their house and they will convince them, and during our next visit, they will bring them to us. And we will explain the possibilities, provisions.<sup>51</sup>

Interestingly, the very same NGOs seem to see themselves in a different light, as we could observe in an interview with representatives from the organisation RLHP. They state that they support “community based organisation” in order to assist slum dwellers in organising and claiming their rights towards the government.<sup>52</sup>

In order to identify the needs of slum dwellers, officials in Mysore seem to rely not so much on political representation, but rather on technical instruments, especially on data collection via surveys and expert reports.<sup>53</sup> This might be a good example of how political problems are being treated as technical ones. There do in fact exist some intermediaries, such as “Corporators” and “community

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<sup>49</sup> See chapter III.

<sup>50</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 30.

<sup>51</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 60-63.

<sup>52</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 23.

<sup>53</sup> Interview 59, Mysore, RAY Project Engineer at City Level Technical Cell, 12/09/2014, line 44; Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/2014, line 84-85.

organisers”, but their exact role remains blurry and their actual legitimacy remains questionable. The problem of representation of slum dwellers is explored in more detail in Chapter V.

What we can say so far is that these actors are in a position of power, since they are the linkage between slum dwellers and governmental welfare. As one official in Mysore stated, they are both in the position to identify the needs of slum dwellers and are also expected to articulate governmental plans towards them<sup>54</sup>. Also, NGOs seem to work closely with these “Corporators”, as stated by a representative of SHELTER, a local NGO in Pune.<sup>55</sup> The so-called “community organisers”, however, are concerned with identifying people below poverty line (BPL)<sup>56</sup> in the framework of the “National Urban Livelihood Mission” (NULM), poverty-reduction programme we learned about in Mysore. This programme is designed to help those citizens living below poverty line and will be explored in more detail below. An official in the Mysore City Corporation (MCC) described the role of the community organisers the following way: “They are the real people [who] go work in the field (...) they know each and every person of their given [place]”.<sup>57</sup>

In an interview with this official, who is heading the NULM-programme, she outlined the second main strategy employed in order to solve problems related to the urban poor. She emphasised the necessity to “motivate” the urban poor to take up certain measures concerning education, employment or financial security: “(...) it becomes our duty to, you know, reach the people, motivate them, council them, take up trainings, or at least start their own business, get (...) better education”.<sup>58</sup>

Accordingly, the NULM-programme is comprised of several components.<sup>59</sup> Among them, there is the formation of “self-help groups” where especially women shall be motivated to collectively organise in saving groups in order to achieve more financial security.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, loans with subsidised interest are provided for people who want to start their own business and provide a business plan (“project report”) that has to be approved beforehand. The subsidy on the interest is only granted if the loan is paid within six months.<sup>61</sup> In this way, BPL-citizens are linked with private banks via a government agency. As a community organiser in Mysore explained, one of his tasks was to be a “linkage to the bank”<sup>62</sup>.

Since a lack of education has been identified as a major problem concerning the low-income population, “skill trainings” and “capacity building” are offered within the NULM-programme in order to turn BPL-citizens into assets of the formal economy.<sup>63</sup> This appears to be the third main strategy aimed towards the low-income population. As our interviewee noted, one problem in the

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<sup>54</sup> Interview 59, Mysore, RAY Project Engineer at City Level Technical Cell, 12/09/2014, line 37.

<sup>55</sup> Interview 22, Pune, Employee of Shelter Associates, 06/09/14, line 138.

<sup>56</sup> See introduction, footnote 3.

<sup>57</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 46.

<sup>58</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 52.

<sup>59</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 7-14.

<sup>60</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 9; 31-36.

<sup>61</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 10, 30; 37-38.

<sup>62</sup> Interview 39, Mysore, community organiser, 15/09/2014, line 10.

<sup>63</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 11; 14.

approach of the NULM-programme is that the “beneficiaries” are often too unskilled to be able to participate in some of the capacity-building programmes offered to them, especially when they are related to IT-skills.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, an official of the KSDB noted that most of the low-income, unskilled workers are too old to be able to improve their education. Referring to the NULM programme, he stated that the trainings are provided by NGOs that are appointed by the officials heading this programme.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, many educational provisions seem to be outsourced towards non-governmental organisations. They even seem to be taking up problems within the formal education system. As representatives of the RLHP-organisation stated, they are trying to improve the quality of the public education system. They train teachers, they deliver “informal education” (in shape of singing, dancing, acting and alike), and they try to mobilise the community to participate in monitoring and to improve the conditions in public schools.<sup>667</sup>

At the same time, there appears to be a structural need for slum inhabitants in the city economy. When asked which problems arise from them, one official in Mysore concerned with waste management declared:

See, (...) there is no problem, because of them only you can get cheap labour and all. (...) [The] Problem is there from our side. See, when we are developing, we are generating a lot of waste and other problems (...). But that can be handled by these people only.<sup>68</sup>

## 5. Conclusion

The government of India has, at least rhetorically, established ambitious plans to fight poverty and to improve the living conditions in the whole country. But having analysed the findings of our research, we come to the conclusion that the implementation remains highly technical and standardised at the local level. Picking up the concept of the “Anti-Politics-Machine” by Ferguson again, we conclude that city administration officials in both Pune and Mysore tend to understand the problems of the urban poor in a very technical way. Most of the officials in charge of urban development we have interviewed are engineers, who have a rather technical understanding of the urban environment. Direct interaction with slum-dwellers and the direct exchange about their needs and preferences is rarely found. MUDA, the city-planning authority in Mysore, for example, is redesigning the city without respect to social conflicts and the problems arising in the everyday life of slum dwellers, such as increased distances for slum dwellers in order to go to work and the segregation of society with wealthy people in the centres and low-income people in the peripheries. What Ferguson found out for Lesotho appears to be true here as well: poverty is turned into a merely “technical” problem (Ferguson 1990). The design of the houses constructed during the slum development and resettlement processes

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<sup>64</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 47-48.

<sup>65</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 21; 89.

<sup>66</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 52.

<sup>67</sup> See also Chapter II.

<sup>68</sup> Interview 36, Mysore, MCC Project Engineer in Waste Management, 15/09/2014, line 41.

hardly take in account the needs of those who are supposed to live there. The idea to give proper shelter to the inhabitants of informal settlements may at best be considered to be well-intended, but the actual implementation doesn't seem to consider the actual conditions in the slums.

As we have demonstrated, as Chatterjee (2005) argues, that the municipal administration seems to distinguish between citizens and population. Slum-dwellers appear not to be considered as “citizens”, that is, as “bearers of rights”, but as targets of governmental policies. Efficiency is the ultimate goal here, as one may observe, for example, in the governmental plans for a “slum-free city”. As we highlighted above, in the eyes of most of our interviewees, “participation” is not perceived in the sense of ensuring an inclusive process, but more as a tool to ensure efficient governance. Therefore, slum-dwellers run the risk of remaining unheard, especially since the growing middle class claims more and more space and influence in the urban room. Since municipalities finance their measures by tax money, with slum-dwellers usually not paying public taxes, a dilemma arises: who is prioritised in administrative policies, the ones who pay tax money or the ones who desperately need the most public support? The dilemma appears to be solved in favour of the former.

Decisions made concerning informal settlements (“slum development”) are rather made on the basis of surveys than on an actual debate with the beneficiaries. This leads to measures that fail to address the needs of the slum-dwellers and impedes more sustainable approaches to city development. The low income population appears to be left out in the planning the cities for the future.<sup>69</sup> This impression was consolidated even more when it comes to trainings and educational programmes for the slum-dwellers. Even though the decision makers of the city administration seemed conscious about the precarious situation of slum-dwellers due to a lack of education, the improvement of the public education system did not seem an issue for them. Instead, NGOs tend to play a growing role delivering formal and informal education, with short-term trainings replacing sustainable approaches to education. More and more public tasks appear to be outsourced to NGOs or private businesses, which gives the impression that the city administrations are in a state of retreat.

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<sup>69</sup> Even though we were told about practices that are working together with slum-dwellers, our field trips to the slums and a lack of information about how bottom-up communication actually happens gave us the impression of missing representation. This however, will be further discussed in chapter V.

## **II. Access to Education and Health in Pune and Mysore**

Katharina Koller and Stephanie Walter

### **1. Introduction**

The following part will focus on the access to education and health facilities in households of informal settlements in Pune and Mysore. In this regard, health and education are both seen as the most important factors of human capital (Butsch/Kraas/Nitschke 2008). Additionally, both have an impact on the remaining four capital forms, while simultaneously being influenced by them as well, making them interdependent categories.

Regarding education, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act determines that the state is obligated to guarantee education to all children between the ages from six to 14 (Press Information Bureau 2009). This was strengthened when it became a fundamental right in the provisions of the Constitution. Health, too, is a “state subject” (Nambiar 2013: 135) and a constitutional right (Sakdapolrak 2010: 108). This paper aims to compare these official standards with observations taken in the field.

At first, this paper will examine access to education. Concerning education, formal, public and private, as well as non-formal education were taken into account in the research process. Non-formal education includes education in learning centres, vocational centres and religious institutions. The second part will focus on access to health facilities. This entails public and private facilities as well as informal strategies of citizens of informal settlements to cope with a lack of health infrastructure.

A conclusion will summarise major findings and answer the research question whether or not a general access to primary education and health care in the researched slum areas is given.

Due to the limited research time in the field, as well as the limited scope of this paper neither all aspects of access, nor all marginalised groups can be taken into consideration in this analysis. Additionally, special programmes, such as for physically and mentally disabled, were not focused upon.

### **2. Education**

In the following, we will provide an overview on present central and federal state provisions. Subsequently, the actual access to primary governmental education will be analyzed. We detected three different factors which might hamper the access to state provisioned education: financial factors, lacking transport systems and gender related challenges. Further we will elaborate on costs and quality differences between public and private learning institutions.

## **2.1 State Provisions for Accessibility to Education**

As mentioned previously the right of free education is enshrined in the Indian constitution with article 21A stating: „The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine” (MHRD 2013a). Further, Article 46 secures the promotion of education of marginalised groups (MHRD 2013b). The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act strengthens the costless education by stating: “parents of children covered under RTE are not liable to pay for school fees, uniforms, textbooks, mid-day meals, transportation, etc. until the elementary education is complete” (Setalvad 2013: n. p.). Besides the central governmental provisions, every state of India has its own State Board of Education which monitors the overall implementation of education in the respective state. It is the main school authority in the state and responsible for all public schools.

The following section will analyse in how far access to education in informal settlements in Pune and Mysore is in line with official provisions such as the Right to Education.

## **2.2 Public Education**

The majorities of families and children we spoke to during our field research received, respectively still receive education at least until the age of fourteen. One exception was a family which just recently got resettled to a new housing complex. The case will be outlined in the later section about transport infrastructure. Additionally, there were a few examples of slum citizens working in the informal economy sector who dropped out of formal education before fourteen. However, those decisions were taken before the introduction of compulsory education in 2009. Therefore, the analysis will take those findings with caution and prioritise present cases under the RTE.

## **Financial Factors**

Financial burdens may constitute a major challenge for low-income families resulting in either not investing in education, which will cause consequences on individual human capital in the short run and possibly on financial capital in the long run, or investing in education following cut backs on other forms of capital.

Unlike stated in the Right to Education Act, the following examples show that outlined provisions do not reflect the reality in our research area, since direct and indirect expenses may occur. For example, during our field research we were faced with contradicting statements of school staff regarding the cost of uniforms. While the teachers in an all-girls elementary and-high school stated that uniforms are included in the annual fee and therefore for free, the headmaster explained that special shops provide uniforms where poorer children may buy them cheaper.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Interview 27, Pune, School Children and Teaching Staff at Public Girls School, 06/09/2014, line 184.

Other contradicting statements we found referred to tuition fees. At the same school in Pune, different amounts of the annual school fees were named by teachers and pupils.<sup>71</sup> This was also the result of another case in Mysore, in which an affected mother stated that she is required to pay for education fees and supply, although her children receive primary public education.<sup>72</sup> The fact that education is not free also became apparent when the school principal mentioned an extra “poor girl fund” for pupils from weaker socioeconomic backgrounds who cannot afford the school fees.<sup>73</sup>

A more indirect barrier is the loss of a potential wage earner in a poor family when a child visits the school regularly. This becomes even more important when children get beyond the obligatory schooling as the following quotation shows:

R: There are few students, after 14 years (...) they drop out.

I: So after 7th grade they drop out?

R: Economic problems are also there and because of that they don't send their children after 14 to school.<sup>74</sup>

This economic factor becomes particularly important in case of non-employment.<sup>75</sup> From our interviews it appeared that – in addition to the financial constraints – a minor ascribed value of education may contribute to dropping out of formal education. This particularly applies to self-employed people working in the informal sector, where, for instance, the boys enter into the footsteps of their fathers.

To conclude the analysis of financial factors, it could be shown that public education is as a matter of fact not always free as outlined in the Right to Education Act and that the reality does not reflect the outlined provisions.

### **Transport Challenges**

In order to physically access a school, transportation facilities have to be available. We were told that schools are either accessed by bus, rickshaw or walking. However, physical access is at the same time linked to financial resources.

I: So do you know by accident if some families have problems to pay the transport as well?

R: Yes many times they have. (...). And that's the reason you find people admitting their children to nearby schools. So up to my knowledge I don't find transport an issue. Because school networks are there. So if that school is far away I can take admission to a nearer governmental school. So there are areas where they have enough numbers of schools for children.<sup>76</sup>

According to provisions of the Right to Education Act, transportation is covered by the state governments for students up to 14 years. However, our research presented quite the contrary: “Transport is the own responsibility, (...) if you go to a governmental school they will not pay for

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<sup>71</sup> Interview 27, Pune, School Children and Teaching Staff at Public Girls School, 06/09/2014, line116-121; line 185-197.

<sup>72</sup> Interview 43, Mysore, Female Single Parent Working in Cardboard Factory, 12/09/2014, line 34.

<sup>73</sup> Interview 27, Pune, School Children and Teaching Staff at Public Girls School, 06/09/2014, line184.

<sup>74</sup> Interview 29, Mysore, Teaching Staff at Public Primary School in J.P. Nagar, 07/09/2014, line 69-77.

<sup>75</sup> Interview 26, Pune, Global Youth Ambassador, 09/09/2014, line 51.

<sup>76</sup> Interview 26, Pune, Global Youth Ambassador, 09/09/2014, line 56-75.

your transport. You will have to pay for your transport”.<sup>77</sup> Not only did families tell us that their children either walk to school or take the bus, they also stressed that free transport is not provided. In the case of J.P Nagar in Mysore, the governmental school lies in the heart of the slum and is therefore in walking distance. However, if they want to access a school outside of the slum, for example because they want to continue after grade seven, they get resettled or do not want to be socially stigmatised by attending a school in a slum; the families need to pay the costs of transportation. Officially, distances up to two kilometres have to be covered by the governmental schools.<sup>78</sup> However, as a representative of a NGO explicitly stated, “(...) that is a rule in the Right to Education Act. Now, you know that in India all the acts and all those bills are in the paper only. The implementation is very lacking”.<sup>79</sup>

### **Gender Related Issues in Education**

One of our research fields, the J.P. Nagar Slum in Mysore, is predominantly a Muslim inhabited slum. Here, we specifically came across the issue of gender equality in education and in how far gender is an obstacle in the access to visit schools and receive education. In various interviews with experts from NGOs, the issue of empowering woman was raised. The general opinion presents itself along the lines of women empowerment starting with education at a young age: “So how do you make a woman stronger? One, train future generations who are now at the primary level to get access to education. I'm sure after five or ten years this will have an impact”.<sup>80</sup>

To further support girls' higher education, the Indian government introduced a tuition remission for all single-girls until 12th grade (Press Information Bureau 2005). This waiver should officially be an incentive to counter gender inequality. However, it also includes economic reasons. Since children in India are mostly responsible for the financial coverage of parents in high age and retirement, single-girl children are in need of good job opportunities which are often traced back to a certain education. Notwithstanding, the information gained here was not verified, since not all girls get free education as shown in the previous example from the all-girls school in Pune.

In a Muslim slum girls might not be allowed to visit a school with the start of puberty and menstruation as it is seen as the start of adolescence.

So I asked this girl, 'Do you go to school'? So she said: no I have left the school. (...) And the girl told me that she was forced by her father because of her menstruation. So the father said that is a taboo. (...) [Y]ou can't go to school, because if you go to school, people will look at us in a different way. It's a taboo.<sup>81</sup>

We encountered this issue in our interviews as well, although we did not hear of any specific family. However, the primary school in J.P. Nagar experienced this inequality and agreed on the hypothesis

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<sup>77</sup> Interview 26, Pune, Global Youth Ambassador, 09/09/2014, line 71-75.

<sup>78</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 85-94.

<sup>79</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 83-96.

<sup>80</sup> Interview 26, Pune, Global Youth Ambassador, 09/09/2014, line 150-151.

<sup>81</sup> Interview 26, Pune, Global Youth Ambassador, 09/09/2014, line 27.

that girls are denied access to education by their parents after the beginning of puberty. This statement was confirmed by a teacher we interviewed.<sup>82</sup> Additionally, one of the slum leaders raised the question of security:

Here, girls especially in the Muslim community up to seven standard get education in this school but after the seven standard they have to go outside but in the Muslim community they won't allow them to go outside and get their education so their main problem is they don't want to send the girls outside so they are requesting many people to include this school classes up to ten standard to get the education up to ten standard.<sup>83</sup>

This proposal seems a useful recommendation to foster access to education for Muslim girls. If local schools inside the slum offer secondary education as well, girls might stay in school and graduate from high school. Access therefore also depends on the cooperation between the Muslim communities and local school authorities.

### **2.3 Private Education**

An alternative to public education is private education. With the Right to Education, a 25 per cent quota for 'children from weaker sections of society' has been introduced. Here, the state reimburses the schools within a PPP Plan (The Times of India 2010). In both research fields, we found families who were sending their children to a private school although the majority of children in the region received public education. Yet again we also found statements that contradict the general consent such as the following:

There is a rule in the Right to Education which says that 25% of the reservation for private schools is free of cost to slum children but till today none of the children in the slum area is able to go to a private school. It is just a saying.<sup>84</sup>

### **Costs and Affordability**

Costs for private education differ drastically from free up to thousands of Indian Rupee. For example, in Mysore we encountered a private school free of costs: "The primary school is a partnership of a private and public school, which is free of cost up to 7th Standard. For the High school, 8th to 10th Standard, the school authorities are paying the fees".<sup>85</sup> This was the only case we became aware of, in which families do not have to pay tuition fees for a private school, especially not after 8th grade. In another case, it was stated that "fees are manageable"<sup>86</sup> but no concrete figures were mentioned. Regardless of the tuition fees a private school is more costly than governmental schools, private school students need to cover costs of uniforms, textbooks, transportation, et cetera themselves.<sup>87</sup>

However, it can be stated that private schools do not necessarily have to be unaffordable for slum inhabitants and could in general be accessed by this part of the population as well. Yet, prior

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<sup>82</sup> Interview 29, Mysore, Teaching Staff at Public Primary School in J.P. Nagar, 07/09/2014, line 78-88.

<sup>83</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 79.

<sup>84</sup> Interview 34, Mysore, Self-Employed Woman and Housewife in J.P.Nagar, 13/09/2014, line143.

<sup>85</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor,12/09/14, line 30.

<sup>86</sup> Interview 52, Mysore, Print Shop Owner, 11/09/2014, line 94.

<sup>87</sup> Interview 12, Pune, Family in Kashewadi, 07/09/14, line 56-74.

knowledge of rights on quotas or research on low-tuition schools is required. Therefore, access of children from uneducated parents or with scarce social networks might be hampered.

### **Differences in Quality**

The question was posed if an investment in private schools really pays off and if a difference in quality is noticeable. In Mysore and Pune, slum inhabitants as well as NGO experts responded in the same way underlining the fact that it does make a difference and private schools show a higher education standard than schools run by the government: “Private school means there is a good education and everything. [In] the government schools nobody monitors, nobody cares”.<sup>88</sup> Another informant states: “Private school is a high education, education standard is high, and public school is low. So people prefer to give their children to private schools”.<sup>89</sup>

Throughout all interviews focusing on education it became clear that parents are aware that private schools assure better education which is linked to greater skill development, higher chances for university placements and in general better job opportunities.

It was shown that private schooling seems to be of great importance, as a great quality difference between the two school systems is noticeable. Therefore, not only the general access is important but rather the choice of the right school. Attending and in general preferring private schooling has to be differentiated. Here, financial restrictions conflict with the will to enhance personal human capital.

### **2.4 Non-Formal Education**

The major focus of the conducted field research lies on the access to formal education in slum areas. However, non-formal education as well as vocational training need to be taken into consideration, too, as all sorts of individual skill development contributes to human capital. Due to the given scope of this paper, non-formal education will only be summarised briefly.

In the field we came across different non-formal education projects. In Pune, a NGO called ROSHNI, for instance, provides education for dropped-out students in slums. The organisation does neither have financial resources, nor offices or class rooms. However, motivation and fun while learning are paramount. The same approach is followed by the Rural Literacy and Health Programme (RLHP) in Mysore:

First, we have to understand that the education is important, like all the slums now we have a school. After that the children are send to school we conducted non-formal education, improving the quality education. Enrolling child labourers because we have some many child labourers and drop outs. So, non-formal education means that this is a non-formal method, we are teaching with singing, with dance, drawing, painting, story telling.<sup>90</sup>

The goal of those learning centres is not a formal education. However, it is a way to create motivation to learn and to guide children back into the education system in a playful way. Therefore, those

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<sup>88</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 52.

<sup>89</sup> Interview 18, Pune, Political Representative of Kashewadi, 07/09/14, line 186-198.

<sup>90</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 52.

projects are a helpful instrument to pave the way from non-formal to formal education. By teaching directly in the slum area, those learning projects ultimately target drop-outs and marginalised at their living spaces. Furthermore, they offer additional training for children from low-educated or even illiterate families. Those children are in a double disadvantage of not attending a quality school and at the same time not having educational support at home.<sup>91</sup>

The concept of apprenticeship does not directly exist in India. Necessary job skills are acquired by on-the-job trainings. Here, either a family member has a company or a shop and trains the workers as in the case of the hairdresser or the card board factory. Sometimes the work does not even require specific preparatory education.<sup>92</sup>

Besides that, the state government and municipalities also provide training sessions and workshops to further enhance skills. Here, trainings on computer, IT or driving are specifically offered to people below poverty line. However, it does not become clear how interested people can apply to it and if it is accessible for every citizen. “Once they get proper education and take the training what we give them, naturally they become self-sustained. They don't have to depend on others”<sup>93</sup>. This comment summarises the main reason why non-formal training projects are offered and access to people below poverty line is granted. The more skills and the higher the education background, the higher the job opportunities and the possibility for a self-sustained life.

### **3. Health**

This part will focus on access to health. Here, the paper is divided into three sections. The first part explores the health infrastructure in India regarding the public, private and health insurance systems. The slum dwellers’ possible preferences for the public or private are analysed in the second part followed by a section on access to health facilities. The latter focuses on transport, health insurance and the implementation of health programmes.

#### **3.1 Depiction of Infrastructure**

The constitution of India lays down that “the State shall regard [...] the improvement of public health as among its primary duties [...]” (Constitution of India/Part IV). Hence, health is “constitutionally designated as a state subject” (Nambiar 2013: 135) and a constitutional right (Sakdapolrak 2010: 108). Despite this self-commitment, the health care system is affected by two main problems: First, its two-tiered system. On the one hand an existing but under-financed public sector and on the other hand an unregulated and heterogeneous private one (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 33; Butsch/Kraas/Nitschke 2008, Sakdapolrak 2010: 267). However, the private system provides services for the majority of the population (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 33; Butsch/Kraas/Nitschke

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<sup>91</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 52.

<sup>92</sup> Interview 51, Mysore, Mechanic Shop Owner, 12/09/2014, line 572-940.

<sup>93</sup> Interview 38, Mysore, Skill Development Expert, 12/09/2014, line 52.

2008, Sakdapolrak 2010: 267). The objective of the public one to provide free or heavily subsidised services, for example by special programmes and funds for low-income citizens, has not yet been achieved (Butsch/Kraas/Nitschke 2008). The second problem is the discrepancy between existing laws and their implementation. It has been pointed out by a number of observers that India has a comprehensive legal health system. Nevertheless, it is characterised by a poor administrative and bureaucratic control (Peters/Muraleedharan 2008: 2133). According to a NGO: “In India all (...) act[s] and all those (...) it is in the paper only. The implementation is very lacking”.<sup>94</sup> For instance, there is no standardisation of fee structures (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 33). As a result, it is possible that patients pay different fees for the same services and provided medicines in different governmental health facilities. It is challenging and very complex to make statements about in how far and to what extent low-income slum dwellers have to pay for health care costs which incur in governmental facilities. It is worth to mention that corruption in the governmental health care system is an issue, too (Nambiar 2013: 136). Against this backdrop, the two-tiered system will be further depicted in order to understand the main characteristic of the public and private health care system.

### **The Public Health System**

Studies point out that India has a comprehensive public health system. However, it is disconnected from the realities and needs of the population (Butsch/Kraas/Nitschke 2008; Peters/Muraleedharan 2008: 2133).

Three major challenges can be identified in regard to the access to health. Firstly, inconvenient opening hours of health facilities is one of the crucial obstacles for slum citizens: “Many public facilities open for consultations later than poor people typically start the working day and then close earlier than they can easily access them (in general, 8am-12pm and 2pm-5pm)” (Ergler et al. 2011: 334). As a result, people are forced to consult private facilities which offer convenient opening hours or even provide 24/7 services or they lose working time. Secondly, an appointment and treatment in a governmental hospital is very time-consuming (Sakdapolrak 2010: 274). This might be a result of the public sector being characterised by underfunding and understaffing as well as consumables and medicines often not being available and medical equipment being out of order. As a result, patients need to travel to health facilities and then need to queue and wait hours to see a doctor (Sakdapolrak 2010: 110; 273). In milder cases doctors often require that patients return on the next day for further treatment because s/he only treats severe cases. Moreover, drugs are often given for one day only and the doctor expects patients to come every day to get more (Sakdapolrak 2010: 273). The third obstacle to accessing public care is the in-patient system in governmental hospitals. In general, patients need a care giver, usually family members, who provide them with food because this service is usually not offered by the hospital. An interviewed waste picker in Pune reports: “(T)here was nobody who even

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<sup>94</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 425ff.

gave me bread [and] water”<sup>95</sup>. Traditionally, the family is the key resource for providing care of patients in India (Mattoo et al. 2013: 2). However, family caregivers “have received very little attention in the published literature from India” (Joad/Mayamol/Chaturvedi 2011).

In conclusion, it can be said that in cases of sickness, particularly for in-patient hospitalisation, the household is affected by an additional financial burden which encompasses travel expenses and a loss of working time (of the care giver). Therefore, the mere existence of public health facilities does not necessarily imply utilisation. Furthermore, the public health care system requires social capital (Ergler et al. 2011: 336).

### **The Private Health System**

First, it is worth mentioning that the private sector is heterogeneous (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 33; Sakdapolrak 2010: 267). That means, “(f)acilities range from modern, sophisticated hospitals [...] to dilapidated rooms in slums run by semi-qualified persons” (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 33). Second, it is unregulated. For example, “Maharashtra is among the few states which require registration of private hospitals” (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 32). Through this missing regulation and the lack of the state to enforce regulatory controls the private health sector offers a range of services for different needs but not all of these services have a good quality as well as the care is often inadequate (Cook/Halstall/Wankhade 2015: 63; Sakdapolrak 2010: 267). Nevertheless, private healthcare providers have a growing influence (Cook/Halstall/Wankhade 2015: 63). India has witnessed a rapid expansion of private facilities in the past two decades (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 32). Current research findings reveal that the private system is the main source of health care (Butsch/Kraas/Nitschke 2008; George/Iyer 2013: 298; Sakdapolrak 2010: 250f). It is estimated that approximately two thirds of slum habitants use private services (Nambiar 2013: 136; Sakdapolrak 2010: 250f), although they have to pay. As indicated above, appointments and treatments in public health facilities are time-consuming. Private providers are less time-consuming. Patients usually are treated immediately and the doctors give or prescribe all drugs which are needed for the treatment, therefore they do not need to return and queue on the next day. In addition, public facilities usually offer catering, therefore no care giver is necessary and they offer more convenient opening hours (Sakdapolrak 2010: 273f). On the other hand, studies shed light that especially for informal settlement habitants their “reliance on private health providers is fraught with serious economic consequences” (Alam 2013: xxvi).

The private sector, however, provides health services for the majority of the population. As a result, the access to health facilities is mainly determined by financial capital.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 202.

<sup>96</sup> Our research results encompass only public and private health care systems because none of our interviewees mentioned another system. Indeed, in India informal providers (Laiengesundheitssystem) are a third system (George/Iyer 2013; Sakdapolrak 2010: 228 ff).

### 3.2 Preference of Public and Private Health Facilities

This chapter analyses the two-tiered system in India. Our interest was to look whether public or private facilities are preferred and if we can find an explanation for this decision. An elected representative of the PMC explained us the situation in Pune as follows:

[I]n private hospitals [there is] good service, in government hospital [the] service is weak, poor people are going always to government hospital because they have no more money, they have hard work, middle class and higher class they always prefer private hospitals.<sup>97</sup>

This statement indicates the different qualities of the two-tiered system and that access is regulated by money. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that “using” and “preferring” a system are two different aspects. Low-income households might use the public system because of financial restraints but their “first preference is private”<sup>98</sup> according to a female slum dweller in Pune. She explains that governmental hospitals are not clean and that the private service and quality is better. Statements about the insufficient public system can be found in Mysore, too. One interviewed NGO representative summarises the current situation concerning governmental health facilities: “Bed is there, doctor is not there, injection is there, no medicine is there. (...) If doctor is there but there is no instruments. That is the situation. If PHC [Primary Health Care] is there, doctor is not coming. That is the situation”.<sup>99</sup>

According to our definition, physical capital includes the physical existence of health facilities as well as its management systems. In conclusion, public health facilities are available but their services have such an insufficient quality that habitants try to access private services if possible.

### 3.3 The Health Insurance System

Along with the public and private health care system described above, the health insurance system is an important factor when it comes to access to health. In general, a health insurance can improve the access to health facilities since out-of-pocket payments can be avoided. This is particularly crucial for low-income groups who have limited financial capital and cannot pay cash first (Basu 2013: 86). In India, however, such out-of-pocket payments are the main source of health financing for informal households (Bhate-Deosthali/Khatri/Wagle 2011: 33; Seeberg et al. 2014: 52; WHO 2010: 486). In general, studies point out that 85 per cent of the working population is not covered by any insurance and lack access to effective social protection schemes (Basu 2013: 83). Respectively only ten per cent of the overall population is insured, particularly civil servants and employees of big companies employed in the formal sector (Balarajan/Selvaraj/Subramanian 2011: 509; Saktapolrak 2010: 112). There is a huge disparity between the formal and informal economic sector. For instance, “[c]ommunity-based health insurance schemes and schemes for the informal sector that encourage risk

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<sup>97</sup> Interview 18, Pune, Political Representative of Kashewadi, 07/09/14, line 200.

<sup>98</sup> Interview 12, Pune, Family in Kashewadi, 07/09/14, line 160.

<sup>99</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 116.

pooling provide for less than one per cent of the population“ (Balarajan/Selvaraj/Subramanian 2011: 509).

In India, publicly funded health insurance schemes are rare (Singh 2009: 402). Nevertheless, India's governments have been trying for years to make health insurances available, especially for informal households which are most sensitive to the costs for health care (Balarajan/Selvaraj/Subramanian 2011: 509). For example, the Ministry of Labour and Employment launched the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) scheme for BPL families in 2008 (RSBY 2015). Its objective is to provide cover for hospitalisation expenses up to 30.000 INR for a family (five members) (ibid). Transportation charges are also covered up to a maximum of 1.000 INR with 100 INR per visit (ibid). However, there were difficulties to equip public health facilities with the necessary IT-devices which are essential to verify the identity of the card holder (Virk/Atun 2015: 6). Furthermore, 30.000 INR are a “paltry sum for major surgical interventions in private hospitals” and some medication is excluded (Basu 2013: 87). Moreover, the weak services in public facilities still exist. “However, the major drawback or shortcoming in this scheme is the non-inclusion of BPL population, because it is also true that a large majority of population does not come under BPL status” (Chaudhary/Gupta 2013: 20). This non-inclusion is a result because in most states cards are issued on BPL lists made in 2002 (Basu 2013: 88). Families who impoverished after 2002 are not considered as BPL and are not eligible for that scheme. According to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare another problem is the low awareness among the beneficiaries (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2014: 8). In late August 2014, the current Prime Minister Modi launched the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY)-scheme, in which every family is eligible (PMJDY 2015). Like RSBY, the scheme is publicly funded. Actually, this scheme is a banking one, where account holders get a debit card including an accident insurance (cover up to 100.000 INR) and a life insurance (cover up to 30.000 INR) (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2014: 8).

In conclusion, the weakness of the governmental implementation concerning health care is obvious. The public sector can neither offer adequate services, nor are the governmental agencies able to control the private health sector. In addition, public health insurance schemes might not achieve to enrol BPL households efficiently.

### **3.4 Access to Health Facilities**

This chapter deals with access to health facilities and is divided into three topics: transport, health insurance and lacking implementation of health issues.

#### **Transport**

As mentioned above, the reachability of health facilities accounts for the general access of health facilities. One obstacle for access to health facilities is the insufficient transport system. A PMC official stated that citizens can reach governmental hospitals in 20 to 30 minutes which is “fairly good

in India”<sup>100</sup>. However, for emergency cases, it is not sufficient. Until 2005 an ambulance network was non-existent (National Health Mission 2013). To address this problem, a PPP was established in the same year. However, it is highly resource constrained (Marla 2011: 3). Although Mysore is a comparably small city, the Health Care Centre stays out of reach for many households due to long distance which cannot be walked. Therefore, an ambulance service for difficult deliveries is being established.<sup>101</sup>

In regard to our case example of the J.P. Nagar area, inhabitants need to pay 50 INR to reach the nearest governmental hospital by using public bus system.<sup>102</sup> This amount is a financial burden (Sakdapolrak 2010: 259). Thus, for both cities it stays questionable whether the transport system can cope with emergency cases (Sakdapolrak 2010: 259). It should be kept in mind, that in governmental facilities an assisting family care giver is required. In the case mentioned above, affected families would have travel expenses of 100 INR a day. Summarising the results we can see that transport is expensive and probably not immediately available. Thus, both could have a negative impact on accessing health facilities.

### **Health Insurance**

In Pune we had the opportunities to speak with waste pickers, PMC officials and two local NGOs which organise a pilot PPP-project concerning the waste collection and support waste pickers. Concerning the provision of health insurance we obtained contradicting information.<sup>103</sup> One employee of the NGO stated that waste pickers get medical insurance provided by PMC.<sup>104</sup> This is challenged by the statement of waste pickers who claim not to have any health insurance.<sup>105</sup> Another waste picker, however, reports that the NGO helps them with the hospital bill “as much as they can”<sup>106</sup>.

But even if they have a health insurance the ability to use it is not guaranteed. As one man explained illiteracy might be a problem as “there [in the public hospital] is a lot of paper work and that causes a lot of trouble”<sup>107</sup>. Hence, even if insurance is provided it is questionable whether one is able to profit from it.

With regards to the outlined RSBY and PMJDY scheme: None of our BPL interviewees report that s/he holds a RSBY or PMJDY insurance. In Mysore, one out of three interviewed small-scale entrepreneurs has a health insurance which covers his dependents (wife and children), too.<sup>108</sup> None of

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<sup>100</sup> Interview 56, Pune, PMC Official (Part 3), 05/09/2014, line 27.

<sup>101</sup> Interview 25, Mysore, Nurses at Primary Health Care Center, 14/09/14, line 134.

<sup>102</sup> Interview 32, Mysore, Female Quran Teacher in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/2014, line 102.

<sup>103</sup> The report on Solid Waste Management in this volume provides further insights on the contradictive findings, see chapter III.

<sup>104</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 29; Interview 10, Pune, waste pickers at Katraj ward, 05/09/14, line 7.

<sup>105</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 196; 200f.

<sup>106</sup> Interview 7, Pune, Slum Dwellers, 05/09/14, line 50.

<sup>107</sup> Interview 7, Pune, Slum Dwellers, 05/09/14, line 50.

<sup>108</sup> Interview 49, Mysore, Head/ Man in Charge of Construction Site, 13/09/2014: 42; 44; Interview 51, Mysore, Mechanic Shop Owner, 12/09/2014, line 80; Interview 52, Mysore, Print Shop Owner, 11/09/2014, line 110.

them is BPL, however, one reports that the cost of insurance is too expensive because he would need to pay 1.000 to 15.000 INR a year but the limit of coverage is too low with 30.000 to 40.000 INR.<sup>109</sup>

Besides formal structures and official health insurance companies, we find hints that non-formalised structures exist, too. An interviewed small-scale entrepreneur of a mechanic shop reports how he supports his workers in cases of accidents:

[They] do not pay from their salary; he pays from the organisation that is this workshop. And if he [the worker] needs a couple of days off, he does give them the days off and they are paid. It's like a paid leave.<sup>110</sup>

To get financial assistance in health related issues, families and friends are the major sources for credit. Therefore, slum dwellers are particularly dependent on this kind of social infrastructure (Zingel et al. 2011: 310; 316).

In conclusion, it can be questioned whether slum habitants are aware of health insurance schemes and to what extent both schemes have a trickle-down effect. Similar to the two-tiered system of private and public health care, the health insurance system seems to be a two-tiered system, too, where the access is regulated by money. For instance, we obtained the statement: “Here people will not do medical insurance, unless they are, above middle class family, they will do. Lower middle class and lower class people will not do medical insurance”.<sup>111</sup>

### **Lacking Implementation of Health Programmes**

Health systems entail various infrastructures to support access to health facilities. The condition of those systems determines whether health facilities are accessible and if they can provide quality services. During our research we obtained diverging information concerning public health care services. For instance, in Mysore contradicting statements were made by BPL interviewees concerning the governmental provision of free medical treatment. While providers of medical treatment often proclaimed the provision of free services, recipients denied that those were free of costs. This applies for school medical check-up programmes<sup>112</sup>, provision of vaccination<sup>113</sup>, and pregnancy screenings<sup>114</sup>.

A possible explanation might be the varying degree of implementation of such medical programmes that are free of cost. Furthermore, the manager of a local NGO in Mysore declares corruption as one of the hampering factors. Another interviewee backs his theory when stating:

There is no safety in the BPL-card. And even they show the BPL-card, below poverty card but the doctor is expecting a money from these poor people also. (...) [T]hey charge more and more. In spite of the BPL-card they will charge more expensive.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Interview 52, Mysore, Print Shop Owner, 11/09/2014, line 110.

<sup>110</sup> Interview 44, Pune, Female Workers at Stitching Shop, 06/09/2014, line: 250.

<sup>111</sup> Interview 29, Mysore, Teaching Staff at Public Primary School in J.P. Nagar, 07/09/2014, line 105.

<sup>112</sup> Interview: Mysore, Teaching Staff at Public Primary School in J.P. Nagar, 07/09/2014, line 91ff.

<sup>113</sup> Interview 34, Mysore, Self-Employed Woman and Housewife, 13/09/2014, line 50ff.

<sup>114</sup> Interview 25, Mysore, Nurses at Primary Health Care Center, 14/09/14, line 27; 162-165.

<sup>115</sup> Interview 24, Mysore, Man and Woman in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 85.

As a result of varying degrees of implementation, low-income slum dwellers developed strategies in order to avoid expensive health care. For instance, they purchase drugs directly from the pharmacy without consulting a doctor before.<sup>116</sup> Sakdapolrak (2010: 241) shows that 55 per cent of slum dwellers use such strategies. Second, they only go to health facilities in severe cases, like “when they are so sick, then only they go for the hospital”<sup>117</sup>. By avoiding fees, informal settlement inhabitants might endanger their health.

Summarising our research findings concerning the implementation, two conclusions should be emphasised. Firstly, it does not matter how many governmental health facilities exist that provide health programmes, as long as their implementation is not controlled efficiently, the access is not guaranteed and people cannot benefit. Secondly, such failures might lead to a vicious circle of exacerbating health conditions and people jeopardise their health through self-medication.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Our research has shown that habitants of informal settlements in Pune and Mysore do have access to public and private education and health facilities. In general, the access is regulated by financial means and private facilities are preferred because of their better service and quality. However, private services are not always affordable for low-income slum dwellers due to limited financial capital. Nevertheless, the poor quality in public facilities is perceived as a crucial concern and was criticised by many of our interviewees. Interestingly, a general access to public primary education is not the ultimate concern of slum residents. However, this is more eminent in low and middle class families who try to enrol their children in low-cost private schools.

We could detect that the access is not only limited through financial constraints but also through other factors, such as knowledge, motivation, and possibilities of transport.

Furthermore, it should be differentiated between the implementation on the ground and the legislation. Those findings add up to the picture of incomplete implementation of the political schemes aiming at the accessibility of education and health for the informal settlement citizens.

With regard to the school sector the financial side of accessing public primary education stays mostly opaque. Not all public schools are for free, sometimes school uniforms are provided and sometimes one has to pay, at least partly. Transport up to a specific distance should be provided by the government as well. However in one case, children could not access a public school since no transport was available. School drop outs due to commencing puberty and also safety concerns are other challenges that particularly effect girls.

This, however, also depicts that restrictions in accessing schools are not always caused by missing or poor implementation of governmental decisions but are also the responsibility of the families. On the

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<sup>116</sup> Interview 32, Mysore, Female Quran Teacher in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/2014 line 9.

<sup>117</sup> Interview 32, Mysore, Female Quran Teacher in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/2014, line 111.

other side, our analysis shows that particularly the poor implementation within the public health sector and varying degrees of implementation of health programmes hampers the accessibility. Furthermore, it can be argued, public health insurance schemes have not yet been successful in covering BPL-families in Pune and Mysore. Summarising our result pertaining to public and private facilities of education and health, it can be argued that the implementation of existing governmental regulations and laws is lacking. The gap of theoretically guaranteed legislation and their implementation in reality seems to be huge in India.

It can be concluded that a general access to education in informal settlements in the visited slums in Pune and Mysore is partly given. Yet the implementation lags behind the legal framework, such as the Right to Education Act continuing higher education depends even more on the socioeconomic background of the families, since not only tuitions fees and supply need to be paid for but parents also need to consider that their children will, during the time of education, not be able to contribute greatly to the monthly income. For the health sector it can be concluded that generally slum inhabitants have access to public and private facilities as long as they have financial means. Indeed, it can be argued that “health is not affordable for the poor”<sup>118</sup>. The limited access to public and private health facilities and services could have a negative impact on the health condition.

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<sup>118</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 135.

### **III. Solid Waste Management in Pune and Mysore**

#### **Exploring the Effects of Political Programmes of Solid Waste Management on Waste Pickers**

Hannah Schmidt and Nora Wagner

##### **1. Introduction**

Solid waste management (SWM) represents one of the major challenges for fast growing cities in less developed countries. In India, where several of the fastest growing cities are located, this is even truer. Consequently, the subject of solid waste management finds its way into several debates; the developmental discourse discovers government schemes on solid waste management as a possibility to enhance the living standard of the most disadvantaged, big industries see enormous potential for introducing new technologies and increasing their profit. Politically, the subject becomes more pressing and needs quick reaction and adaption (Annepu 2012).

As a result of this discursive mainstreaming of SWM, several reforms were introduced all over India to tackle the challenges of solid waste management. Uprising protests in the whole country due to increasing waste, pushed the Supreme Court of India to file a charge against the Government of India, all state governments, and several municipal authorities for failing to manage municipal solid waste appropriately. Consequently, in 2000 the Municipal Solid Waste Rules 2000 (“Rules 2000”) were published (Asnani 2006: 167). According to the National Institute of Urban Affairs “the rules are applicable to every urban local body in India responsible for collection, segregation, storage, transportation, processing and disposal of municipal waste” (National Institute of Urban Affairs 2015: 4). Among various recommendations, the Rules 2000 make segregation at source mandatory (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 26).

Our research question aims at the effects such political programmes have on waste pickers, as they often begin to govern formerly ungoverned areas where informal economic opportunities were provided. Our findings show that this new engagement of politics in the area of SWM is not only limited to providing logistical support but also aims at creating awareness, broadening the subject of solid waste management not only to spatial and logistical problems but also to health, environmental and social issues. This is why we propose the hypothesis that those government schemes which we will analyse in the following also have an effect not only on financial and physical capital but also on social and human capital of waste pickers.

Our research took place in the two cities, Pune and Mysore. We conducted 12 interviews; two of them were focus group discussions. Furthermore, we were able to draw results out of observatory participation when we accompanied two waste pickers through their daily routine in Pune. Additionally, we gained insights from our observations of waste picking processes throughout our entire stay. Our informants were largely waste pickers, but included also responsible political

representatives, representatives of the NGO sector and experts from private contractors, like the manager of the Mysore Excel plant.

This paper is structured into two parts. The first part will focus on Pune and the second part will focus on Mysore in regard to the cities' SWM and the respective effects on waste pickers. As the cities' municipal corporations chose different approaches to waste management (they mainly differ in the degree of (de)centralisation) we will be able to draw conclusions regarding the acknowledgement of the waste pickers needs by either governmental schemes or private actors. Although these results cannot be generalised throughout all India, it represents interesting findings on the intention of top-down mechanisms and the results at the bottom.

## **2. Pune**

In terms Solid Waste Management, Pune represents a decentralised approach. The involvement of bottom-up organizations acting pro-poor is a remarkable feature of Pune. Especially the organization of SWaCH has gained national and international attention. The following section will look at the effects the decentralised scheme on waste pickers have.

### **2.1 Solid Waste Management in Pune**

In India the waste generation per capita has increased from 0.44 kg per day in 2001 to 0.5 kg per day in 2011. Of course this places enormous challenges on infrastructural, natural and budgetary resources of the city administrative. Pune is one of the fastest growing cities in India which is reflected in the development of waste generation. It is estimated that in Pune 1.600 tons of waste are generated per day (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 28). A survey of 2009 observed that out of the total waste collected, 90 per cent gets dumped, whereas the other 10 per cent are either recycled or composted (FICCI Survey 2009). 52 per cent of the waste in Pune is collected through doorstep collection, while the remaining waste still gets collected from central dumping stations (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 26). Pune operates a single dumpsite (Vij 2012: 441). It is located at Urali Devachi, 20 kilometres outside the city boundaries. Close by is a private processing plant, the Hanjar Biotech Energies Pvt Ltd. which uses biochemical technology transforming the waste into compost (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 27). Before the waste is transferred to Urali Devachi, it goes to transfer stations where it is weighted and registered (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 27). The large landfill in Urali Devachi is the site in the city where the challenges of waste management is most visible. Since its instalment in 1999 (Rode 2011: 7), there were several “garbage crises” when residents agitated against this dumping site in their direct neighbourhood. This gets worse in situations (e.g. Festivals) where the PMC cannot handle all the waste the city is generating (Isalkar 2013a; Banerjee 2015).

Waste management in Pune is – like in many other developing cities – a major issue which will further increase in scope and complexity. Hence, as Ahmed and Ali are pointing out, it needs “careful

attention for striking a balance between quality of service and cost effectiveness” (Ahmed/Ali 2004: 468). The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) has approached the problem of waste management with two strategies, which will be discussed in the following. Important to note is that Pune presents a specific case because of the high level of organisation of Pune’s waste pickers. Since 1993 they are represented by their trade union Kagad Kach Patra Kastakari Panchayat (KKPKP) which aims at the integration of waste pickers into the formalised system of SWM. KKPKP was founded at a time when privatisation was globally promoted as universal solution. KKPKP designed their proposals aiming at countering privatisation by providing a better service which would guarantee the further employment and involvement of the waste pickers in Pune (Poornima 2012: 5; 11). Their influence can be traced back to the designs of the actual SWM system in Pune.

### **2.1.1 Mandatory Segregation**

In 2000 the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) implemented the compulsory segregation of waste, even before the Supreme Court India made it mandatory (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 26). Since then it is obligatory for Pune citizens to segregate their waste into dry and wet waste. The time to adapt ran out in July 2005 when the last collection of non-segregated waste stopped. Since then, waste which is not segregated does not get collected by the corporation (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 26) – at least in theory. Furthermore, PMC has made it compulsory that “each and every establishment has [to supply and use] their [organic] waste processing facility”<sup>119</sup>. This aims at societies, schools, commercial establishments et cetera whereas slums are still not addressed. Since then, each of those buildings is obliged to use their own composting facilities to dispose their own wet waste. The mandatory character is secured by the distribution of building permission certificates<sup>120</sup> and completion certificates which lead to tax benefits<sup>121</sup>.

The segregation at source seems to be a good strategic move from the PMC, since new technologies require segregated waste to process it. As it is difficult to segregate, once the garbage is mixed not to segregate at source would cause a huge loss for all actors involved.<sup>122</sup> A study from KKPKP in Pune, carried out in 2007, revealed, that 90 per cent of the waste which is dumped at Urali is actually biodegradable, making the transportation unnecessary and causing a loss of financial resources for the city (Anagal 2010: 5). Also the segregation would facilitate the “silent” work of waste pickers who were already generating valuable resources out of recycling (Mundhe/Jaybhaye/Dorik 2014: 26). There are estimations that these waste pickers already are reducing the waste for four per cent with

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<sup>119</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 8.

<sup>120</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 8.

<sup>121</sup> Interview 8, Pune, Chairman of Middle Class Building, 05.09.14, line 5-19.

<sup>122</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 54-55.

their (informal) recycling activities (Annepu 2012: 107). So when the residents segregate it at source the value of the waste increases” because a greater percentage of waste can get recycled.<sup>123</sup>

This applied measure made economic engagement a possibly lucrative option. Hence, the second measure taken by the PMC – privatisation – is closely interlinked with the necessity to reduce the quantity of dumped waste and the steady increase of waste generation in Pune.

### **2.1.2 Decentralisation of the Solid Waste Management System**

Like Ahmed and Ali describe, there is “an emerging trend in encouraging the private sector to enter into solid waste management” (Ahmed/Ali 2004: 467). As they further elaborate, linkages between private and public sector can improve the efficiency of handling the waste and provide therefore a solution for cities like Pune. Our findings suggest that Pune embraced this strategy by contracting various actors in the solid waste management sector, thus decentralising the SWM in Pune. Especially, the collection and processing process experienced outsourcing while PMC is still responsible for the transportation and disposal of waste throughout the city and still provides the collection from central points in parts of the city.<sup>124</sup>

#### **Waste Processing**

Besides the segregation at source, which can already be seen as a part of the decentralised waste system in Pune, the problem of too much untreated waste was mainly addressed by contracting private companies on a tender basis to process the waste in order to reduce the quantity of dumping at the landfill site. There are 15-20 biogas plants located in the city, providing alternatives to the dumping in transforming large quantities of waste either into electricity or into compost.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, there are several private companies working as a government tender mainly in installing and managing processing plants. There are mixed results regarding their efficiency. Rochem and Hanjar, two large processing facilities were lately target of increased criticism as they could not fulfil the target of the signed contracts (Isalkar 2013b). The critic even went as far as opposing the PPP-model in general “since they have caused financial losses to the civic body and only benefited private companies” (Anparthi 2014).

#### **Waste Collection**

When the Municipal Solid Waste Rules from 2000 required the primary collection of garbage (door-to-door) instead of the earlier practice of secondary collection from central points, Pune – not able to provide door-to-door collection for the whole city – had to adapt its system which led to a gap where private actors could engage. This led to a decentralised system of waste collection in Pune (Anagal

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<sup>123</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 11-12.

<sup>124</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 39.

<sup>125</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 11-12; Interview 9, Pune, Official at the Biogas Plant, 05/09/14, line 3-4.

2010). Since then, the main transportation of waste with big vehicles is done by PMC workers and vehicles but the actual collection from the households is often outsourced to other actors.

Probably because of the high level of organisation of Pune's waste pickers there are several projects applied which concentrate on the integration of waste pickers into the formal system. This was further encouraged by the Maharashtra Government which required a priority given to organisations of waste pickers in case of outsourcing (ibid). The KKPKP seized the opportunity when the national Municipal Solid Waste Rules were announced in 2000. Together with the PMC it launched a pilot programme in 2005 through which informal waste pickers were integrated into the door-to-door collection and thus formalised. As a formal "pro-poor" partner for the PMC SWaCH as an institutionalised workers cooperative was founded (SWaCH 2013). There are two projects which aim at integrating the waste pickers and which will be described in more detail. Both are mainly operated by SWaCH.

#### *Project 1: Dhole Patil*

In the ward *Dhole Patil*, SWaCH as a formal partner to the PMC has the responsibility to provide the door-to-door collection. The workers collect the waste at the doorstep and bring it to a central point where the PMC truck collects it daily. The salaries of the waste pickers are generated through the direct payment of the households – creating a personal relationship between them – and the additional surplus they are getting by selling off the valuable recyclables. Only the pushcarts, bins and uniforms are provided by PMC.<sup>126</sup> Hence, waste pickers remain self-employed workers and are not getting paid by the PMC (Rode 2011: 5). Nevertheless, they are formalised through the issuing of identity cards by PMC which was successfully argued by KKPKP in 2007 (ibid). Additionally, SWaCH provides them with a basic health insurance paid by a small amount which is taken from their monthly income.

#### *Project 2: Zero-Waste Project in Katraj Ward*

After another waste crisis – when the waste could not get processed at Urali in 2010 – the project "Zero Waste" was implemented in 2011. Its aim is the 100 per cent segregation at source and 100 per cent door-to-door collection.<sup>127</sup> This project was initiated by JANWANI and is operated by PMC, SWaCH and JANWANI. JANWANI, a social initiative initiated by the chamber of commerce<sup>128</sup> functions as a facilitator which brings all the stakeholders together<sup>129</sup>, PMC provides the authorisation and the distribution of pushcarts and other equipment and SWaCH recruits the waste pickers in this respective area.<sup>130</sup> It is a project linking the administrative level (PMC) with the industry (JANWANI) and the waste pickers themselves (SWaCH). The payment is the same system as in *Dhole Patil* where the households pay the waste pickers directly. The collection experiences a slight differentiation to the

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<sup>126</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 40-41.

<sup>127</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 13.

<sup>128</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 48-53.

<sup>129</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 15.

<sup>130</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 48-53.

system in *Dhole Patil* as the waste is segregated more thoroughly. After the segregated waste is collected from the households, the organic waste which cannot be treated in own composting facilities is either given to the PMC or directly to a biogas plant. The inorganic waste is again segregated into 15 to 17 different categories. This enables the waste pickers to sell more – formerly invaluable – waste as valuable resource to scrap dealers.<sup>131</sup>

### **Assessment of Decentralisation by the Involved Actors**

The PMC presented us the way of privatisation and decentralisation as the perfect way to tackle several problems simultaneously. Private actors and their applied technologies and their manual labour force are reducing the carbon emission and hence reducing environmental problems.<sup>132</sup> The partnership with SWaCH is designed to address the needs of the waste pickers and also to make the process of waste collection more effective.

The efficiency of decentralisation shows different results. As mentioned before the private processing plants were lately target of critique because of their marginal efficiency. The collection processes which integrate the waste pickers on the other hand are referred to as quite successful. Not only from the operators, as one lady from JANWANI claims:

And this is quite successful! In 20 wards, we have been able to increase the doorstep collection from 25% to around 80-85%. Then segregation it has increased from 30% to 60-65%. Then we have been able to reduce the community bins because of the increased door-to-door collection from 279 to around 130.<sup>133</sup>

It also experienced national and international attention as best practice model (e.g. Gunsilius et al. 2010; Dias 2012). In the positive evaluation of PMC their major financial relief is mentioned above all:

In that context because there is no extra burden on local state government, indirectly we are extracting the money from people's pocket, because people avail the door to door service and they have to pay for that extra services.<sup>134</sup>

Also JANWANI presents us the zero-waste project as a win-win situation for all actors:

So with a small amount of money and accountability, administrative costs have been reduced and the waste collector who actually used to go to the community bins – now they don't have to go into that to take out some material.<sup>135</sup>

Especially the PMC can reduce its expenditures with this partnership as the lady from JANWANI demonstrates:

It is cheaper for the PMC to provide pushcarts, it will just cost them 15-20.000 INR, other than purchasing a big vehicle which is carrying day to day expenses of fuel and all that plus the driver. Now they only have to give the pushcarts which are maintained by the waste collectors.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 11-12.

<sup>132</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 4.

<sup>133</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 13.

<sup>134</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 29-30.

<sup>135</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 11.

<sup>136</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 34-35.

Both, SWaCH and the PMC also emphasise the improvements on the social level. The partnership programme of SWaCH and PMC provides the formalisation of the involved waste pickers through the provision of identity cards et cetera and secures their independency through their self-employment. This is expected to ease not only the challenges of SWM in Pune but also addresses the social issues like the social insecurity and the health hazards of waste pickers. Also the direct interaction between households and waste pickers is expected to lead to a social bonding between waste pickers and citizens.<sup>137</sup>

## 2.2 Effects on Waste Pickers in Pune

As the pro-poor partnership between PMC and a waste pickers union presents a particular case it will be the main focus of the second part which analyses the impact of Pune's solid waste programmes on waste pickers.

The main objective in establishing the KKPKP was to achieve a better recognition of the work of waste pickers. The integration of waste pickers into a formalised system was supposed to achieve a "legitimate work space" (Poornima 2012: 1) and a recognition of waste pickers as workers distributing greatly to the benefit for all – after all there are estimations that one third of Pune's waste was handled by the informal sector (Annepu 2012: 72).

At the first sight there are promising signs that this approach led to a social and economic upgrading of some waste pickers. Mr. Vinayak can be named here. His mother was already working in the waste sector – but still as an informal worker, carrying the bag with recyclables on her back. Today his working conditions are much different. As the representative of the *Dhole Patil* ward he experiences an economic upgrading with the salary generated through the implementation of door-to-door collection – so that nowadays he belongs to the middle class, carrying a saffron ration card.<sup>138</sup>

Also the two women working as waste pickers in *Dhole Patil* seem to distinguish themselves from informal rag pickers when they tell us in passing by a man rummaging through waste "This is not waste ("kacra")". Unlike him, they can pass recyclables which are lying everywhere without picking them up and selling them because of their secured income through waste collection at the doorstep.<sup>139</sup>

One waste picker tells us that the people started to perceive him "well" (in the sense of respecting him) as the political problematisation of waste through awareness campaigns raised the consciousness about the importance of a clean surrounding and hence the importance of people looking after that.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 29-30.

<sup>138</sup> Interview 5, Pune, Memory Log of Participating in Waste Collection, 07/09/14.

<sup>139</sup> Interview 5, Pune, Memory Log of Participating in Waste Collection, 07/09/14.

<sup>140</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line: 99-101.

### 2.2.1 Effects of Segregation

When we joined two women in *Dhole Patil* in their daily routine of the collection of waste we realised that – despite it being mandatory – the waste hardly gets segregated. Consequently, the segregation was done by the two ladies at the respective premises into three different categories: organic waste, wet waste and dry waste. In middle class societies the organic waste goes directly to the composting station, in the slum area the organic waste is part of the wet waste. The segregated bags will be collected by the PMC later on. There is also one additional bag, where the ladies place valuable recyclables which they will sell once every 15 days.<sup>141</sup> Although the formalised income through payment seems to diminish the importance of the additional income through selling of the recyclables, there seems to be still a preference to work in the higher income areas because there the quantity of dry waste is much higher and hence more lucrative.<sup>142</sup> But this preference may also be caused by the slightly better compliance of middle class societies to segregate their waste. After all, the two ladies in *Dhole Patil* were lamenting the reluctance of the citizens and shop owners to segregate their own waste and sent us more than once to tell them again the importance of segregating the waste at source – demonstrating their reluctance to segregate by themselves. In *Katraj*, we observed that there is more attention drawn to the sensitisation of the citizens to segregate their own waste. The PMC sanitary inspector supports the waste pickers in achieving the segregation at source mainly through awareness campaigns et cetera but she also admitted that to reach the compliance of the citizens can take a while. The final responsibility lies at the hand of the waste picker:

Plus three months the lady [waste picker] is in charge of it. She has to see that everybody puts it there. She is the one who actually sees to it. Otherwise it is her extra work. She has to do it which she doesn't want to do. So it is her responsibility to see after that.<sup>143</sup>

It can be noted that until the segregation at source is fully implemented the mandatory segregation is done by the waste pickers themselves, confronting them with additional work. Furthermore, the direct expose to all sorts of waste presents a serious health threat to the waste pickers, as protective clothes are not used. The signed contract obliges them to segregate thoroughly instead of just picking out the valuable items, as they did before. So the segregation policy led indeed to the formalisation of waste pickers through the dependence of PMC and the successful engagement of KKPKP and could hence secure their income but until the segregation at source is not fully implemented it does not facilitate their everyday work.

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<sup>141</sup> Interview 5, Pune, Memory Log of Participating in Waste Collection, 07/09/14.

<sup>142</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 23.

<sup>143</sup> Interview 10, Pune, waste pickers at Katraj ward, 05/09/14, line 10-11.

### 2.2.2 Effects of Decentralisation

Obviously decentralisation leads to different working conditions of waste pickers regarding by whom they are employed or represented. This is even more relevant as we observed that even with the same representative (SWaCH) there are different working conditions for waste pickers depending on the ward they are working in. For example, we could observe that the relation to SWaCH and hence the provision of benefits was correlated with the spatial and time relation to the SWaCH office and the installed programme. In the nearby slum, the waste pickers portrayed themselves as a part of SWaCH and the union without an authority above them.<sup>144</sup> They also reported a good health insurance.<sup>145</sup> The ladies at *Dhole Patil* had a good network with other waste pickers who they knew from SWaCH meetings but would not simply go to the hospital for treatment.<sup>146</sup> In *Katraj*, the newest project and the furthest situated the waste pickers portrayed SWaCH as a “purely governmental organisation”, challenging the image of SWaCH as a waste picker initiative.<sup>147</sup> Also the health insurance was either portrayed as worthless:

I had Chikungunya [a virus] and there was nobody who even gave me bread. The money we pay for insurance, only a part from it we get for medicine. And they put forth the condition that you have to go to the government hospital. (...) There is a lot of paper work and that causes a lot of trouble. And I didn't get money for medicine.<sup>148</sup>

Or it was denied completely and only referred to as life insurance: “If I pay money to the SWaCH people for insurance, I get only money when I die. Then my grandson will have to go to the SWaCH people and give them the documents”.<sup>149</sup>

### Social bonding through direct interaction?

Just as a paper promoted by SWaCH suggests that the institutionalised direct interaction between waste picker and citizens through the doorstep collection and the direct payment seems to be an achievement, where “[t]he faceless waste picker causing nuisance at the municipal container has become a person who interacts with fellow residents on an equal footing” (Poornima 2012: 9). This is confirmed by a waste picker working in *Katraj* who claims: “They [citizens] perceive me well. They behave well with me. Because of this work I come into contact with thousand people and I know them all by name”.<sup>150</sup>

Nevertheless, the interaction also bears difficulties. Those lay primarily in the question of who is obliged to pay for the service. Because the provision of efficient SWM is mandatory for PMC, some

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<sup>144</sup> Interview 7, Pune, Slum Dwellers, 05/09/14, line 51-53.

<sup>145</sup> Interview 7, Pune, Slum Dwellers, 05/09/14, line 50.

<sup>146</sup> Interview 5, Pune, Memory Log of Participating in Waste Collection, 07/09/14.

<sup>147</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 46-47.

<sup>148</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 202-203.

<sup>149</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 200.

<sup>150</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 99-101.

people are reluctant to pay double for this service – once through taxes and second with the direct payment for the waste pickers.<sup>151</sup>

The official reasoning for the payment through the citizens is the control mechanisms they have – other than PMC – whether the doorstep collection is actually happening.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, the benefit of a direct relation between service provider and citizen is emphasised as it provides direct accountability.<sup>153</sup> Additionally, SWaCH claims that the costs citizens have to pay for the service would have been the minimum amount raised by additional tax money the municipality would have needed for the provision of this service (Poornima 2012: 10). Of course this logic is contested as opposing the principle of solidarity a tax system provides – namely to relief the poor from those financial duties. Many waste pickers reported that even citizens who are paying taxes often see the responsibility still with the PMC and the handling of their tax money.<sup>154</sup>

In some cases this results in a reluctance to pay. We encountered several strategies to solve this problem. One waste picker in Katraj ward describes the situation and his reaction: “I get very angry on them if they don’t pay me and I ask them how am I going to eat without money! If I don’t get paid for two month what should I eat?! I fight with them”.<sup>155</sup> The strategy of not collecting the waste shows various results. In *Dhole Patil* the ladies show us a house where the waste is already piling because they are not collecting it until the inhabitants would pay their fees. In the area of *Katraj* where there is still a dual system at work, the PMC weakens the power of the waste pickers when they pick up the waste a waste picker has deliberately left until the household is paying him.<sup>156</sup>

## 2.3 Findings in Pune

The findings in Pune show that the instrument of privatisation can lead to a social upgrading of one of the most marginalised group – namely the waste pickers. At least, this is the success story which is told everywhere – weighing it against scenarios of usual privatisation which marginalise the waste pickers even more (e.g. Bansal 2013; Dias 2012; Medina 2008, SWaCH 2013). The solution for designing a solution benefitting everyone and every interest seems to be found in the Pune model. The privatisation lifts the financial burden of the city administrative; the bottom up process of waste collection secures the increased efficiency of the collection process and the formalisation and acknowledgement of waste pickers, or at least their cooperative leads to an economic and social upgrading of the waste pickers. Nevertheless, by all this enthusiasm it is important to name some challenges which still persist. One is the financial burden it poses on the citizens when they are paying

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<sup>151</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 34-35; Interview 9, Pune, Official at the Biogas Plant, 05/09/14, line 13-17.

<sup>152</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 40-41.

<sup>153</sup> Interview 11, Pune, PMC Sanitary Inspector, 05/09/14, line 32-33.

<sup>154</sup> Interview 9, Pune, Official at the Biogas Plant, 05/09/14, line 8.

<sup>155</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 174.

<sup>156</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 28-32.

for a service the administrative is meant to pay for. This point needs further clarification as our findings reveal the strong conflict potential between the waste pickers and the households. Also the increased workload for waste pickers through the obligatory segregation and little compliance by the households has to be named and addressed to secure a fair gain for the waste pickers regarding their work-salary balance. Also the unequal benefit for waste pickers regarding where they are situated has to be addressed by the KKPKP and SWaCH as their claim to speak for every waste picker who is their member was strongly contested by those waste pickers further situated from the offices.

### **3. Mysore**

In the previous chapter we have explored the effects on waste pickers within a privatised system that is predominantly organised by private actors. Within the following pages, we will explore in how far the waste picker's needs are acknowledged within a governmental system.

#### **3.1 Solid Waste Management in Mysore**

Mysore city does not seem to have a profound waste problem. Streets and places look tidy and well kept. In fact, Mysore is often referred to as “second cleanest city in India” (Siddiqui/Pandey/Akhtar 2013: 293). Being a frequent tourist destination the city municipality is well aware of the negative impact a littered environment has on visitors from all around the world. Yet, just as every Indian city, Mysore has been struggling with an increasing amount of waste in recent years. Accordingly, risks of health and environmental problems are on the rise (Khaledsh 2012: 81). A survey published in April 2014 investigating Mysore’s assessment of SWM concludes: “The civic authority is trying hard to maintain its cleanliness but lacks proper government support and infrastructure” (Rajendra/Ramu 2014: 137). Within the previous years, the daily amount of waste has risen from 350 tons in 2007/2008 to 402 tons in 2012 (Khaledsh 2012: 81). During our field research in 2014, the estimated number of waste generated was still pending at 400 tons a day. This implies that the increase of waste in Mysore is happening continuously but slowly.<sup>157</sup> Yet, the growing amount of waste generated becomes visible when taking a bigger time line into account. According to our informant, the amount of waste generated in Mysore 15 years ago (in 1999/2000) was around eight tons a day.<sup>158</sup> Projections estimate that until 2020, the generation of waste will have reached almost 600 tons a day (Khaledsh 2012: 81). In terms of Mysore’s increasing waste piles, citizens have been protesting against the smell and the occurring health problems. Initiatives are demanding the removal of the plant and the landfill site to the surrounding villages in order to get rid of the existing problems.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 19-20; Interview 1 Mysore, MCC Official, 15/09/14, line 16-17.

<sup>158</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14 line 33-34.

<sup>159</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14 line 27.

In order to master the daily amounts of waste generated, the city delegated a compost plant (Excel Plant) which processes half of the amount of waste generated in Mysore daily. The Excel Plant is situated at Vidyaranyapuram, six kilometres outside the city centre (Chandra/Devi 2009: 18). The remaining waste which cannot be processed is brought to Mysore's landfill site situated right behind the Excel Plant. Furthermore, the city is in charge of one biogas plant and nine compost units. However, their capacity only offers around five tons and is merely run at ward level.<sup>160</sup> Mysore SWM entails door-to-door collection throughout the city, drainage cleaning and sweeping of streets.<sup>161</sup>

The organisation of SWM in Mysore is based on three pillars, including three different kinds of actors: Collection and transportation is supervised by the Mysore City Corporation (MCC) accordingly, it is in governmental hands (Ranjendra/Ramu 2014: 136). The procession of waste has been outsourced to a private actor operating the Excel Plant. As will be outlined below, the procession is partly interlinked to governmental authorities. Finally, metals and other valuable materials are sold to the scrap dealers. In contrast to the previous pillars, the scrap dealer is to be located within the informal sector. While collection/transportation and procession officially work hand in hand, the scrap dealer works in his own accounts.<sup>162</sup>

### 3.1.1 Non-Implementation of Rules 2000

Due to the issued Rules 2000, the state of Karnataka has taken action towards their implementation by outlining guidelines for all solid waste management activities. Roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders have been defined (Asnani 2006: 171). But, as the Bangalore crisis has shown, the implementation lags behind throughout the state (National Institute of Urban Affairs 2015: 47).

As mentioned previously, Mysore city municipality is well aware of the increasing problems regarding waste and its appropriate procession and disposal (Siddiqui/Pandey/Akhtar 2013: 293). However, there are big gaps in solid waste management infrastructure. It is often critiqued that Mysore city has not yet implemented the Rules 2000 (Rajendra/Ramu 2014: 137). Although different approaches have been launched in Mysore to enact the Rules 2000, none of them remained. The attempt of distributing two different buckets to households for segregation at source failed.<sup>163</sup> An MCC official tells us: "Initially we were planning for segregated waste but the people as you know they don't care about that, they are mixing everything so now we are taking un-segregated waste"<sup>164</sup>. As we are told by a high ranking manager of a compost plant, waste is still stigmatised in India:

See, it's not like in western countries. Indian people are like (...) nevertheless they are at least thinking this is waste and is something that is if you considered it twenty years before, there are only category of people who can touch this waste. The other upper category of people never touch

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<sup>160</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14 line 112.

<sup>161</sup> Interview 1, Mysore, MCC Official, 15/09/14, line 30.

<sup>162</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 148.

<sup>163</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 30.

<sup>164</sup> Interview 1, Mysore, MCC Official, 15/09/14, line 30.

this waste. Even households. Once they throw into the dust bin, they are thinking that it is not their part of life. It is some has to lift it, someone has to dispose, someone has to take of it.<sup>165</sup>

Moreover, the Zero-Waste-Management plant (EXONORA) was shut down three months before our arrival due to a lack of finances.<sup>166</sup> One model of community initiatives for solid waste management at ward level remained. In Kumbarakoppal, local citizens, community, resident welfare associations and stakeholders are brought together in the process of managing waste at household and community level (Shankar 2012: 6). Yet, Kumbarakoppal is not representative for solid waste management in Mysore. It is officially declared a “model”, not suitable for large implementation.<sup>167</sup> Other than in Pune where we focused on a best-practice model, the research focus in Mysore is laid on the general treatment of waste.

### **3.1.2 Centralisation of Solid Waste Management in Mysore**

In contrast to Indian megacities, Mysore has been rather reluctant to involve the private sector in SWM (Chandra/Devi 2009: 15). Since 2009 various moves have been implemented by the MCC directing towards a greater incorporation of private actors. However, the city municipality is still in charge of great realms of SWM. As such, the city’s SWM is administrated by the health department of MCC. Except for the Kumbarakoppal model successful bottom-up approaches (e.g. NGO engagement) were not found.<sup>168</sup> Particularly in the section of waste procession, a complex net of private actors, such as Public Private Partnership and government tenders “assisting” MCC have been discovered.

#### **Waste Collection**

The realm of waste collection and waste transportation is predominantly controlled by the MCC. It employs a governmental tender who is in charge of most of the collection process (Siddiqui/Pandey/Akhtar 2013: 291). Out of 65 wards which require cleaning, three are handled by the Federation of Mysore City Wards Parliament (department of MCC) while the remaining 62 wards are run by contract labourers who are employed by the government tender. Back in 2009, the proportion of wards controlled by the MCC respectively contract labourers was reverse, with MCC operating more than half of the wards (Chandra/Devi 2009: 18). Here, the trend towards outsourcing realms of SWM becomes quite apparent. However, the centralised structure in regard to SWM is still present. The MCC distributes the required equipment for waste collection and transportation<sup>169</sup> (Rajendra/Ramu 2014: 135f). Usually, municipalities outsource collection and transportation to save

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<sup>165</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 46-49.

<sup>166</sup> Interview 1, Mysore, MCC Official, 15/09/14, line 30; 34.

<sup>167</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 131; Interview 1, Mysore, MCC Official, 15/09/14, line 36.

<sup>168</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 153.

<sup>169</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 79-81.

costs. If so, trucks, hand carts, uniforms et cetera are provided by the contractors (Asnani 2006: 196f). Yet, the equipment distributed by non-governmental institutions is often in bad conditions since it lacks appropriate and protective design (Asnani 2006: 161). However, Mysore city municipality has kept the distribution of appropriate tools to its own control: “it is done by MCC. We send the vehicle, labour and all”<sup>170</sup>.

As mentioned above, Mysore has not implemented segregation at source. The waste collectors are asked to do a first segregation at “ward-level”<sup>171</sup>. However, no controls or sanctions are carried out for non-segregation. Old metals and other valuable materials are managed differently. Their “after live” is semi-formally organised, since the households sell them to scrap dealers who in turn resell the material.<sup>172</sup> Also waste collectors make a little extra money by sorting out valuable material and sell it to the scrap dealers.<sup>173</sup> However, this action takes place outside the official framework of SWM.

### **J.P. Nagar**

J.P. Nagar was our main area of studying waste collection and transportation in Mysore. We observed a rather “smooth” procedure of door-to-door collection. The bright yellow MCC truck arrived around 7:45 am in J.P. Nagar to carry out door-to-door collection and to clean the drainage. The ward is operated by a government tender. Yet, the equipment is provided by the MCC. The mixed waste is collected from the households by waste collectors and brought to a bigger street from where it is taken by the MCC truck. A man standing on top of the truck receiving the waste bundles checks every bin bag for valuable materials which he puts aside. The remaining waste is stored on the back of the truck. After the waste is collected, it is brought to the processing station, respectively landfill site.<sup>174</sup> Therefore, the pathway of (domestic) waste in Mysore is rather short.

### **Waste Proccession**

In Mysore, the process of waste treatment has been outsourced to private partners on the basis of PPP (Siddiqui/Pandey/Akhtar 2013: 292). In regard to the Excel Plant, Mysore’s biggest processing facility, a private company (IL&FS) assumed the compost plant superseding on the position of MCC which conducted the plant previously<sup>175</sup> (Chandra/Devi 2009: 18). As will be further outlined below, the plant is run within the frame of social enterprises that guarantees its funding.

Within processing waste, the Excel Plant transforms mixed waste into soil. The process of sorting the waste and sieving it into smaller particles is in great parts mechanised. Therefore, only few people are involved in the waste treatment. Only up to ten workers, both male and female, are engaged in

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<sup>170</sup> Interview 1, Mysore, MCC Official, 15/09/14, line 43.

<sup>171</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 19.

<sup>172</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 67-85.

<sup>173</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 21.

<sup>174</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 11.

<sup>175</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 96-108.

processing the waste into soil. Subsequently, the soil is being sold: One ton ranges between 2.500 and 2.800 INR.<sup>176</sup> Yet, the plant does not make any profit from the selling. Instead it is run on a non-profit basis and is financed up to 100 per cent by the private company.<sup>177</sup> According to the manager, the Excel Plant operates in the red: “[As] per my calculation at this level there are around 25 per cent every year we are undergoing loss”<sup>178</sup>. The implications of a non-profit waste procession will be further elaborated in the following.

Waste which exceeds the capacity of the plant is taken to the landfill site. Here, two excavators are piling the waste dumped by the trucks. We never see any waste-pickers at the landfill site, only official workers.<sup>179</sup>

### **Assessment of Centralised SWM**

Mysore’s formalised SWM system framed by a centralised structure has prevented civil- and non-governmental engagement in SWM. The governmental set-up is based entirely on non-profit-operation. This implies a lack of informal conversion of waste into finances. Within Mysore SWM, waste is not turned into a valuable resource which can be resold.<sup>180</sup> Except for the scrap dealer mentioned above, people in charge of collection do not sell bigger amounts of waste – in fact, the scrap dealer is not part of the formalised waste systems but takes in an informal side-position.<sup>181</sup> Even the Excel Plant does not make profit from the waste procession. It is dependent on the funds of a private company which is paid to the compost plant in terms of corporate social responsibility. The “programme” obliges big companies to fund social projects, such as facilities engaged with the procession of waste.<sup>182</sup>

The manager of the Excel Plant complains about the non-involvement of civil society in regard to segregation at source. According to him, the city’s waste problem evolves from the failure to recognise the value of waste which is connected to the lack of segregation at source<sup>183</sup>:

[S]ee this SWM processing facility is not weighable, as for my practical experience, commercially it is not weighable. So unless, otherwise, the waste has been segregated at source. If it is segregated, definitely it is going to be weighable.<sup>184</sup>

Since Mysore has not yet started segregation at source, the waste cannot be used in the sense that waste collectors gather plastic bottles et cetera in order to resell it. According to the Excel Plant

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<sup>176</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 18.

<sup>177</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 96-108.

<sup>178</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 107.

<sup>179</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014.

<sup>180</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 83; 67-72.

<sup>181</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 63-65.

<sup>182</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 101; 107-108.

<sup>183</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 838.

<sup>184</sup> Interview 4 Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 83.

manager, mixed waste is useless for further processing: “(...) these plastics are dirty now. Our plastic cannot be useful. See, whatever you are seeing outside, it’s scattered”<sup>185</sup>.

### **3.2 Effects on Waste Collectors**

We particularly refer to people in charge of collecting waste as *waste collectors* instead of *waste pickers*. This is due to the formalised framing of their work. As outlined above, the collection and transportation in Mysore is far more formalised than in other Indian cities, since SWM is still headed by the MCC.<sup>186</sup> It is notable, that in J.P. Nagar all waste collectors were male. No women were spotted within the formalised framework of waste collection. The only women we spotted independently gathered recyclables by rummaging through waste.<sup>187</sup>

In the following, the effects of two major parameters of Mysore’s SWM will be outlined, namely effects of non-segregation and effects of centralisation.

#### **Effects of Non-Segregation**

The effects of non-segregation in Mysore provide two different aspects: On the one hand, waste collectors do not have the opportunity to gain extra money by selling the waste. Although small bits and pieces of metal are sold to the scrap dealer, no big amounts of waste can be vended.<sup>188</sup>

On the other hand, the waste pickers do not have to submit extra work. In spite of doing a first segregation at ward-level, the waste collectors are officially not in charge of segregation after door-to-door collection is completed.<sup>189</sup> They do not have to rummage through waste. This implies better circumstances for their health, as possibly toxic or contaminated materials are not directly touched.

#### **Effects of Centralisation**

The centralisation of SWM is interlinked to a formalisation of working conditions. Other than waste pickers who carry out waste collection and segregation on an individual basis, waste collectors in Mysore are part of an official network.<sup>190</sup> Therefore, our initial assumption entailed an “upgrading” of the waste treatment, respectively the perception of waste. However, the picture which is drawn during our field research is two-fold. The waste collectors we meet are not supplied with protective cloths such as appropriate shoes, masks and gloves. A young man shows his cuts on hands and arms he sustained during work.<sup>191</sup> When inquired about this deficiency, the Excel Plant manager tells us that the protective cloths provided are rejected by the workers as they often perceive them as “irritable”

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<sup>185</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 67-72.

<sup>186</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 159.

<sup>187</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014.

<sup>188</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 67-72; Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 8.

<sup>189</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 46-49.

<sup>190</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line: 76.

<sup>191</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 25f.

and “uncomfortable”<sup>192</sup>. However, we did experience a certain awareness towards health issues among the workers.<sup>193</sup> During our stay, these contradicting statements could not be resolved. Additionally, we are told that the uniforms are not provided without any pressure exerted on the officials. One man explains that protests were necessary to obtain new uniforms after five years.<sup>194</sup> Furthermore, the workers complain that the salary varies monthly and is not sufficient for food and school fees.<sup>195</sup> Finally, it is notable that all waste collectors we encounter belong to the category of scheduled tribes.<sup>196</sup> This implies the stigmatised work with waste as “polluted substance” is still predominantly performed by backward classes.

At the same time, the formalised dimension of their work becomes clearly visible, entailing an upgrade of their work: All waste collectors in J.P. Nagar are clothed in uniforms by which they can be identified as official MCC labourers, although the men we meet are employed by a private contractor. When asked about the purpose of the uniform we are told that it serves to identify with the company the men are working for.<sup>197</sup> Furthermore, all waste collectors inquired possess a BPL-ration card and an Employee's State Insurance Corporation card (ESIC card) which includes a provident fund.<sup>198</sup> Moreover, the men have access to a bank account on which their salary is deposited. According to their task, they are paid different loans. The waste collectors earn 6.800 a month.<sup>199</sup> The driver gets around 10.000 INR a month, but has to pay for the maintenance of the car and for the fuel.<sup>200</sup> However, the jobs at MCC are highly valued. A man working for the (informal) scrap dealer explains to us that he has no job security working in the informal sector. Also he tells us about the better career enhancement waste collectors have.<sup>201</sup>

A person embodying an upgrading perception of waste is the Excel Plant manager. The distinction between waste collection and transportation on the one hand and waste procession on the other is essential in regard to Mysore SWM. It needs to be kept in mind. As such, the Excel Plant manager is not part of the collection- and transport process and cannot be regarded as a waste collector. However, his position carries important insights in regard to the perception of waste treatment in general. He combines a scientific approach to waste and the concrete work with the substance. In this regard, he accomplished his studies in waste management:

See, I am an engineer graduated. I did my M/BA but I am working in this condition. So the people are thinking, if they send professionals – initially it was not professional, someone useless,

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<sup>192</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 87; 89; 91.

<sup>193</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 27; 50f.

<sup>194</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 23.

<sup>195</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 52f; 61.

<sup>196</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 36.

<sup>197</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 23; 45.

<sup>198</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line, 19f.

<sup>199</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 61.

<sup>200</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 66.

<sup>201</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 72.

someone without any job, someone who cannot do anything – such people used to come and do this job. But now it becomes a profession.<sup>202</sup>

The manager regards waste from the scientific point of view which implies a certain value: “They don’t know the science of waste. (...) But this waste... you can keep on talking you can talk for 24hours. So that much sense is there in this. So people don’t understand the science behind waste”.<sup>203</sup>

### 3.3 Findings in Mysore

As has been outlined, Mysore is in the process of outsourcing its SWM to private actors. However, during the time of our field research the city municipality was still heading the entire process of waste collection and transportation. Within our findings, non-segregation plays an important role. Due to non-segregation, waste is not processable to a greater extent and therefore neither profitable nor sustainable.

Nevertheless, the waste collectors benefit from the centralised SWM, as they enjoy job security and other benefits that come with the formal employment. Moreover, they do not have to implement segregation which certainly contributes to their health. However, the top down approach damps any civil engagement. Accordingly, civil awareness of appropriate waste treatment is simply missing in Mysore.

## 4. Conclusion

*Firstly*, our findings revealed contrasting governmental schemes concerning the implementation of SWM. *Secondly*, the cities differ concerning the implementation of segregation, respectively non-segregation at source. Pune displays a *decentralised* system of SWM. The city has included the concept of PPP in waste-disposal and treatment especially prioritising pro-poor initiatives making Pune a role model for NGOs engaged with the rights of waste pickers. Furthermore, Pune has implemented the Rules 2000 which require households to *segregate* their waste at source. In Mysore, SWM is mainly conducted by the government. The system is rather *centralised* evincing strictly governmentally controlled realms. Furthermore, Mysore has not implemented the Rules 2000, leaving waste *mixed*.

Our preliminary hypothesis suggests that governmental schemes take strong effects on waste pickers and their capital forms outlined by the sustainable livelihood approach. During our field research we found that the system of SWM applied not only influences physical and financial capital of waste pickers in terms of income and spatial and infrastructural problems. The system of SWM applied by the respective city administration also effects social and human capital of the waste pickers regarding their health or social status.

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<sup>202</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 155.

<sup>203</sup> Interview 4, Mysore, Official at the Excel Plant, 12/09/14, line 142-144.

Due to the decentralised SWM-system and the mandatory segregation in Pune, we sensed a rising awareness towards waste issues in its broader, environmental context among the citizens. This rising awareness is strongly interlinked with an upgraded perception of waste pickers which contributes to their social capital. This assumption is based on the self-perception of waste pickers who described their work as important for society. Also the expectation of involved NGOs assuming that the direct interaction between waste pickers and the households would further enhance their social status can carefully be confirmed. On the contrary, self-employed waste pickers are left on their own with no help of a higher authority to claim their salary in case of non-payment by the households. This leaves the waste pickers with the insecurity usually accompanied by self-employment. Another unintended aspect applies to the human capital. By rummaging through the waste due to segregation and in terms of reselling the gathered materials, waste pickers are risking contamination through hazardous substances and endangering their health. This presents a contradiction as the policy was implemented in order to reduce the health hazards by segregation at source. But as long as the households are not performing segregation themselves, the health of waste pickers will remain endangered. Their situation even worsened since the segregation act as non-segregated waste is not collected by the PMC. This forces the waste pickers to fill in and do it themselves.

Despite unintended effects it is important to note that the model in Pune presents a formalisation of participation mechanisms for the targeted population – namely the waste pickers. The needs of waste pickers can be voiced and get heard at least on the policy level. Nevertheless, there are still serious challenges in the evaluation and feedback mechanisms which would leave waste pickers involved also after the implementation. In Mysore the top-down approach leaves waste collectors no space for articulating their needs leaving them dependent on the agenda of the state. As such in Mysore the SWM is still under the control of the government and relies heavily on machines instead of labour. This leaves less formalised working contracts possible. Nevertheless, if a waste picker *is* employed at the government or a government tender s/he enjoys a comparably safe income and additional funds through her/his working contract. The non-segregation of waste facilitates their work as they only have to dispose whatever they are given by the households. On the other side this presents a serious dilemma as the disposal is and will become even more challenging. The beginning agitation against the disposal site can be named as a potential downgrading of the resource waste and the additional downgrading of all persons attached to it. Furthermore, it presents serious challenges for the environment which can no longer be ignored.

## **IV. Informal Economy in Pune and Mysore**

### **In How Far Do Informal Workers Have to Rely on Other Forms of Capital in Order to Compensate Their Potential Lack of Financial Security?**

Josephine Hartwig, Luisa Scholz, Hans Stanka

#### **1. Introduction**

Within the framework of our research studies, the sustainable livelihood approach serves us as an instrument to understand the organisation of an existence. During our time in the cities of Pune and Mysore we have developed a complex catalogue of questions which was aiming to conduct research on general questions concerning the importance of certain dimensions of the SLA against the backdrop of informal economy.

We will first elaborate on the informal sector in general. In the following, we will focus concretely on informal labour in India. After that we turn to our main part in order to give an answer to our research question. Here, we will examine in how far informal workers are dependent on other forms of capital to supplant a general financial insecurity. Finally, our conclusion will summarise our findings.

#### **2. Informal Economy**

“Poverty persists across the world. The informal economy is growing worldwide. These two facts are connected” (Lund 2009: 69).

According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the informal economy entails between half and three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment in developing countries and is strongly correlated to poor employment conditions and increasing poverty (ILO 2016; Jütting/de Laiglesia 2009: 13).

In general, informal economy is characterised through a lack of protection both in case of non-payment of wages, as well as unsafe working conditions (ILO 2016). The concept of informal activities goes back to Keith Hart, who conducted an anthropological field work study in Accra, Ghana, and argues that the distinction between formal and informal income opportunities is based essentially on that between wage-earning and self-employment (Hart 1973: 68). Hart identifies the degree of rationalisation of work as the key variable. Rationalisation of work thereby is classified through the question of whether or not labour is recruited on a permanent and regular basis for fixed rewards (ibid). He also differentiates between the terms ‘organised’ and ‘unorganised’ sectors in order to refer to the kinds of companies and enterprises in which formal or informal job holders are employed, this is also emphasised by Bhalla (2009: 4). According to Sinha and Kanbur, the categories ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ have received a significant amount of attention since their introduction into the development discourse (Sinha/Kanbur 2012: 2). However, one has to take into account that they are rather imprecise when one aims to use them analytically. Sinha and Kanbur define informal

economy as follows:

Informality of a production unit, or an employment relationship, is mostly defined through the absence of one or more forms of state mandate regulation, such as registration for taxes, enrolment into a social security system, minimum wage regulation, etc. (ibid).

Broadly speaking, one could thus say that informal activities are those that are beyond the regulation of the state. However, numerous definitions go further than simply defining informality through the pure absence of state regulation. These definitions may include a range of other factors, such as smallness of size and competition. Other definitions characterise the informal sector as consisting of small-scale units that are engaged in producing goods and services operating typically at a low level of organisation and have little or no division between labour and capital as factors of production (ibid). These units are also expected to have no clear separation between labour, management and ownership. Labour relations often do not exist and if they do they are mostly not in the form of contractual arrangements that would imply formal guarantees but are instead based on casual employment, kinship, or social relations (ibid). The necessary finance to start a production unit is mostly raised by the owners themselves which makes them personally liable for any debts or obligation incurring in the production. Furthermore, expenditure for production is often indistinguishable from household expenditure and capital goods, for instance buildings or vehicles that may be used for both business and household purposes (ibid: 3). The typical informal worker is thus characterised through various economic activities and income sources within their household. Illegal activities, such as drug pushing or petty theft also need to be considered as part of the informal sector.

Furthermore, one has to differentiate between informal self-employment and informal wage employment. According to Lund, informal self-employment includes employers, own account workers, businesses/farms who do not hire others in informal enterprises, unpaid contributing family workers, businesses or farms without pay and members of informal producers' cooperatives (Lund 2009: 71). Informal wage employment is characterised by employees without any formal contracts or those who are employed by formal or informal enterprises or households. According to Lund, the most common categories of informal wage workers include informal employees, casual or day labourers who usually do not have a fixed employer but rather sell their labour on a daily or seasonal basis, and industrial outworkers (also called homeworkers), who produce items for a piece rate from their homes or from small workshops (ibid). Hence, against the common perception the informal sector is not only about the "deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes or social security contributions, or infringing labour or other legislation or administrative provisions" (Sinha/Kanbur 2012: 3).

Informal workers in general face several challenges: they cannot usually afford to purchase private insurance at risk or private insurance against risk; they live in poor communities which cannot co-insure against risk; and they are excluded from contributory schemes, for example unemployment insurance or workers compensation against accidents at work (Lund 2009: 73). Moreover, informality is quite often linked to the issue of poverty, even though one should take into account that the informal sector as such is also rather heterogeneous (Bhalla 2009: 4). Furthermore, informal workers are often

confronted with “(...) low and uncertain incomes, high levels of hazard associated with the work, and the work is not covered by social protections” (Lund 2009: 70).

Nevertheless, Lund claims that even very poor people show the will to save up money and when faced with the choice between health insurance and savings for later years they tend to choose health insurance showing that there is awareness and appreciation for the importance of a healthy body (Lund 2012: 73). Additionally, the informal economy is as segmented as the formal economy when it comes to gender. As shown in Figure 3, women generally tend to be employed in other fields than men and earn less: “Some of this difference can be explained by the fact that men tend to have better tools of the trade, operate from better work sites/spaces and have greater access to productive assets and financial capital” (Chen/Vanek/Carr 2004: 39).




Figure 3: The Gender Segmentation of the Informal Economy (Chen/Vanek/Carr 2004: 39).

Furthermore, men tend to produce and sell a higher volume and are usually in charge of different range of goods as opposed to women. According to Chen, Vanek and Carr women are more likely to sell perishable goods, such as foods and vegetables, whereas men tend to sell non-perishable goods. Additionally, men tend to sell from push-carts or bicycles, whereas women are more likely to sell from the ground (ibid: 40). This is also because men are more likely to be heads of family businesses while women are more likely to be unpaid contributing family members.

### **3. India's Informal Economic Sector**

Including agricultural employment, the informal sector comprises 93 per cent of total employment in India (Lund 2009: 70). According to Naik, the first Indian National Commission on Labour defined the informal, or unorganised sector as consisting of those workers who have not been able to organise themselves in pursuit of their common interest due to certain constraints like casual nature of employment, ignorance and illiteracy, small and scattered size of establishments (Naik 2009: 2). Other organisations, for example the Indian National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), adopt certain criteria in order to identify the informal sector, such as those enterprises or industries that are not covered under the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). For the case of service industries, the NSSO considers all enterprises, except those run by the Government (Central, State and Local Body) and in the corporate sector, as un-organised (Naik 2009: 2f). As one can see, problems may occur due to the fact that different organisations tend to use different definitions of the term 'informal' or 'unorganised'.

A survey conducted during 1999 – 2000 and 2004 – 2005 displays a growth of the informal sector, both in rural and urban areas (see Appendix; Figure 4). It is noteworthy that the agricultural sector almost completely consists of informal workers. Agriculture as such provides approximately 52 per cent of the total number of jobs available in India and contributes 18,1 per cent to the country's GDP (see Appendix; Figure 5). Moreover, agriculture is the only means of living for almost two-thirds of the employed class in India (Arjun 2013: 343). Furthermore, it is of importance to note that the share of informal sector workers grew in all industry groups, except for electricity. There is a significant increase of 8.77 per cent in the construction sector. Similarly, the share of informal sectors within the trading sector grew by 3.85 per cent.

### **4. Workers of the Informal Sector Struggling with Financial Insecurity**

When answering the question, in how far do informal workers have to rely on other forms of capital in order to compensate their potential lack of financial security, we want first to bring light to the financial situation in the informal sector. The informal sector is segregated in workers without contracts and informal enterprises. According to our understanding, the most important threshold of analysis lies between informal labourers and micro entrepreneurship. Following financial capital, we will elaborate on human, social, and as one block, natural and physical capital, in order to identify strategies how informal workers react to lacking, or potentially lacking financial resources.

#### **4.1 Financial Capital**

Financial capital marks the financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood fundamentals. The term used is not economically solid in the sense that it can contribute to consumptions as well as production (Department for International Development 1999). However, we have decided adopting it to try to capture an important sector. Explicitly, we were looking at the

availability of cash, access to credit, et cetera which enable people to accept different livelihood strategies.

Between the five categories of capital, the financial capital is probably the most flexible one as it can be transformed into other types of capital and can be used in a direct way when it comes to the achievement of livelihood results (for example to purchase food to diminish the lack of it) (Department for International Development 1999). As a matter of fact, financial capital can be utilised to acquire natural or physical capital. This theory also works in reverse, as natural and physical capitals can be sold (Morse/McNamara 2013: 35). However, financial capital has the tendency to be the least accessible for the poor. Within our research time in the cities of Pune and Mysore, we have witnessed that a lack of economic capital concludes in a situation in which the other assets of capital become more important.

In Mysore we visited a cardboard factory where we were fortunate enough to meet the two persons in charge, father and son. They are producing cardboard, selling it to mostly large companies which need the packing products in bulk. These customers mostly are local businesses situated in Mysore. They proudly explained how the family business was founded and how the development took place over the years. Out of their air-conditioned office where the interview took place they were also able to observe several security cameras. Moreover, their appearance gave us the feeling that the factory was running well. When asked about their employees they told us they prefer to employ women rather than men:

The women work better around here and the men are lazy (...) [The women] are more committed towards the work (...). And they are cheaper also.<sup>204</sup>

When asked about the salaries paid we were informed:

They are all paid between 5.000 and 10.000 INR. Depending on how old they are, how long they have worked for the company and the skill (...).<sup>205</sup>

However, this statement was contradicted by a young female employee who told us she would only get 4.000 INR monthly. The gap between the two comments got even bigger when the women told us that she was only earning 1.500 INR a month for the past six years and that only last year her salary has been increased to 4.000 INR.<sup>206</sup> She went on telling us that she is not able to save any money at the end of the month because she has two children studying, most of her expenses flow into their education.<sup>207</sup> Accordingly, there is a visible lack of financial capital at present. She is not able to save money which she could use, for instance, for securing a better health care. Now, she relies on the governmental hospitals which only ensure a very basic health care. Furthermore, she was saying that she has to ask her mother to work, too, so that they have a “sufficient” amount of money for a living.

A similar statement concerning the insufficiency of wage was made by a hairdresser who reported that:

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<sup>204</sup> Interview 50, Mysore, Head of Cardboard Factory, 13/09/2014, line 50.

<sup>205</sup> Interview 50, Mysore, Head of Cardboard Factory, 13/09/2014, line 50.

<sup>206</sup> Interview 43, Mysore, Female Single Parent Working in Cardboard Factory, 12/09/2014, line 35.

<sup>207</sup> Interview 43, Mysore, Female Single Parent Working in Cardboard Factory, 12/09/2014, line 33.

[He] earns about 3.000 INR a month and he can maximum save about 1.000 INR a month. And he says that his earning is low because there are almost four parlors in the same area. He travels by bus, so he has a bus pass, the money also gets into that.<sup>208</sup>

Due to his advanced age the man expressed the need to improve his income: “He is saving for once he has retired from his job, for his further livelihood and also in case of illness and medical issues (...)”<sup>209</sup>. As a way to improve his earnings he considered shifting his barber shop to a less competitive area. Yet, by leaving his current working space, he would also have to leave his establishment which he has had for the last 45 years, leaving social contacts and memories behind.

#### **4.2 Human Capital**

The skills, the knowledge and the ability to work are included within this form of capital which can enable to overcome the lack of financial capital. During our research we have witnessed different situations telling us the versatile ways people develop their skills. The hairdresser who we mentioned before was taught his profession by his father. Now, his children are learning it from him.<sup>210</sup> It seems that there has never been other room for development except taking over the father’s profession. Taking over the father’s profession does also have the effect that a financial burden is taken from a family as the father has the function of a teacher himself, no other education expenses have to be paid. As his sons get more experience, their base of competence will enhance as will their quantity of human capital. Since even public education is expensive to low-income families due to hidden costs (compare to findings of chapter II) and private education is mostly not accessible to low-income population, those costs may be evaded by teaching one’s own profession to one’s descendants. Another informant was working at a construction site as the man in charge. His career displays a certain flexibility to enhance his livelihood: “He got into this field as they are agriculturists that is why his motivation was to get into this building business. On his agricultural land they manufacture these bricks, so that they can use as building material”.<sup>211</sup>

He has used his knowledge of manufacturing bricks (human capital) turning from an agriculturalist to a contractor which brought him a solid financial security. Also, he can seize the chance occupying the function of a facilitator/teacher as our translator informed us:

“Normally for these regular jobs (transporting stuff) he does not want any skill, he will tell them what to do. For more critical works (designing et cetera) then it is skilled labour that is needed”.<sup>212</sup>

From his own vision of ideas he has created a new level of establishment which gives him the freedom to recruit his own workforce if needed. He is in the position of transferring his own knowledge that is defined as human capital to his workers, for which he is saving money (financial capital).

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<sup>208</sup> Interview 47, Mysore, Self-Employed Hairdresser in J.P.Nagar, 12/09/2014, line 39.

<sup>209</sup> Interview 47, Mysore, Self-Employed Hairdresser in J.P.Nagar, 12/09/2014, line 41.

<sup>210</sup> Interview 47, Mysore, Self-Employed Hairdresser in J.P.Nagar, 12/09/2014, line 28.

<sup>211</sup> Interview 49, Mysore, Head/ Man in Charge of Construction Site, 13/09/2014, line 18.

<sup>212</sup> Interview 49, Mysore, Head/ Man in Charge of Construction Site, 13/09/2014, line 26.

### **4.3 Social Capital**

In order to compensate their lack of financial capital many of the people we interviewed mentioned their family or other social contacts as a form of back-up. Especially, when it comes to compensating lacking financial capital, it seems important to know someone who is able to lend money. A female interviewee explained that after the death of her husband and father she and her mother are the only breadwinners for them and her two children.<sup>213</sup> The young woman would not be able to take care of them if she did not have her mother helping out as well. The situation was quite similar for a woman making bidis (Indian cigarettes) at home. Being a grandmother, she took care of her grandchildren while her own children were at work. However, she also managed to make 500 bidis per day in order to contribute to the family's income.

Additionally, in Pune we came across social networks of money lending which we framed as social capital. For example, a waste picker told us that the family could not afford health insurance and therefore could not pay for their sons' treatment themselves, thus they had to ask their social network for financial help.<sup>214</sup> Although the son did not make it in the long run due to their inability to pay for further treatment, they managed to pay for the first one. It therefore seems important to have social capital as they were able to at least get their hands on a little bit of extra money. As already elaborated in part II of this work, the loss of health always poses a threat to the slum population due to a lack of accessible public health services. This also applies to the informal sector with its immanence of insecure working positions.

Similarly, the statement below points out how important a social network is when it comes to the possibility of borrowing money. "He has lend 200.000 INR from someone to pay his rent. Furthermore, he has asked the chief minister from Karnataka for help. But he is not getting any help from the government".<sup>215</sup> In addition to having family and friends to fall back on, it might also be important to know certain people or be part of organisations, such as the waste pickers' organisation.

### **4.4 Natural and Physical Capital**

Both natural and physical capital have a direct influence on an important factor of life in general: space. Although a classical perspective on natural and physical capital does not limit their understanding to one factor, we will here focus on the relation of working space and living space, since both are scarce resources/capitals in Indian cities and both influence informal working conditions. Working space can be seen in various relations to living space: Living space and working space can be (1) the same, as one works where s/he lives; (2) one lives at his/her working place (in opposition to 1), when a worker is exercising her work at home); and (3) both may be spatially separated. All varieties of this spatial dimension are represented in informal work.

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<sup>213</sup> Interview 43, Mysore, Female Single Parent Working in Cardboard Factory, 12/09/2014, line 28ff.

<sup>214</sup> Interview 6, Pune, Waste Pickers in Katraj Ward, 06/09/14, line 188-189.

<sup>215</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 6.

## **Working Space and Living Space**

In Mysore and Pune we could observe the practice of living and working at the same sites: Handicraft workers, often women, are producing incense sticks<sup>216</sup> and bidis (Indian cigarettes)<sup>217</sup> which they later on sell to wholesale traders or factories. There are even civil society initiatives which foster the development of home based jobs, such as the at-home-production of paper bags.<sup>218</sup> Another concept of working-living-space is the one of many business owners: These are living with their families at the premises of their businesses, like shops or hotels.<sup>219</sup> Furthermore, we could observe cases in which workers lived at their working space, mostly in small or medium sized enterprises. The workers were work-migrants mostly from outside the city who left their families to send money back home. We found workers in such conditions in a scrap recycling shop in Pune<sup>220</sup> and a print shop in Mysore<sup>221</sup>. We also found, in both Pune and Mysore, labourers working outside but mostly close to their homes; in the construction sector<sup>222</sup> or in small businesses, like a mechanic shop<sup>223</sup>. Classically, there are various working milieus where it is common for labourers to work outside their living space, due to central characteristics of their work, like rickshaw drivers or workers in bigger construction companies.<sup>224</sup>

## **Space as Scarce Natural and Physical Capital**

As already discussed in Chapter A, the scarcity of space is a major concern for the city administrative. In Pune, 40 per cent of the population is said to live in slums.<sup>225</sup> The public services are overstretched due to high migration and urbanisation rates, though basic services, like water, electricity, education and health are mandatory services for the City Corporations.<sup>226</sup> The “Slum tax” (of 365 INR a year) is considered too little to provide adequate infrastructure and services.<sup>227</sup> But additionally, the process of urbanisation drives land values on levels which low-income workers are not able to afford.<sup>228</sup> So the question, if someone may stay on a certain site or not coincides with the ground's value. A resettlement thus opens up economic perspectives for the owners or the cities.<sup>229</sup> The official reaction

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<sup>216</sup> Interview 34, Mysore, Self-Employed Woman and Housewife in J.P.Nagar, 13/09/2014, line 94.

<sup>217</sup> Interview 53, Mysore, woman in "bidi" production, 11/09/2014, line 17ff.

<sup>218</sup> Interview 26, Pune, Global Youth Ambassador, 09/09/2014, line 20.

<sup>219</sup> Interview 51, Mysore, Mechanic Shop Owner, 12/09/2014, line 513ff; Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 29; 32.

<sup>220</sup> Interview 54, Pune, scrap shop owner, 07/09/2014, line 985ff.

<sup>221</sup> Interview 52, Mysore, Print Shop Owner, 11/09/2014, line 841ff.

<sup>222</sup> Interview 49, Mysore, Head/ Man in Charge of Construction Site, 13/09/2014, line 21f.

<sup>223</sup> Interview 51, Mysore, Mechanic Shop Owner, 12/09/2014, line 2708ff.

<sup>224</sup> Interview 22, Pune, Employee of Shelter Associates, 06/09/14, line 72.

<sup>225</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 34.

<sup>226</sup> Interview 33, Pune, PMC official, 05/09/2014, line 10f.

<sup>227</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC Zonal Medical Officer, 05/09/2014, line 38.

<sup>228</sup> Interview 40, Mysore, MCC Town Planning officer, 12/09/2014, line 58.

<sup>229</sup> Interview 40, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 60.

to the scarceness of space is subsidised land in the city outskirts, for example in Mysore<sup>230</sup>, or the relocation of encroached informal settlements, for instance in Pune<sup>231</sup> and Mysore<sup>232</sup>. This relocation implies a destruction of informal constructions and the resettlement of its inhabitants. Another reaction to informal constructions is slum upgrading. Here, the old structures are removed and replaced by new ones – for the same people.<sup>233</sup>

As Chapter A has already discussed, the MCC has been launching several programmes to reorganise space such as resettlement schemes in order to tackle those challenges. The resettled persons may buy a subsidised apartment in a multi-storey building, costing 30.000 INR in advance (about 10 per cent of the construction price) and 2.000 INR for service per month.<sup>234</sup> The KSDB points out that there is interaction taking place to act in accordance with the “beneficiaries” before they are relocated.<sup>235</sup> For handicraft and home workers, there are supposed to be new multi-purpose community centres near the resettlement areas.<sup>236</sup> These community centres will host little shops and working possibilities for the resettled persons – but the houses shall only be used for living purposes.<sup>237</sup> But the KSDB official later on relativized his statements, emphasising that the living space created will serve best for individuals working in the city.<sup>238</sup> Urban industries, like the incense stick industry, should provide working areas to their workers. Those should not use their “basic shelter”, provided by the government, for work.<sup>239</sup> He further admits that a working area does not concern the KSDB's concept. Working at one's living area is perceived as a bad habit that has to be overcome.<sup>240</sup> The idea of the new community centres was also presented to the affected population in J.P Nagar by the area's Corporator.<sup>241</sup> As a local NGO in Pune put it, resettlement should only take place to a nearby area (2-3 kilometres), to guarantee access to one's former social environment, meaning aspects such as school or labour.<sup>242,243</sup> The KSDB also points out that there are cases in which old informal structures are removed and new ones constructed in the same place for the same persons.<sup>244</sup> Nevertheless, it is indispensable to collect sufficient data in advance and to foster communication between the city corporation and the affected population.<sup>245</sup> This will be further discussed in the following Chapter V.

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<sup>230</sup> Interview 41, Mysore, MUDA Civil Engineer, 12/092014, line 118.

<sup>231</sup> Interview 35, Pune, PMC Waste Management Deputy Commissioner and PMC zonal medical officer, 05/09/2014, line 22f.

<sup>232</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/092014, line 26f.

<sup>233</sup> Interview 41, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 78.

<sup>234</sup> Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 7ff.

<sup>235</sup> The character of this interaction will be further discussed in the following chapter V.

<sup>236</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/092014, line 31f.

<sup>237</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/092014, line 36f.

<sup>238</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 94f.

<sup>239</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 99.

<sup>240</sup> Interview 42, Mysore, KSDB Division 2 Civil Engineer, 15/09/2014, line 100ff.

<sup>241</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 116ff.

<sup>242</sup> The importance of reachability to health and education facilities is outlined in chapter II.

<sup>243</sup> Interview 22, Pune, Employee of Shelter Associates, 06/09/14, line 23.

<sup>244</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/092014, line 78.

<sup>245</sup> Interview 22, Pune, Employee of Shelter Associates, 06/09/14, line 72.

## **Effects of Resettlements on Working and Living Space**

However, the forwarded actions by the local administration do not succeed completely. The RLHP, an NGO in J.P. Nagar, Mysore, criticises the relocation action, because mostly women – often working at home and being discriminated against on different levels – will lose their working opportunities when losing their working space in a familiar environment.<sup>246</sup> Additionally, affected individuals claim the running maintenance costs of 2.000 INR and the initial one-time amount of up to 30.000 INR will overstretch slum dwellers' financial capacities, often only gaining 100 – 200 INR per day.<sup>247</sup> Informal workers have lost their businesses and jobs due to resettlement, like selling vegetables or owning a hotel.<sup>248</sup> Others suffer from long distances to their former working place, like an informal rag picker woman who lived close to and worked in J.P. Nagar before. Now she has to travel long distances after her resettlement.<sup>249</sup> Besides, there are of course informal workers who did not suffer concerning their job, like a resettled construction worker who's working place changed all the time anyway.<sup>250</sup> We were also not able to confirm the actual existence of new community centres that could serve as working places for informal workers.<sup>251</sup>

## **5. Conclusion**

When answering the question, in how far informal workers have to rely on other forms of capital in order to compensate their potential lack of financial security, we considered the five dimensions of the SLA: financial, human, social, natural and physical capital. Informal work is coined by insecurity, mainly because one's working position is not secured by fixed contracts. This does not automatically mean informal workers are suffering from a lack of financial resources – but at least they are facing the threat of losing their work faster than contracted workers.

Generally, financial capital, being the centre of our research group's topic, might on the one hand restrain the flexibility of one's livelihood when financial resources are low or living costs exceed beyond the possibility of making savings. On the other hand financial capital enables individuals to greater moves or investments when being high.

When being deprived of financial security, our interview partners revealed a variety of actions or reactions to balance this lack: Human capital is often framed by castes, social status or family traditions. It can contribute to avoidance of cost when considering professional formation of following generations. Traditional family businesses or skills are passed down from one generation to another or from individual to individual, thus multiplying this form of capital. In an ideal case, human capital contributes and might be transferred to the forms of capital, first and foremost, financial capital. Social

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<sup>246</sup> Interview 31, Mysore, NGO Supporting Slums, 13/09/2014, line 181.

<sup>247</sup> Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 7ff.

<sup>248</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 29, line 32.

<sup>249</sup> Interview 2, Mysore, Memory Log, 13/09/2014, line 86ff.

<sup>250</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 26f.

<sup>251</sup> Further estimations of the effects of resettlement will be discussed in chapter V.

capital seemed mainly important as an insurance to skip certain financial shortages. Families and friends provided for the victim's shortages, at least for a certain time. Natural and physical capital as space influences working conditions as its lack could impede or its presence might foster them. We found out, that scarcity of space and administrative measures might strongly interfere with one's livelihood if labourers are dependent on a working-living-space or living-working-space combination. If these entities are being dissolved, working conditions worsen, thus threatening informal labourers' livelihoods. The closer work is connected to the living space and a certain urban environment, the harder are workers hit by relocation actions. The tighter a connection between a certain amount of space to an informal work, the harder are workers hit by slum-upgrading measures, where enough space was not provided.

# **V. Forms of Representation in Informal Settlements in Pune and Mysore In How Far Can People in Informal Settlements Possibly Articulate Their Needs and in How Far Are These Acknowledged by the Political System?**

Mauno Gerritzen and Corinna Würzberger

## **1. Introduction**

Our interest was to look at the forms of representation in informal settlements and how these structures are legitimised. After entering the field, we soon noticed that the expected structures and forms of representation are very different to the prevailing forms or non-existent at all. This fact led to some communication problems when we asked for certain structures that either did not exist or had different functions than we thought they would have. So either the people did not know what we were asking for or we had difficulties to understand their answers because we had a different classification of certain words or structures than they had. Referring to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's (cf. Spivak: n. d.) "Can the Subaltern Speak", we adapted our research question as follows:

*In how far can people in Informal Settlements possibly articulate their needs? In how far are these acknowledged by the political system?*

We changed the point of view from an analysis of existing forms of representation to the question whether people in informal settlements are being represented at all. In addition, we looked at political authorities and compared their actions with the interests and needs of the people in informal settlements who the decision-makers claim to benefit with their taken actions. We conducted thirteen interviews with individuals and groups of people. In our analysis, we refer to all the interview material of the whole research group but the conclusion is mainly influenced by the data of our own interviews. In Mysore we had the chance to examine the process of a resettlement scheme that had just been executed before we arrived. We were able to talk to people of all the different sides and managed to find some structures of representation. In Pune our research was more stretched out over the city and not focused on one informal settlement. Therefore, it was more difficult to examine the representative structures of the informal settlements. Because of that our outcome will mainly focus on the situation in Mysore.

## **2. Research Outcome**

The research outcome is divided into two sections. The first section is about the question in how far the interests of slum dwellers find acknowledgement in political programmes. We will point out two different views on these programmes: One perspective supports the statement of the politicians that they are improving the livelihood of the informal settlement inhabitants; another perspective accuses the politicians that their actions are not primarily orientated towards the interests of the inhabitants of

slums but rather their own profits. The second section will demonstrate various forms of representation which we could identify in the informal settlements, and especially in J.P. Nagar. This section will be divided in political and non-political forms of representation.

## **2.1 Intentions of Political Programmes**

This section is about the political representation of the informal settlements and in how far the needs of the dwellers were recognised in the political actions. The Indian government implemented different programmes in order to represent the interests and needs of this group and to raise awareness for the challenges of informal settlements and their inhabitants.<sup>252</sup> Different intentions to run these programmes can be identified. Not all of them are purely beneficial as the governmental actors emphasise. This part focuses on the process of a resettlement scheme under the JNNURM-programme in the J.P. Nagar Slum in Mysore. The MCC resettled 70 families who had lived in an illegal settlement on a governmental owned land next to the railway and who were defined as poor (BPL<sup>253</sup>). This piece of land is needed by the government to widen the road next to it.<sup>254</sup> During our research we spoke to the Corporator who is in charge of this ward and therefore in charge of the resettlement.<sup>255</sup> We also spoke with people who have been resettled and live in the new colony now. The colony consists of several multi-storey buildings (four floors). Furthermore, we talked to people who lived in the J.P. Nagar Slum next to the area that was resettled. These people were not affected by the resettlement scheme because they live on private land. Therefore, their settlement is not illegal. Some people told us that they will be shifted some day, too, but it seems that this is not going to happen in the near future.<sup>256</sup> Instead, some smaller upgrading had been done in this area in order to support the dwellers.

### **2.1.1. Improvement of the Livelihood of the Urban Poor**

Under JNNURM the Indian government implemented a programme to improve the infrastructure and the living situation of city dwellers (Ministry of Urban Development 2011). As a nationwide mission, JNNURM includes numerous programmes like the Basic Service to urban poor programme (BSUP).<sup>257</sup> Other programmes exist, such as the Slum Rehabilitation Authority Schemes (SRA) under which slum dwellers defined as the urban poor are resettled into multi-storey buildings. The goal of these schemes is to improve the living conditions of informal settlements and to enable the people to

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<sup>252</sup> Cf. Gov. of India n. d.; Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation n. d.

<sup>253</sup> Cf. footnote 3 in the introduction.

<sup>254</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 86.

<sup>255</sup> For a more detailed description of the ward-system see below.

<sup>256</sup> Interview 14, Mysore, 3 women in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 9; Interview 24, Mysore, Man and Woman in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 15.

<sup>257</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 6.

live a better life.<sup>258</sup> People who are classified as living below poverty line are going to benefit from these schemes. Different than earlier schemes, the government approached the slum dwellers in the phase of planning in order to consider their interests.<sup>259</sup> For this reason the government conducted surveys to find out how many people below poverty line live in the slum, what their basic needs are, and what kind of living area they want.<sup>260</sup> Furthermore, they conducted mass meetings to discuss the process of the resettlement with the slum dwellers.<sup>261</sup> By ensuring them that the government is providing facilities and that they will not lose their job because of the shifting, the Corporator claims that the resistance of the people disappears.<sup>262</sup> Most importantly, the dwellers receive a legal right to stay at the new place. Owning a property and not having to fear that someone is coming to resettle them again is very important for them.<sup>263</sup> The costs for the people to purchase one of the apartment units are very low compared to the constructing costs of the building. The politicians repeatedly told us that these programmes are beneficial for the poor people. As for the shifting scheme in Mysore, people had to pay around 20.000 INR to acquire one apartment in the new colony.<sup>264</sup> The amount of 20.000 INR does not have to be paid at once, the slum dwellers have 20 years to repay the government.<sup>265</sup> According to the Corporator, they do not have to pay taxes or maintenance costs.<sup>266</sup> However, some of the resettled slum dwellers told us that they had to pay 2.000 INR for the installation of a meter.<sup>267</sup> Hence, there are inconsistent answers about the maintenance costs. The rest of the costs for the construction of the colony is paid by the central government (80%), the state government (10%) and the corporation (10%). Furthermore, the government is providing subsidies for food.<sup>268</sup>

As we visited the new colony, we talked to several people or groups of people and asked them about the process of shifting as well as what their opinion about this programme was. We received partly inconsistent answers and different views about the quality of these programmes. Some people said that electricity and water are not working and that they do not have a waste collection system yet which leads to problems with mosquitoes.<sup>269</sup> Some other people told us that they are not facing any problems anymore. They got access to water and electricity, after they complaint about the not functioning

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<sup>258</sup> Interview 57, Pune, PMC official (Part 4), 05/09/2014, line 1902ff.

<sup>259</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 31.

<sup>260</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 84; Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 37ff.

<sup>261</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 32ff.

<sup>262</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 97.

<sup>263</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 99.

<sup>264</sup> In our research we were told different prices. But all of them are close to the amount of 20.000 INR, which was mentioned by the Corporator and some resettled slum dwellers (Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 64; Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 20; Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 100f.; Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 12).

<sup>265</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 100ff.

<sup>266</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 113.

<sup>267</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 19.

<sup>268</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 107; 48.

<sup>269</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 17ff.

facilities. For cooking they use a kerosene stove and profit from the food subsidy programme of the government.<sup>270</sup> The shifting did not affect the jobs of most of the people we talked to.<sup>271</sup> But there were also some complaints about losing their businesses because of the resettlement. Someone explained that he used to run a hotel and now he is without a job.<sup>272</sup> In one point everyone agreed to the same answer: No matter if they were looking forward to moving to this place or not, everyone said that the structures are an improvement and they are happy to live in houses with a permanent structure. Before the resettlement the people lived in houses or “huts” without permanent structure. In some cases water penetrated into the house during rain. Some did not have access to water and electricity. By moving to the new place the living conditions of all of the people improved.<sup>273</sup> Therefore, one can say that the political programmes reached their goal and are in fact a successful strategy to improve the livelihood of people in informal settlements. However, having a better place to live does not mean that the people are fully satisfied with the process of the resettlement and the situation in the colony. People told us that they are not happy about the complex because too many people live together in a small area and that this might lead to clashes.<sup>274</sup> Some said that they did not want to move to a different place because they had lived in the former settlement for 20 years and they did not want to lose all their neighbours and shops. As chapter IV has shown, these social networks are often very important for slum dwellers to compensate a lack of financial capital. Furthermore, the school is too far away now and the only nearby school is a private one and therefore not free of costs.<sup>275</sup> People we talked to who were not shifted yet made clear that they “think it is a good scheme as long as the scheme lets them live here”.<sup>276</sup> Another critical aspect was the uniform structure of the new colony building. All the apartments have the same size. The size of the family moving there is not considered. Everyone gets the same no matter if they have two or six members in their family.<sup>277</sup> Furthermore, we noticed that the newly built colony was constructed at a place a little bit further out of the city and not bordering with the middle class areas. Locating resettlements to the border of the city or away from their central position is a fact noticed in many other resettlement schemes in India. In Pune we observed the development of a phenomenon known as mushrooming at the outskirts of the city. People from rural areas migrated to the city to look for a better job. Due to the scarcity of space these people settle in any vacant place and sometimes even in unfinished constructions of multi-storey buildings (Desai 2012: 54, Schrader 2004: 1f).

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<sup>270</sup> Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 9ff; Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 9ff; Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 4.

<sup>271</sup> Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 20f; Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 68; Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 27.

<sup>272</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 29ff.

<sup>273</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 34; Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 4.

<sup>274</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14; line 25.

<sup>275</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 27; 29; 43ff.

<sup>276</sup> Interview 7, Pune, Slum Dwellers, 05/09/14, line 31ff.

<sup>277</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 53.

### 2.1.2 Political mission of slum free city

The politicians told us that all the different resettlement programmes are beneficial contributions from the government to the slum populations and the urban poor. They even called it a “golden opportunity for urban slum dwellers”.<sup>278</sup> As described in the section above, it seems like all the politicians really care for the bad living conditions in informal settlements and want to help the dwellers to live a better life. In contrast, they always accentuated that this is a national programme. As already outlined in chapter A, the Indian government has been launching a programme to free all the cities from slums.<sup>279</sup> So the question comes up, in how far this programme is not primarily installed to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers but to implement city development plans to brighten up the appearance of the city? In our conversation with the Corporator we asked if the people accepted the rehabilitation scheme. Instead of telling us how the people reacted to that programme, he made clear that this is a national mission. The Mysore city corporation (MCC) obtained a mandate to implement the steps according to the mission. It is commonly seen that the poor people hamper this process because – in the opinion of the Corporator – “they are not educated”<sup>280</sup>. Therefore, in order to convince the people in informal settlements to move, they have to educate them first.<sup>281</sup> We were told that it is not easy to make the slum dwellers “understand the scheme and all”<sup>282</sup>. The planning of the colonies is overseen by the Slum Clearance Board. All over the country the buildings and the process of implementation are the same.<sup>283</sup> We were also explained that the reason why they are building multi-storey houses is not just because they can offer more people a place to live. One other reason is that the government does not want the slum dwellers to think that they own the land they live on:

They feel that so if they get only ground floor house, so they will get that land also (...). So the land title will be in government custody only, so they will be given position and certificate for living in that house.<sup>284</sup>

The reason why the government offers people who are settled on illegal ground a different place to live is that they do not want them to settle somewhere else.<sup>285</sup> In this case they stay in control over the settlement of the people. The government can resettle them to the places they want them to be “so the country looks good and everything will be fine”<sup>286</sup>. The people who purchased an apartment are not allowed to sell this property for 25 years.<sup>287</sup> This regulation ensures that the people will stay and not

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<sup>278</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 7.

<sup>279</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 3ff.

<sup>280</sup> See also chapter I; Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 20f.

<sup>281</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 4ff, 11ff.

<sup>282</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 103.

<sup>283</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 125.

<sup>284</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 35.

<sup>285</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 28.

<sup>286</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 28.

<sup>287</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 105.

move somewhere else. However, there will always be people who will not obey the rules. But it will be only a small amount.<sup>288</sup>

Apparently, the resettlement in Mysore was not due to bad living conditions but rather because the government wanted to widen the road and the illegal settlement was in the way.<sup>289</sup> Asking for other problems in this ward, we were told that they built a park and a playground for the people. Also, a truck terminal was built, so the big trucks are no longer allowed to enter the city. Besides this, the roads are too small why they have to widen them and they want to install an underground drainage system.<sup>290</sup> Most of those ‘problems’ or projects seem to especially meet the middle class’ needs, yet mostly affect the urban poor. At the J.P. Nagar slum people who are not affected of the shifting complained about facing a problem of high rents. The rents are up to 2.000 to 2.500 INR a month and they are struggling to pay those rents.<sup>291</sup> Since they do not live on the piece of land that is being affected by the resettlement they will not benefit from the housing programme of the government in the close future.<sup>292</sup> In our research only those people who lived on a piece of government land profited from the resettlement programmes. This land was needed for city development. The people living on a private land did not benefit from the resettlement and said that the government is not helping them at all. This leads to the question in how far the government’s primary intention is the improvement of the living conditions of informal settlements. The reason for this question is that the living conditions of the dwellers on the private land are very similar and therefore as bad as the ones who were already resettled. It seems that implementing the national mission and ideas of city planning (which mostly represent the interest of the middle class) are playing a more important role in this process. Furthermore, we gained the impression that the government tries to stay in control over the settlers of informal settlements by implementing their programmes.

## 2.2 Forms of Representation

When talking about representation in this paper, we want to point out two different senses of representation which often appear combined. There is “representation as »speaking for«, as in politics, and representation as »re-presentation«, as in art or philosophy” (Spivak n. d.: 70). During our research we identified different forms and levels of representation. Besides the formal, political system several rather informal representative systems developed and will be illustrated in more detail in the following sections. The question arises if the existence of these sub-representative structures could be already an indicator of certain shortcomings in the formal system. With regard to the representation,

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<sup>288</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 101.

<sup>289</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 22; Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 60.

<sup>290</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 137; 139; 146.

<sup>291</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 4; Interview 14, Mysore, 3 Women in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 5.

<sup>292</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 21; Interview 14, Mysore, 3 Women in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 9.

the most important factor lies in the connection between power and discourse (for example about the informal settlements). Those people who gain the power to appear or to be accepted as representative of the informal settlement population consist of the power to form the discourse about them (Bourdieu 1990: 71-114). The existing representative structure will have different impacts on the discourse over the informal settlements and the people living there. Moreover, it is striking that a lot of people do not even see the need for representation or organisation in some kind of structure at all. They are emphasising the fact that “[they] are the leaders”<sup>293</sup> and that “[t]hey are fighting for their own problems”<sup>294</sup>. Yet, individual engagement and mobilisation also exists and examples proved that representation and communication with the political system can be possible and quite successful. Successful in this case means those people were at least able to articulate their interests and needs. This is a fact that challenges Spivak’s theoretical approach. However, we also met instances where the attempt of communication failed completely in spite of strong individual engagement. Therefore, the question remains when the individual engagement in a communication process with the political system in order to actively shape his or her personal conditions or the situation of a group will be acknowledged and reacted to? What makes the difference between those who are effectively heard from the political system and those who were not? As seen above, it stands to reason that one factor could be if the dwellers will be affected of a current resettlement or not. Another question that arises from the research findings is how it is possible that a high amount of people did not know representative structures that are very well established and backed up through the Corporator such as the one of Khaled who was introduced to us by the Corporator as the ‘slum leader’ of J.P. Nagar?<sup>295</sup> During the last decades, he even established a hierarchical representative system which he is chairing. However, people from the same settlement community (Muslim) living only a few hundred metre from his house and who had been living there (nearly) as long as Khaled did not know him at all. Our research outcome cannot answer these questions in total and a further analysis would be necessary. Further explications and an approach to answers will be given in the next sections.

### **2.2.1 Formal Representative Structures**

The formal representative structures were analysed on the basis of the municipal level of politics. The formal political system on national or state level is not relevant for the following analysis that focuses on Mysore. The city of Mysore is fragmented in 65 wards (MCC 2016). Each ward is governed by an elected Corporator who is elected every five years. The people have election cards with which they can vote. Three women told us they even have to vote because otherwise they do not get the vital ration card. They are depending on this card because this way they get a lot of subsidies for food et

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<sup>293</sup> Interview 17, Mysore, Resettled Muslims II, 16/09/14, line 8.

<sup>294</sup> Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 41.

<sup>295</sup> Name was changed by the authors.

cetera.<sup>296</sup> In the case of J.P. Nagar we were able to interview the concerned Corporator. Compared to the other channels of representation in the settlement demonstrated in the following sections this was the only one we found which was truly democratically legitimised. Concerning the position of the Corporator and the quality of his work we met three different perspectives. One group of persons did not know him at all or at least they did not name him when we were asking for leaders and political representatives. Among various statements interviewees gave<sup>297</sup>, the consensus was: “There is no kind of leaders to solve their disputes and all, there is no leader”<sup>298</sup>.

The next group knows the Corporator and his political position but they are generally very disappointed in the group of politicians. They are blaming the politicians that they would only come to the informal settlement close to elections and then they promise a lot such as to help the people of the informal settlement. But after the election the politicians neither let action follow nor show up again. This is why the slum population – from their perspective – normally cannot count on the government and politicians in general or even approach them. Especially, the father of a Muslim family in the settlement in J.P. Nagar told us his experiences strongly emotional and desperate:

Even the local authorities are not responding to the problems. (...) The big authority people came to hold a speech and then they left and never came back. They just tell them to send an application form and then they will solve their problems. But there is no response on the application form and they can't meet them at the office and they won't come back. (...) Furthermore, he says that he won't be able to get in touch with anyone because at the office the assistance will say the person is at some other appointment he is not here. They will lie to the people. They are highly frustrated with those people, because they just promise things and won't come back. They only come for getting the votes from the people.<sup>299</sup>

But even in the new colony of the resettled people we had the impression that the opinion of the Corporator is mostly critical – at least in the Muslim community:

He is not good, he is not cooperative with these people, he hasn't provided any basic need or anything. So he did not vote for him. But she said he came and he gave the insurance that if you vote for me I will look after your problems. But he didn't turn back. (...) For five years he is elected. After the five years he will come back and insure again. 90 per cent of the people will do like this, they promise something and don't come back, only 10 per cent will do what they have said before.<sup>300</sup>

The last category of respondents is more or less satisfied with the work of the Corporator. Here, especially a Hindu Community has to be named that was resettled and will be illustrated in more detail in the next section. Both before the shifting and after the shifting, the Corporator responded to their problems and helped to solve those with them. That is why they will probably vote for him in the future again.<sup>301</sup> Also Khaled seems to be satisfied with the work of the Corporator.<sup>302</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> Interview 14, Mysore, 3 Women in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 17ff.

<sup>297</sup> Interview 24, Mysore, Man and Woman in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 46; Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 41.

<sup>298</sup> Interview 24, Mysore, Man and Woman in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 61.

<sup>299</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 18; 45-48; 51-55.

<sup>300</sup> Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14, line 145; 148f.

<sup>301</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 52-55; Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 48-51.

<sup>302</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 160-165; 243.

The Corporator explains to us that he speaks normally with the different leaders of the slums and these leaders communicate with the population of the settlement. In the case of the resettlement programme the Corporator informed firstly Khaled about the prospective shifting. According to the Corporator's knowledge Khaled is the leader which represents the people of the J.P. Nagar slum. The Corporator educated the leaders beforehand, and afterwards those had the task to convince the local people to move to the new place. According to the Corporator, the basic arguments to persuade the settlers are on the one hand the improvement of their standard of living with all the necessary facilities, and on the other hand the right of property which they achieve through the resettlement programme. Another research supports these findings as the most important concerns of slum dwellers (Schrader 2004: 8). Additionally, if the dwellers of the settlements want their issues to be addressed rightly to him they should do this through their leaders. In general, he evaluates his own work very positively, pointing out that his ward, the J.P. Nagar ward, "is one of the best wards in Mysore"<sup>303</sup>. For the Corporator his responsibility of representation seems to be fulfilled because he is responding to the leaders of the slums and stays in regular contact with them. His messages get received through those leaders. Therefore, he believes the settlers know about this representation structure. He assumes that they are satisfied with him and his work and will choose the way through the leader if they are facing any problems. But it has the impression that this argumentation makes it quite simple and comfortable for him. Actually, it would be relatively easy to see through this not working illusive representation by listening to the numerous other attempts of contact with his person of some slum dwellers. By doing so he would understand that Khaled is not the leader of this settlement to the extent the Corporator thinks of him.

### **2.2.2 Informal Representative Structures**

Besides the previously mentioned formal representative structure, multiple informal systems of representation have been developed in the settlement. The several forms of these systems and their various outcomes will be illustrated in this section in more detail.

#### **Slum leader**

Khaled was introduced to us by the Corporator as the leader of the informal settlement in J.P. Nagar. Additionally, Khaled himself claims to be the leader of the whole settlement:

R: thirty-five years<sup>304</sup> he is a leader for this group and he is, you know, developing the area.

I: How many people belong to this group?

R: There is 3.000 population in this area.<sup>305</sup>

According to Khaled, he himself is the person who addresses the government, for instance in regard to

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<sup>303</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 137.

<sup>304</sup> The translator uses different numbers which does not seem to correlate and result in contradictions time wise. Considering the language problems we were facing during the non-professional translation it seems to be appropriate to suppress this incidence.

<sup>305</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 5-8.

slum resettlement.<sup>306</sup> Also he claimed to have established a committee of representatives of which he is the chairman by selecting twenty capable volunteers.<sup>307</sup> He describes the modus of selection as follows:

T: he is living here since twenty-seven years. So he knows the people living around here. So he decided based on their capabilities how, you know, they judge the situations how they are able to give the, you know, solutions to the problems to nearby people.<sup>308</sup>

The whole area is subdivided into ten “crosses” and there are two selected volunteers for each cross. They are responsible for their area and visit it daily. If the people of the crosses face any problems they approach the appropriate volunteer and he or she tries to solve the problems. Minor ones can be worked out by him- or herself but with more complicated issues they appeal to Khaled and discuss it in the monthly committee meetings.<sup>309</sup> Khaled and one female volunteer we talked to during our interview explained to us that all these representatives are Muslims but they deal with the problems of the Hindu community as well because “here all the religions live united”<sup>310</sup>. However, they did not mention any example even when we asked for one. To name one success of him and the committee he told us the following: At the beginning, the dwellers started to build their huts illegally on this space. He negotiated with the government by arguing that there is no other place for them to settle and in 1995 the government approved the informal settlement.<sup>311</sup>

The representative system Khaled introduced to us seems to be well-elaborated. Probably, it evolved over time. It already has a hierarchy and covers a relatively big area of 3.000 people. Furthermore, it is accepted and respected by the political authorities. In spite of this there was never an election that brought him to this position. In this context the concept of clientelism shall be introduced: Hüstebeck (2004) argues that in the East Asian cultural sphere (but not only) informal political structures occur that are based on loyalty and personal dependencies (Hüstebeck 2004: 1). They are characterised through asymmetry and reciprocity. According to the situation we found in the settlement in J.P. Nagar, the Corporator as the political representative such as in any democracy would then play the role of the Patron with its electorate as its clients. Additionally, Khaled could function as a broker, someone that mediates between both parties and speaks for the clients in the way he claims to (Hüstebeck 2004: 11-14). Our research lacks of sufficient information to classify this representative structure finally as a Patron-Broker-Client-relationship. But it is worth mentioning and to keep in mind for further considerations. Patron-Broker-Client-relationship or not – the question remains if this system of representation works well because the majority of the slum dwellers we spoke to and asked for a leader could not name any. Even if we asked specifically for Khaled they did not know him or related to him hesitantly as someone from the past. Besides, these respondents belong to the Muslim

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<sup>306</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14; line 122-129.

<sup>307</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 53.

<sup>308</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 58.

<sup>309</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14; line 95-105.

<sup>310</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 169.

<sup>311</sup> Interview 20, Mysore, Slum Representative, 13/09/14, line 11-15.

community, too, and they have lived in this place as long as Khaled, in some cases even only a few hundred metres away from his house. From this perspective it is relatively extraordinary that they apparently cannot relate to him.<sup>312</sup>

I: Do they know Khaled?

R: Khaled existed long back, right now he is not there (...) So, there is no leader there (...) Seventeen years before he existed as a leader (...) There is no leader here right now. (...) We are the leaders.<sup>313</sup>

It has the impression – and for him personally, too – that the long duration of his stay and the experience he got from living in this settlement since the beginning of it seems to be the legitimacy for being the self-selected representative. The other part of his legitimacy appears to result from the interaction with the Corporator who confirms the position of Khaled by giving us his phone number as we ask for slum leaders.<sup>314</sup> However, this legitimacy seems to be enough for the Corporator and for Khaled but it appears that it is not enough for the dwellers we talked to. According to common democratic understandings it is not sufficient either. Additionally, the questions remains in how far he articulates not only the interests and needs of himself and his closest environment such as his family but also the interests of the families that belong to the area but not even know about him and his position? To claim that he would speak for 3.000 people certainly gives his own words and needs more bargaining weight and can therefore increase the likelihood to be heard and that his interests will be fulfilled.

### **Initiatives of Individuals**

A Hindu community of 35 families were shifted in June 2014 from another settlement in J.P. Nagar to the new colony. Two women we talked to did not know the name of their Corporator, but since they have lived with their families for 25, respectively 30 years in the J.P. Nagar area and got resettled to the same colony as the other families we have talked to, we assume that the same Corporator was in charge for both shiftings.<sup>315</sup> In general, the statements that appeared in both interviews of the Hindu families confirm to each other a lot. They have a very positive opinion about the Corporator and will probably vote for him again.<sup>316</sup> The municipal government had told them already ten years before that they have to move because they were illegally staying on private property but did not have any place to go. “They said give us a place to move then we will move”<sup>317</sup>. From the perspective of the Hindu community, the Corporator started to construct the new area for the resettlement only after the owner

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<sup>312</sup> See Interview 23, Mysore, Resettled Muslims I, 12/09/14; Interview 24, Mysore, Man and Woman in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14; Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14; Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14; Interview 17, Mysore, Resettled Muslims II, 16/09/14.

<sup>313</sup> Interview 17, Mysore, Resettled Muslims II, 16/09/14, line 3-8.

<sup>314</sup> Interview 19, Mysore, Corporator of J.P. Nagar, 13/09/14, line 52.

<sup>315</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 5; Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 3.

<sup>316</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 33-35; Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 32ff.

<sup>317</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 9.

of the land had talked to the Corporator and finally they could move to these new apartments.<sup>318</sup> The Corporator called a meeting with all the 35 families to inform them that they had to move to this place. During the negotiation process the husband of one resettled family got engaged as a spokesperson. He was not formally elected by the concerned families but everybody accepted his role. On the one hand he spoke with every family and on the other hand with the Coporater.<sup>319</sup> The other family supported the positive impression in saying that they are satisfied with their leader and his work.<sup>320</sup> Although not formally elected this personal support of the people he represents seems to be strong and therefore gives him legitimacy. Additionally, after the shift the Corporator still responds to their problems and needs. For instance, at the beginning they were facing problems with water and electricity in the new buildings. This is now working after a group of the Hindu community approached the Corporator.<sup>321</sup> In general, they are happy to live in these new apartments. It appears that for them the resettlement represents a big improvement to their former living conditions. Only space could become a problem in the future when, for example, the family will grow further and the son will marry. Then his wife and their children will live there, too.<sup>322</sup> Also, they add that the mother does not like the heterogeneous neighbourhood.<sup>323</sup> But these appear to be minor issues. However, altogether the community seems to be very satisfied with the outcome of their negotiation process. They were able to at least articulate their needs and interests, got heard and taken serious by the political level through their spokesperson who was supported from all involved parties. However, this paper cannot answer in how far the private owner of the land put pressure on the Corporator and in how far this crucially influenced the ability of the community to communicate directly with the political system.

On the contrary, we found one example where the individual engagement had no positive outcome. The father of a Muslim family in the settlement in J.P. Nagar who was already mentioned above told us that he faced serious problems because he is not able to pay for the rent of 2.000 INR. Therefore, he already had to get a loan. As different politicians came to the settlement and promised to help he tried to contact various ones even up to the chief minister of Karnataka.<sup>324</sup> He sent application forms and tried to speak to someone in person at the office. Especially the last attempt is very costly and difficult for him as it means he has to sacrifice working hours, earning even less and causing problems with his boss. The man is very frustrated because all of his attempts of strong engagement did neither have any result nor reaction. He got no answers regarding his written appeals and the people from the office lied to him in order to make him go away. It was impossible for him to get in contact with anybody of the

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<sup>318</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 12; Interview 16, line 7, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 7.

<sup>319</sup> Interview 15, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 13f.

<sup>320</sup> Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 8.

<sup>321</sup> Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 14-17.

<sup>322</sup> Interview 16, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 2nd Floor, 12/09/14, line 11, 46f.

<sup>323</sup> Interview 15, 44, Mysore, Resettled Hindu 1st Floor, 12/09/14, line 25.

<sup>324</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 6.

political system.<sup>325</sup> Additionally, he seems not to know Khaled because he did not tell us about this way of communication to reach the Corporator. At this point it is very interesting for our research question to analyse why it was possible for the spokesman of the Hindu community to articulate their interests and why it is not possible for this Muslim family. Could religion be a reason? It is less probable because at least Khaled is Muslim, too, and everybody told us that there are no conflicts between the religious groups. Another reason could be because the man is only speaking for one family with seven family members but the spokesman was representing 35 families and therefore his request has more bargaining weight and seems to be more an average issue instead of being a single problem. The last but very important aspect is that the family does not live in a part of the slum that is immediately affected by a slum resettlement programme and therefore at least seems not to be in the primary focus of the political system as it was already mentioned above.

Additionally, we identified various statements in high numbers that many dwellers do not participate in a representative structure or do not know about such structures at all. In our perception it is not quite clear what the explanation for this could be: On the one hand, they appear not to see a necessity for such mobilisation as they are already facing their problems on their own.<sup>326</sup> On the other hand they do not seem to perceive the opportunity of a collective engagement. They do not know about cooperation among the settlers and they do not believe that anybody would work together in order to achieve a common goal as there is not such a common goal: “So there are a lot of opinions between the rich and the poor people here and there is not a proper unity among those people”<sup>327</sup>.

Supporting this outcome, de Wit and Berner (2009) speak of a “scepticism of the urban poor with regard to collective action” (de Wit/Berner 2009: 929). Several explanations can be offered:

Firstly, practical reasons can be named: The father of the Muslim family in the settlement explains the first reason very concretely: He needs to make 100 INR a day in order to feed his family. However, he is already not able to pay for the rent alone. This is the most pressing issue he faces and why he wants to speak to the political authorities to ask for help. He could not approach them and was several times sent away from the office<sup>328</sup> which means a reduction of his daily income due to less working hours for no result at all. That is why he is not able to put all his energy and time into the attempt to be politically recognised and acknowledged or cooperate with others, because he has more existential issues to face such as securing his livelihood. Also Schrader (n. d.) supports this outcome: The settlers can only show solidarity with other slum dwellers and slums, after they have addressed their daily problems and existential needs (Schrader n. d.: 4). The second reason for de Wit's and Berner's scepticism is internal competition among the urban poor that was as well mentioned in the previous quotes. The third reason appears to be a preference to vertical and hierarchical structures which refer

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<sup>325</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 18f; 45-55.

<sup>326</sup> Interview 24, Mysore, Man and Woman in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 63.

<sup>327</sup> Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 29.

<sup>328</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 26f.

to the clientelism (de Wit/Bermer 2009: 928f). However, the unorganised groups seem to be more dissatisfied with the overall outcome of the resettlement programme and are complaining that their needs have not been considered in the resettlement process. It has the impression that they moved because they did not have any alternative. Indeed, for them the apartments appear to be an improvement of their living conditions as they underline that they are satisfied about the permanent structure. But they seem not to be happy about the way the process was executed. This general dissatisfaction is reflected in the political discontent and the negative attitude to vote for the Corporator again. This is different with the case of the Hindu community that worked collectively with one spokesman as a representative. In comparison to unorganised groups the Hindu community seems to be more content and therefore is more likely to vote for the Corporator again.

### **NGOs:**

Most interviewees did not know any NGO or a similar help group that was engaged in their living area, both in the old as well as in the new area: "They have said that no NGO or any government people come forward to help them. They are fighting for their own problems".<sup>329</sup>

RLHP was the only NGO that was occasionally mentioned by a few interviewees. They are responsible for different projects in the slum in J.P. Nagar concerning health issues and women empowerment (RLHP n. d.). For instance the daughter of the Muslim family gets stitching classes. This way she is able to sell some of her works and can produce a small additional income for the family.<sup>330</sup> It is very interesting how the NGOs seem entangled in the representative structures of the informal settlement. At least one woman of Khaled volunteers works also for RLHP. Additionally, NGOs appear to be used by the municipal politics as mediators in the communicative process with the population of the informal settlements. An Executive Engineer of KSDB explains to us during the interview:

So we took the help of NGOs (...). RLHP, Rural Literacy and Health Programme, (...) widely they have activities in all the areas, all the slum areas.

I: And what are these NGOs doing, what is their task in the process?

R: So during the interaction with the beneficiaries, these NGOs, they will organise. So they will inform all the hut men, door-to-door they will go and they will inform, (...) so later these NGOs, they will visit their houses and they will convince them, and during our next visit, they will bring them to us. And we will explain the possibilities, provision.<sup>331</sup>

The advantage of NGOs of course is that they are already working in the field and therefore they are already having personal contacts that may even result in a trustworthy relationship. Accordingly, it is easier for them than strangers from the political authorities to speak with the population and explain the plans of the government. The same idea is connected to Khaled's and other leader's positions. However, one spokesperson from Shelter Associates (Shelter n. d.) made it very clear that they do not

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<sup>329</sup> Interview 21, Mysore, 2 Muslim Women in J.P. Nagar, 11/09/14, line 41.

<sup>330</sup> Interview 13, Mysore, Family in J.P. Nagar, 12/09/14, line 14.

<sup>331</sup> Interview 37, Mysore, KSDB Division 1 Executive Engineer, 16/09/14, line 57-63.

want to speak for or represent the slum dwellers. Instead, they are trying to empower the dwellers and integrate them into the process. In the case of Shelter Associates this means to build new living spaces and houses on the one hand, and on the other to involve them into the negotiation process with the political level where they have to speak for themselves. However, Shelter is still negotiating with the government.<sup>332</sup> Similar to the case of Khaled, the question remains if the position of NGOs as a mediator can be evaluated effectively and legitimately, as the majority of our interview partners did not know any NGO working in the settlement. But if the political authorities regard them as intermediaries and forward important information through these persons it is no wonder if the formalised system of representation is not working and sub-structures of representation are established as we suggested in the introduction of this main chapter. These intermediaries such as Khaled and some NGOs are rather muting instead of representing and empowering the inhabitants of informal settlements, by either pretending to speak for them or by the fact that they are seen from the political level as representatives. In these cases it is very difficult for the people to articulate their own interests and needs or be acknowledged.

### **3. Conclusion**

In this chapter we analysed the forms and possibilities of representation in informal settlements. We took a closer look at the resettlement scheme under the JNNURM-mission in Mysore and the political actions to improve the livelihoods of the informal settlement population. The paper makes clear that political programmes like the resettlement scheme reach their goal at least by improving the living situation of the urban poor and slum inhabitants. However, the process and the implementation of this mission seem to be primarily motivated by city development plans to brighten up the appearance of the city and to shift the people of informal settlements away from needed land as happened in other shifting schemes all over India (Desai 2012: 54, Schrader 2004: 2). Being forced to move to a different place results in losing all or most of their networks which are especially important for slum dwellers because for them the slum is more than just a place for living but also for instance a place for work (Schrader 2004: 8). Additionally, social networks are needed to compensate a lack of financial capital. Representative structures of the people in informal settlements are barely strong enough to be acknowledged in the political process and mission of development programmes or they are blocked through intermediaries such as NGOs and informal leaders on which the political authorities count as legitimate representative structures. Mostly, these structures are not well known in the slum population. Additionally, clientelism and Patron-Broker-Client-relationships make the situation even more complex. However, in one case a group of people managed to discuss the process of the shifting with the political authorities through a dedicated representative that stood in close contact with the families that were affected by the intended resettlement. As a result, this community seemed to be

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<sup>332</sup> Interview 22, Pune, Employee of Shelter Associates, 06/09/14, line 39-46.

very satisfied with the resettlement process and the government. However, it must be kept in mind that the private owner of the illegally occupied land was also involved and could have facilitated the communication process. The research made clear that the government holds the opinion that the people need their help and cannot help themselves. Instead of enabling the people of informal settlements to help themselves, they implement shifting schemes and force the people to move. The resettlements are located at the outskirts of the city and separated from the middle class. Resettled slum dwellers are not being integrated into the city. All the improvements are accredited to the government and politicians who increases their power by implementing beneficial programmes for the urban poor. In this process the people of informal settlements are not able to articulate their needs. Representatives such as Khaled who seems to speak for the slum dwellers mutes them instead of representing their interests (Spivak n. d.: 79f). Putting more effort into the process of integrating the slum dwellers and working out solutions fitting the interests of the informal settlements better, the political programmes could turn out being a win-win situation. By doing so, the people of informal settlements could be enabled to articulate their needs and get empowered to help themselves and at the same time the governmental bodies still achieve the goals of their political mission, too. Therefore, the slum dwellers need some preconditions such as a right to stay and a secure livelihood (Schrader 2004: 8). By adjusting the process of the political programmes the mission of “slum free” cities can turn out to be a win-win-situation for the population and the government.

Regarding the Sustainable Livelihood Approach our research illustrated colourfully how important social networks are in order to get the individual interests and needs acknowledged by the political level. Khaled for example seems to have a lot of social capital that he could deploy in order to establish and foster the close contact to the Corporator. This contact is important for being recognised. Also the appointed Hindu spokesman could build a certain network and was able to be the intermediary between the concerned group of people and the municipal government. This way their living conditions were improved and they were satisfied with both the negotiation process and its outcomes. But the father of the Muslim family seems not to have the right or enough social capital to bring his needs into a certain network or is not able to address the right persons. Additionally, this man points out clearly that a lack of financial capital meaning a low-income, no regular income or no savings limit the opportunity to increase the social capital and the social networks because there is almost no time left to engage actively in networks or foster personal contacts besides the need to work hard and long hours in order to be able to take care of his family. Furthermore, human capital and the access to information seems to be relevant as a lot of people we spoke to simply did not know about representative structures and their opportunities to be represented. However, it was difficult to examine the reasons why some persons did have the appropriate social and human capital such as Khaled and the Hindu spokesman and were successful and others did not. Do they have a different amount of capital aspects, do they have a different quality in their capital skills or do factors such as

chance and fortune play a role as well? This questions need to be addressed further in potential follow up research projects.

## VI. Conclusion

In this volume, we explored the connections between city development and informal settlements in India. We sought to find out how the population of informal settlements react and adapt to their changing environment in regard to rapid urbanisation and what actions are undertaken by the city administrative. Our research was based mainly on qualitative interviews conducted in two different cities, Pune and Mysore. Pune, with officially 5.5 Million inhabitants, matches the definition of a ‘megacity’ with an extremely high population growth challenging the city infrastructure, especially as around 22 to 40 percent of its population live in informal settlements with precarious living conditions. Mysore is a comparatively small city with roughly one Million inhabitants, much lower population growth rates and only around four percent of slum population. While Mysore has been famed by several interviewees as India's “second cleanest city” and a “pensioner's paradise”, a Pune Municipal Corporation official described the work of his institution as a mere reaction to deficits, since the city has become unmanageable. Accordingly, we found an overburdened city infrastructure in Pune and the tendencies towards such a development in Mysore as well. Administrative decision makers and city planners see the causes of that development in the rural-urban gap: The prospects of access to employment, health and education are considered as push and pull factors for people to migrate into the cities. This has been elaborated in chapter I, where we explored the administrative perceptions of and perspectives on city development. We found that especially in Pune, but to a lesser degree in Mysore as well, practically all areas of the city infrastructure are overwhelmed by the rapid population growth. As large parts of the migrants from the rural areas work in the informal sector this population growth does not correlate with higher tax revenues, causing even greater financial challenges to the administration. Due to continuous city growth, space becomes increasingly scarce, that leading to conflict about space between administration and slum dwellers but also between slum dwellers and the middle class, as we could quite well observe in Mysore.

The immense pressure on the infrastructure resulting from the dynamics of a megacity such as Pune may, on the other hand, lead to more comprehensive and sustainable approaches in dealing with growth related issues. This was the case in the topic of solid waste management (SWM), as explored in detail in chapter III. While in Mysore SWM remains centralised and in governmental custody, leaving most of the garbage non-segregated, Pune pursues the strategy of a decentralised SWM with a broad inclusion of stakeholders (waste pickers, local government and private actors). This has led to a high rate of waste segregation, the recognition of waste as a resource and a social upgrading of previously informal waste pickers that are being included into the formal economic system. Concerning our research question, we found that in the face of rapid urbanisation, waste is being recognised as a resource. In Pune, this has led to a commodification of waste by the waste pickers. It is important to take note of two observations concerning SWM: In Mysore, the pressure to take action in the matter is not very high yet, since the increasing production of garbage has not yet become a problem affecting the majority of the population. The centralised SWM-structure bears certain

advantages for the waste pickers, which we labelled as ‘waste collectors’ in the Mysore case, since they are official employees of the local administration – they enjoy the advantages of being a part of the formal economy, such as financial security and an upgraded social status. In Pune, the city infrastructure is overwhelmed with its waste production. Several “garbage crises” showed that the problem of waste production can no longer be ignored, especially since it affects all areas of the city and all sections of society. The integration of waste pickers into the formal system was made possible by a highly organised waste pickers’ organisation and the fact that the city administration does not only gain relief from garbage, but also a financial relief, at least in part because it ultimately leaves the responsibility of waste segregation with the waste pickers.

The connection between middle class interests and the design of city development seems to be high, as we explored in several chapters of this volume. The resettlement in J.P. Nagar, our main research area in Mysore, took place because the local authorities were widening the road next to the settlement which was neighbouring a middle class living area. The slum dwellers became resettled to the outskirts of the city, leaving us with the impression that the social segregation between slum inhabitants and middle class citizens is at least part of the overall city development strategy (see chapter V). We also found that the needs of the population of informal settlements do not really play a role in the overall city development strategy in Mysore, as we elaborated in chapter I and V. The middle class being the primary focus of city development seems to provide an explanation for why, at least in Pune, there has been taken action to improve the situation concerning solid waste management, but why there are no actions taken in the subjects of health and education. In chapter II, we showed that the public services of health and education in both cities are in a poor condition. We also found that generally, access to qualitatively better private services in education and health is available, with financial factors being the only obstacle to it. That means that the middle class may easily access these private services and therefore, no pressure seems to exist from their side to improve the public services. Indeed, as we have shown, slum inhabitants seem to prefer private institutions of health and education, too, as far as financial means allow it to them. For higher education, payment is necessary in any case. And even though primary public education is supposed to be free, this is not the case everywhere. Along with these financial limitations, costs of transportation and gender-related issues may prevent the urban poor from access to education. Bringing these findings in a wider context, it seems that the global paradigm “private over public”, can be found in city development planning in Pune and Mysore. This global trend towards a reduction of the public sector and decreasing public investments can be traced back to neoclassical economic theory and the so-called “Washington Consensus” and has been promoted by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund since the 1980ies. Since then, structural adjustment policies supported the ideology that private services are more efficient than public ones, shifting the focus of development policies away from the rural and urban poor towards a development in favour of the middle class and a general reliance on market forces (Harriss 2001, Schrader 2010). In the case of

city development politics, we observed that the middle class seems to successfully take possession of resources and the city development discourse, adopting and spreading the ideology of international financial institutions. As a consequence, the city development focus in Pune and Mysore seems to be shifting away from the urban poor and oriented towards market relations and consumerism. Bringing these developments in relation to our research question, slum inhabitants appear to be the losers of urbanisation. They try to gain access to private services since public services of health and education are diminished, taking seriously the promise of the overall discourse that investment in education (human capital) is a way to exit poverty. NGOs try to compensate the retreat of the state from public services, but our findings suggest that their scope in Pune in Mysore is very limited.

From the perspective of administrative actors, the urban poor rarely contribute to the city budget via direct taxes because they are mostly working in the informal sector, as discussed in chapter I. Consequently, the tax-paying middle class is perceived to have a certain claim to be the primary focus of the administration. In Pune, we observed attempts to establish a tax for slum dwellers in order to secure basic services for them. As we elaborated above, the city development policies we examined may be interpreted as an expression of a conflict for space between the urban poor and the middle class, which seems to be sorted out in favour of the latter. This contradiction leaves the impression that the discourse about poverty-reduction policies might be exploited in order to secure votes and, at the same time, to gain access to attractive space that is informally occupied by slum dwellers. This is in accordance with the assumption made above about the middle class having become the primary focus of city development. Still, there appears to exist a structural need for the urban poor in the formal economy (as expressed by an official we interviewed in Pune and Mysore, see Chapter I).

Comprehensive governmental programmes aiming at city development, such as JNNURM and RAY, do take in account the urban poor, aiming at an improvement of their livelihoods. We found that those people who were subjected to resettlement policies found themselves in an improved living situation, making these policies a success story taking on first sight. But a closer look reveals that these programmes are top-down enterprises with ambiguous goals, as we elaborated in Chapters I and V. Even though rhetorically, decision makers hail participation of and interaction with slum dwellers subjected to resettlement programmes, the way this participation and interaction is exercised appears to be a one way street. We could hardly find any formal mechanism by which the interests of the urban poor may be voiced, even though a certain degree of representative structures (representation via ‘slum leaders’) were detected, as shown in chapter V. The legitimacy of these structures remains questionable, at least in the area we researched in Mysore, since most of our interviewees did not even know the person who claims to represent them. Notwithstanding, the formal political and administrative system accepts these structures and uses them to communicate and implement their political programmes, giving us the impression that it serves them as an efficient and convenient tool of governance without serious considerations for a value of representation in itself. We made similar observations concerning the role of NGOs claiming to articulate and to address the slum dwellers’

needs. Local authorities seem to rely on them when it comes to the implementation of governmental policies, such as resettlement. Thereby, NGO involvement seem to be a way of outsourcing governmental tasks and avoiding to improve public services, since they offer educational programmes, skill trainings and even capacity buildings for public school teachers (see chapters I, II and V). This development contradicts with the self-images of these NGOs. For example, RLHP, an NGO in Mysore, perceives its role in empowering slum dwellers and to help them to articulate their needs. We found that the opposite seems to be true, at least in our research-area in Mysore, as its intermediary function seems to mute rather than represent the people of informal settlements.

In Mysore, as elaborated in chapter V, we did in fact learn about two intents by slum dwellers to articulate their needs – successfully only in one case, when a father of a family affected by resettlement was able to establish a position as spokesperson representing 35 affected families, facilitating mutual understanding. In another case, a financially troubled family father tried to appeal to governmental authorities but remained unheard. These examples show that mobilisation and representation of slum dwellers may be possible under some conditions. The establishment of a spokesperson in the first case might have been successful for two reasons: On the one hand, because of the interest that the governmental authorities had (ensuring resettlement), and, on the other hand, the fact that the spokesperson represented several families in that matter – taking collective action. Under which conditions slum dwellers may successfully organise themselves politically in order to defend their claims towards the government seems to be an interesting field for further research. Similarly, further research concerning the informal political structures would be necessary to determine how these structures work, under which circumstances and in how far they are perceived as legitimate structures both by slum dwellers and the local authorities. As far as this research project went, we conclude that slum dwellers are rather muted than represented by formal political structures and NGOs. In order to generalise this thesis, further research, both in more depth and in higher scope would be necessary. Concerning our research question, the slum dwellers' reactions to social change remain rather passive in the matter of representation, or, in a broader sense, collective action. Formal structures of representation have been implemented top-down and remain unknown to most of the people they claim to represent. Most slum dwellers do not articulate their interests formally, but those who are an obstacle to a middle class oriented city planning may become the subject of governmental policies, such as resettlement. In that case, they might even benefit from these policies. The lack of interaction with slum dwellers appears to be one reason why the city administration fails to take in account the problems that arise for them when being resettled, preventing more sustainable solutions. In chapter IV, we dealt with the informal sector which is where most of the slum population makes their living. Against the backdrop of modernisation, India is experiencing rural exodus. People move to cities in the hope of a better life and end up working informally, if at all. The informality as such entails an intrinsic insecurity and even though it represents a central aspect within the Indian economy, it forces people to cope with adapting to this insecurity. Additionally, we have shown that living space

and working space is one and the same thing for many informally employed slum dwellers. These people are in danger of losing their existential foundations when removed from their habitat, especially since a working space is not foreseen in the houses built for resettlement purposes. As we have shown, social capital may be a way to replace financial capital, but social capital may dissolve in the case of resettlement. Still, we have to note that slum dwellers' social networks may be large, but they mostly lack the power to influence formal political structures, since these networks seem to consist of relations between slum dwellers among each other. Concerning our research question, we conclude that slum inhabitants try to compensate their lack of financial capital and other factors of insecurity with different forms of capital, which is not easy, since there is competition for all these other forms of capital.

All in all, we conclude that the discourse about the role of slum dwellers in city development appears contradictory. On the one hand, small business men and women whose places of living and working are often the informal settlements, are praised by the Prime Minister as “the backbone of [the] nation” (Modi 2015). On the other hand, Modi's government pursues policies of “slum free cities” and resettlement. Governmental programmes directed, at least in part, towards the reduction of poverty, such as JNNURM and RAY, are claiming to tackle the underlying causes of poverty but fail to do so. Even though they do improve the living conditions of slum dwellers to a certain extent, the goals of these policies remain ambiguous and appear to be highly influenced by the interests of middle class citizens. Serious attempts to include the urban poor into city development are lacking in almost all the areas of city development we examined in our project. The exception from the rule, solid waste management in Pune, points out that such an inclusion may provide a fruitful solution for problems of city development. Since the rural-urban migration has been identified as a major challenge to city development in Pune and Mysore, one may wonder why the problem is not tackled at its root. Why is done so little to improve the living and working conditions in rural areas?

Again, the middle class focus of development policies may provide an answer to the question. Whatever the explanation, the fact is unfortunate, as the following example may show: On a trip we made from Pune to the Western Ghats, a mountain range running almost parallel to large parts of the western Indian coast line, we had the chance to visit a small, agricultural cooperative. There, organic crops are grown and sold in Pune and the people from the surrounding villages are offered the possibility to make a living and a reason to stay. The cooperative has been founded on a civic initiative without support from local or state government. This is regrettable, since it seems that approaches in this direction may at least contribute to more sustainable solutions for the challenges of city development explored in this volume.

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## Appendix

Figure 4: Distribution of informal and formal sector workers by sector and sex between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 (in million) (Naik 2009: 5).

Sector	Sex	Informal Sector		Formal Sector		Total	
		1999-00	2004-05	1999-00	2004-05	1999-00	2004-05
Rural	Male	178.50	197.87	18.24	21.17	196.74	219.04
	Female	98.63	117.21	5.39	6.82	104.02	124.03
	Persons	277.13	315.08	23.63	27.99	300.75	343.07
Urban	Male	51.62	61.94	25.42	28.46	77.05	90.4
	Female	13.89	17.88	5.07	6.12	18.96	24
	Persons	65.51	79.82	30.50	34.58	96.01	114.4
Total	Male	230.12	259.81	43.66	49.63	273.78	309.44
	Female	112.51	135.09	10.46	12.94	122.98	148.03
	Persons	342.64	394.9	54.12	62.57	396.76	457.46

Source: Computed from NSSO 55<sup>th</sup> (1999-2000) and 61<sup>st</sup> (2004-05) Round Survey on Employment-Unemployment.

Figure 5: Estimated Number of Informal Sector Workers, Percentage share of Informal Sector Workers to Total Workers and Average Annual Growth Rate by Industry Group between 1999-2000 and 2004-2005 (Naik 2009: 6).

Industry Group	Estimated number of informal sector worker (in million)		Share of informal sector workers to total (in percent)		Growth rate (%)
	1999-00	2004-05	1999-00	2004-05	
Agriculture	232.21	252.83	97.70	97.65	1.72
Mining	0.88	0.89	40.55	33.74	0.22
Manufacturing	30.92	39.71	70.19	71.20	5.13
Electricity	0.09	0.09	8.35	6.59	-1.99
construction	12.92	19.66	73.66	75.58	8.77
Trade	34.29	41.43	93.64	95.54	3.85

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